COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

(ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN, RUSSIA, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA)

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This is an interdisciplinary research and it is conducted to show the development and comparative analysis of the Index of Democracy Level in nine post-Soviet countries, such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Moldova. The study encompasses in-country and cross-country analyses.

In-country analysis includes the study of the developments of the Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors impacting the Index of Democracy Level of each country within the period of 1995-2014. Nevertheless, the factors and procedures influencing on the Index of Democracy Level within the period of 2013 and 2014 have been elaborated in more details as this is the succession of the previously published research. Cross-country analysis concludes the comparative indices of factors conditioning the Index of Democracy Level in 2014. The research on the Comparative Analysis of the Index of Democracy Level in the context of Human Rights and Democratization can be used by professors and students of universities and research centres.

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INTRODUCTION

"The third wave" of democratization has fostered and promoted the improvement of contemporary methods and the development of new tools and approaches, which are very important at present. For this reason, the model of Index of Democracy Level based on the method of index construction has been implemented and applied as a tool within the scope of this research in 2013-2014.

A comparative analysis of the IDL in 2013-2014 is a sequel of the 1995-2012 analysis[1] where democracy levels of countries, such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moldova were studied and estimated with the help of the Index of Democracy Level by means of implementing 2013-2014 in-country and 2014 cross-country analyses. Kyrgyzstan is another country that has been added in the research, which has been stipulated by the latter's membership to the EAEU[2].

The selection of the countries, included in the IDL model, is conditioned by their diverse international and regional integration processes. So, the countries are 6 member states of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and other 5 EAEU member states, such as Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Two states, Armenia and Belarus concurrently take part in two European and Eurasian processes. For this reason, a special attention has been paid to the countries, experiencing European and Eurasian integration proceesses with an effort to estimate achievements and challenges.

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[1] For more details see: ''Comparative Analysis of the Index of Democracy Level: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moldova'', edited by Arusyak Aleksanyan, 2015, Yerevan, Yerevan State University Press.

[2] See ''Agreement on annexation of Kyrgyzstan to the EAEU on May 29, 2014'', 23 December 2014, Moscow // http://www.eaeunion.org/upload/iblock/355/2014_3.pdf (02.07.2016).

As a result, three EaP countries were given an opportunity to deepen their relations with the EU as well as to create Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which was an integral part of the Association Agreement. Besides all that, they were provided with the opportunity to be included in the EU economic system. Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine officially ratified both economic and political chapters of the Association Agreements with the EU in 2014 by choosing a European integration direction[3]. Meanwhile, Armenia declared its willingness to join Eurasian Customs Union in Septemebr 2013. Later it was decided to join the newly integration direction adopted by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, namely the Eurasian Economic Union. Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed Treaty on the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union[4] on May 29, 2014 and Armenia joined it on October 10, 2014[5]. The agreement came into force on January 1, 2015 after it had been ratified by states. So, there is a a high level of intergration among EAEU member states with the aim to create common market. These events have been crucial in Armenia's foreign political and economic processes.

The aim of the research is to evaluate integration processes in the post-Soviet countries in context of human rights and democratization. Moreover, it is of great significance when integration processes imply the implementation of agreed policies in various areas of public life, strategy of complex actions and where countries have similar levels of development and progress of democratic institutions. In this respect, the book is a complex of in-country and cross-country research where development trends of the IDL of mentioned countires have been observed.

In-country analysis includes the study of democracy level of each country and the Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors, affecting it throughout 20 years (1995-2014). Taking into account the fact that the previous

[3] See "The EU's Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine", European Commission MEMO, Brussels, 23 June 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-430_en.htm (accessed 20.07.2015).

[4] See "Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union" (ratified on 29.05.2014 in Astana) // https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0013611/itia_05062014_doc.pdf (05.06.2016).

[5] See RA agreement ''About the Eurasian Economic Union'' of May 29, 2014 to join it on October 10, 2014, Minsk // http://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=95214 (05.06.2016).

research was conducted for the period of 1995-2012, we have discussed in more details the processes happening particularly in 2013/2014 and what influence they have on IDL.

Cross-country analysis is a country comparative analysis of the Index of Democracy Level and PFI, EFI, SFI, EdFI and HFI conditioning the IDL as well as their estimation for the year of 2014.

Given the importance of human rights and civil disobedience in democratization processes of political regimes in post-Soviet countries, special attention has been paid to these aspects within the framework of this reseach.

The book is composed of introduction, executive summary, eleven chapters and Index. The methodology of the Index of Democracy Level is presented in the first chapter. Chapters 2 to 10 introduce development trends of democracy level as well as factors conditioning it for the period of 1995-2014 in the following countries: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and Moldova with the application of in-country analysis. Moreover, the PFI, EFI, SFI, EdFI and HFI registered in 2013 and 2014 have been thoroughly analysied. 2014 Index of Democracy Level of the states is estimated in Chapter 11 with the application of cross-country analysis. Besides, the scaling table of IDL and its 5 components, namely Political, Social, Economic, Educational and Health Factors for all 9 post-Soviet countires as well as their comparative analysis are also included in Chapter 11.

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Arusyak Aleksanyan and Ashot Aleksanyan, experts and Doctors of Politics, Astghik Nadiryan, MA student of the Centre for European Studies and Vahan Hunanyan, Post graduate student at the Chair of International Relations and Diplomacy conducted the research of ''Comparative Analysis of the Index of Democracy Level in the context of Human Rights and Democratization in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Moldova. Qualitative and quantitative methods were applied by the experts within the framework of the research. The IDL was particularly developed and based on the method of indices formation, whereas IDL of nine post-Soviet countries was measured by data collected within the period of 1995-2014 by means of regression mathematics and statistical methods. Data of 25 indicators of EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI[1] as well as IDL values of some years estimated and collected by aforementioned research team for the mentioned period of 20 years may slightly differ from those correspondingly published in the previous research conducted for the period of 1995-2012. This is explained by data replenishment processed by World Bank, international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The input of new data resulted in the change of the lowest and highest values. Hence, a slight difference of IDL data collected within 1995-2012 period is noticeable. The lowest and highest PFI values are fixed and therefore, they remain unchanged. Calculations were also made on bulletins and official data collected and published by the states' statistical services observed in the research. As a result of the comparative analysis for 2013-2014, a repository consisting of more than 5000 data was created.

[1] PFI is Political Factors Index, EFI is Economic Factors Index, SFI is Social Factors Index, HFI is Health Factors Index and EdFI is Educational Factors Index.

The choice of the period is conditioned by the necessity to study democratic processes generated after the independence of post-Soviet countries in question. Nonetheless, data accessibility made it possible to start the research from 1995.

In general, the IDL comprises official statistics, developed new variables and data collected and provided by renowned international organizations. So, sources served and used to collect, calculate and process data necessary for this research are as follows:

1. Political Factors:
   - 1.1. Rule of Law (Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank),
   - 1.2. Political Stability / Absence of Violence (Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank),
   - 1.3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House reports),
   - 1.4. Press Freedom (Freedom House reports),
   - 1.5. Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International reports),
   - 1.6. Political System (estimated by the researcher),
   - 1.7. Social Unrest and Political Pressure (estimated by the researcher),
   - 1.8. Majority in the Parliament (estimated by the researcher),
   - 1.9. Religion (estimated by the researcher),
   - 1.10. Conflict Presence (estimated by the researcher),
   - 1.11. Gender Equality (Global Gender Gap report).
2. Economic factors:
   - 2.1. Gross national income per capita, US dollars (World Bank indicators),
   - 2.2. External trade rate (% of GDP)(World Bank indicators),
   - 2.3. Domestic credit (% of GDP)(World Bank indicators),
   - 2.4. Foreign direct investments (% of GDP) (World Bank indicators),
   - 2.5. Inflation rate (%) (World Bank indicators),
   - 2.6. Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation report)
   - 2.7. Budget deficit (% of GDP)(World Bank indicators, data of National Statistical Service).
3. Social Factors:
   - 3.1. Real wage, US dollars (data of National Statistical Service),
   - 3.2. Unemployment (%)(World Bank indicators),

3.3. Gini index (%) (World Bank indicators, data of National Statistical Service).

4. Educational Factors:
   4.1. Human Development Index Educational Index (United Nations Development Programme reports),
   4.2. Government expenditure on education (% of GDP) (World Bank indicators).

5. Health Factors:
   5.1. Life expectancy at birth (World Bank indicators),
   5.2. Health expenditure (% of GDP) (World Bank indicators):

In conclusion, observing methodology of the aforementioned organizations that were used to estimate the IDL as well as repository of data collected, the research team appropriately analyzed and respectively estimated five factors of the IDL.

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

CHAPTER 1.
THE MODEL OF THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL)[1]

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

Since the second half of the 20th century approaches of democracy level measuring and their developments have been widespread within the scope of social sciences. Nowadays, there has been an increased interest and demand for measuring democracy level and methods have been systematically improved.

There is a bulk of academic literature expounding a plurality of theories and definitions of democracy as well as conditions and factors affecting democracy emphasized by scholars. Seymour Lipset, the founder of modernization theory argued that economic growth and well-being led to democracy. Thus, Seymour Lipset *(1959)*, Robert Dahl *(1971, 1985)*, Robert Barro *(1999)*, Joseph Siegle *(et al. 2004)*, Samuel Huntington *(1991)*, Tatu Vanhanen *(1984, 1989, 1997)* and others observed democratic processes and developments reflecting on various factors.

Summarizing main study findings and researches of democracy, Dankwart Rustow *(1970, 337-338)* determines three core analytical accounts. The first approach proposed by Lipset and Cutright correlates the stable democracy with certain economic and social conditions (for example, GDP per capita income), with widespread literacy level, with prevalent urban residence and etc. The second account concentrates on "the need for certain beliefs or psychological attitudes among citizens". Political culture specialists Daniel Lerner *(1958)*, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba *(Almond and Verba 1963)*, claim that civil culture and willingness to participate in public affairs are imperative for establishing

[1] The methodology of the Index of Democracy Level was developed by Arusyak Aleksanyan within the # RO3 scholarship frameworks of Caucasus Research Resource Centre -Armenia and Carnegie Corporation of New York.

democracy." Finally, the third approach looks into the characteristic features of social and political structure. For example, Ralf Dahrendorf *(1959)* and Arend Lijphart *(1968)* specified the importance of conflict and peace for democracy, but Robert Dahl *(1961)* insisted on the fact that democratic stability implied the loyalty to democratic values and rules mainly among skilled politicians rather than electorate.

The above-mentioned concepts and indices generally support one or other aspect of democracy. For this reason, the Index of Democracy Level (IDL) is based on some aspects of democracy, including the Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors/Indices.

Figure 1

Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level[2]



Based on the methodology of main provisions and existing factors, the principle of five groups of factors with various rating scales and with an overall impact on democracy is taken as a base while modeling the democracy. These factors are political, economic, social, educational and health[3].

[2] The reason for the separation of Indices of Health and Educational Factors from the Social Factor Index is conditioned by a deeper and more profound study of their components as separate fields. The Index of Social Factors in this case refers only to inequality of income.

[3] The choice of the IDL variables was made on the method of correlation of matrix construction and

Indicators of political dimensions are:

1. *Rule of Law (RL)*
2. *Political Stability/ Absence of Violence (St.)*
3. *Indices of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (PR&CL)*
4. *Press Freedom (PF)*
5. *Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)*
6. *Political System (PS)*
7. *Gender Equality (GE)*
8. *Social Unrest and Political Pressure (PP)*
9. *Majority in the Parliament (MP)*
10. *Religion (R)*
11. *Conflict Presence (Conf.)*

Indicators of economic dimensions are:

1. *Gross national income per capita, ppp (GNI)*
2. *External trade rate (TR)*
3. *Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)*
4. *Domestic credit (DC)*
5. *Foreign direct investments (FDI)*
6. *Inflation rate (Inf.)*
7. *Budget deficit (Def)*

Indicators of social dimensions are:

1. *Real wage (W)*
2. *Unemployment (U)*
3. *Gini index (GINI)*

Indicators of educational dimensions are:

1. *HDI (Human Development Index) Education Index (HDI.ed)*
2. *Government expenditure on education (EE)*

Indicators of health dimensions

1. *Life expectancy at birth (LE)*
2. *Health expenditure (HE)*

the variable expulsion. More than 50 variables were initially selected, but then the variables with high coefficient of correlation were excluded from the model ($R \geq I0{,}7I$).

The calculation methodology and the nature of certain variables and indices included in the model are the following:

Rule of Law and Political Stability/ Absence of Violence are two out of six indices aimed at the assessment of effectiveness of the public administration published by the World Bank (*Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 2010, 2-3)*. Rule of Law measures citizens' confidence of the law and the level of their readiness to comply with it, crime rates and effectiveness of legislative power, courts and the police. Political Stability/ Absence of Violence includes indicators that measure the stability of state institutions, drastic changes, destabilization and probability of regime change inconsistent with the Constitutional rule (including terrorism and the use of violence within the state);

Indices of Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured by Freedom House organization by Freedom in the World methodology *(Freedom House 2015a*). The 2015 index of Freedom in the World was used to measure the index of 2014 as the calculations, covering the period from January 1 to December 31, 2014 were based on developments occuring in 195 countries and 15 select territories. Researchers and reports evaluators use diverse sources of information, such as news topics, academic researches, analytical reports as well as reports of non-governmental organizations and experts. Political Rights indicator is based on ten-point questionnaire and are grouped into three subcategories: electoral process (3 questions), political pluralism and participation (4 questions) and functioning of the government (3 questions). Civil liberties questionnaire comprises 15 points, which is grouped into four subcategories, such as freedom of expression and belief (4 questions), association and organizational rights (3 questions), Rule of Law (4 question), personal autonomy and individual rights (4 questions). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0-4. The highest score that can be awarded to Political Rights checklist is 40. The highest score that can be awarded to Civil Liberties checklist is 60. The raw points are converted into a 1-7 point rating scale, where 1 point stands for the highest freedom indicator, and correspondingly 7 point stands for the lowest. These ratings, which are calculated based on the methodological process described above, determine whether a country is classified as free (1-2,5 points), partly free (3-5 points), or not free (5,5-7 points) by the survey *(Freedom House 2015a*). The mentioned two indices are

included in the model under one variable (simple average). In the model the standardized data are scaled as maximum value of 1 point and minimum value of 7 points;

Freedom House also defines the measurement of Press Freedom and estimates the degree of freedom of press in 199 countries and territories worldwide. The 2015 index of Press Freedom was measured by the events, covering the period from January 1 to December 31, 2014. Surveys and assessments are connected with the following three spheres, such as "legislative atmosphere", "political atmosphere" and "economic atmosphere". It provides numerical rankings based on the assessments collected from these components and rates the states as "free" (0-30 points), "partly free" (31-60) and "not free" (61-100). During the data standardization the highest accepted value (max) is 0, and the lowest value (min) is 100;

Corruption Perceptions 2014 Index is measured by Transparency International organization and refers to the level of a state corruption perceptions in 175 countries (*Transparency International 2014a*). It is based on the experts' analyses and the index has the ranking scale from 0 -100 according to the updated methodology, where 0 point implies the highest level of corruption and effectively 10 points indicate its lowest level (*Transparency International 2014b*). The data of CPI are calculated in accordance with the resources provided by 11 independent organizations, like Political and Economic Risks Consultancy, the World Bank, Bertelsmann Foundation, "Global Insight" World Economic Forum and etc.;

The survey topics refer to the corruption, the conflict of interests, anti-corruption events and improvements, state's steps taken to apply sanctions and to eradicate corruption. There exist issues concerning the spread of corruption not only in the public administration sphere, but also among citizens of a state and in mass media circles. The corruption risks may appear in small bureaucratic institutions and escalate up to the highest instances of authority, or else there are risks for briberies offered in the spheres of export and import, tax payment offices, utilities payments as well as in decision-making courts (*Transparency International 2014c*). The importance of this variable is conditioned by the fact, that corruption indicators show the quality of bureaucratic and public administration systems.

During the data standardization the highest accepted value (max) is 100 points, whereas the lowest value (min) is 0 point;

The variable of the Political System in accordance with the coding system of Keefer (2012, 3-4) is divided into the following categories: parliamentary (2 points), assembly-elected presidential (1 point) and presidential (0 point). Political systems get 0 point when the head of the state cannot be elected or is elected directly by the state's citizens or electorate, yet there is no position of a Prime Minister. With the elected President and Prime Minister the system is called presidential, if a President has: 1. veto power that the parliament can override with only qualitative majority, 2. appoints Prime Minister and/or other members of the government or ministers and 3. can dissolve the parliament by calling for new election. Political systems with assembly-elected President are characterized as parliamentary (2 points) with the exception, when the parliament cannot easily recall the chief executive as it needs a two-thirds vote to impeach or dissolve itself. In this case, the system gets 1 point;

The variable of Gender Equality is measured by the Global Gender Gap reports published by the World Economic Forum that refers to the measurement of inequality between men and women in four fundamental categories and they are: 1.economic participation and opportunity, 2. educational attainment, 3. health and survival and 4. political empowerment. The value ranges between 0-1 point that stands for perfect equality and 0 point for total inequality (Hausmann et al. 2014). During the data standardization the highest accepted value (max) is 1, whereas the lowest value (min) is 0;

The variable of Social Unrest and Political Pressure is measured by the scaling range of 0-5 and includes a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrest, particularly pressures applied as well as cases of political imprisonments and killings during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question;

The variable of the Majority in the Parliament is measured by the following principle: 0 point is given in case the party of the chief executive has the absolute

majority in the legislative authority; 1 point given, if the mandates are comparatively and equally distributed, and eventually 2 points are applied when the opposition holds the absolute majority. During the data standardization the highest accepted value (max) is 2, whereas the lowest value (min) is 0;

The variable of Religion is based on the research, which proves the close correlation of the religion and democracy and the fact, that non-Christian cultures are less compatible with democracy. Two categories are distinguished in this variable: "Christian" (1 point) and "non-Christian" (0 point);

Conflict Presence affecting democracy is measured in the following way: the absence of conflict (2 points), passive conflict (1 point), when a state is in conflicting relations with another state or states, but there are no active military actions and, active conflict (0 point), which described as a state conflicts with another state/states and there are active military actions carried out. The maximum value in the scale is 2 points and the minimum value is 0 point;

The Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) is measured by The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal with scoring range of 0-100, according to which countries scored under 50 are "repressed", those scored 50-59,9 are considered "mostly unfree" or "moderately free" scored with 60-69,9, while the next are classified as "mostly free" (70-79) and fially the designation of "free" scores of 80 or above. It is based on 10 specific categories: 1.business freedom, 2.trade freedom, 3.fiscal freedom, 4.financial freedom, 5.government spending 6. monetary freedom, 7.investment freedom 8. property rights protection, 9. freedom from corruption and 10. labor freedom (*Miller, Kim 2015, 475-486).* The calculations of the 2015 IDL were based on the IEF calculated in 2014 as it embrassed indicators measured during the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. In general, IEF denotes the guarantee of the construction of legislative body and property rights and it is also considered one of the most important indicators of democracy. For that very reason, the index was included in the model as a separate variable. In the model the value of 100 points (max) is estimated as the highest indicator, where 0 point (min) is the lowest indicator of the rating scale. During the data standardization the highest accepted value (max) is 100, whereas the lowest value (min) is 0;

Human Development Index Education Index (HDI-education) is assessed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). The 2014 report of HDI-education includes the data of 188 out of 193 UN countires measured within 2012-2014. The health dimension is assessed by the overall of three separate indices, like life expectancy at birth, years of schooling and national income. HDI reflects the degree of well-being of the society and is considered one of the most essential indicators. The latter is based on dimensions measured by mean years of schooling (it includes at most 15 years spent at school and/or vocational institutions for adults aged 25) and expected years of schooling (the number of years that schoolchildren will be expected to have after at most 18 years of schooling included Master's education (*UNDP 2015, 208-211*);

Gini index (incomes Gini coefficient) measures the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from perfect equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 1 absolute inequality;

Real wage described the purchasing power of nominal wage within a definite time span, i.e. the goods and services that can be purchased with wages at prices specified at a particular period. During the cross-country analysis, the average monthly wage is calculated by the indicator equivalent to purchasing power in US dollars.

All variables are standardized by the following formula[4]:

$$X' = \frac{x_i - \min\{x_i\}}{\max\{x_i\} - \min\{x_i\}}$$

min and max are the lowest and highest values, the variable x can attain the magnitude of a descriptive indicator respectively

[4] The minimum and maximum values of "negative" variables, e.g. inflation rate, have been swamped in the formula, and the in the low values we correspondingly get the standardized higher values and vice versa.

* The rating scales of the variables of Conflict Presence and Religion have been lowered, as there aren't outcomes of a state's inner developments. Besides, the influence of the variable of Religion is partially measured by means of other variables, such as Gender Equality, and a number of conflicts can be conditioned by a right to struggle for self-determination, which having a negative impact on state's development does not contradict to democracy.

In cross-country analysis, the indicators estimated within the last 5 years and calculated as an average of 3 lowest and highest data were used to assess the lowest and the highest values of some variables, meanwhile corresponding values of different time periods were used when analyzing one country in question.

The calculation of each group, such as Political Factors Index (PFI), Economic Factors Index (EFI), Social Factors Index (SFI), Educational Factors Index (EdFI), Health Factors Index (HFI) was based on counting simple and weighted average of standardized values affecting the factors of democracy:

PFI = (2*(PR&CL+ PF + CPI + RL + St. +PS + PP + MP + GGG) + Conf.+ R*)/20
EFI = (GNI + FDI + IEF + Inf. + Def. + Tr. + DC)/7
SFI = (GINI + W + U)/3
EdFI = (EE + HDI.ed)/2
HFI = (HS + LE)/2

Taking into account the impact of above-mentioned 5 groups of variables (dimensions) on the democracy level we propose to formulate the degree of interrelation between these indicators and democracy. Accordingly, the Index of Democracy Level is a weighted average of 5 computed indices[5]:

IDL = (41,5* PFI + 32,5* (SFI + EFI + HFI)/3 + 26*EdFI)/100

According to this IDL formula, the most influential Factor is the Political one, followed by Social, including Educational and Health Factors correspondingly.

Another peculiarity of the model is that it opts to denote the most impacting indices and variables through regression and to what extent they impact on the stability of a political system of a state under question.

By summarizing aforesaid, it should be noted, that there are other various indices used for democracy measurement within the frameworks of modern political science. Some of them emphasize the formal or institutional democracy (F. Cutright's Index of Political Development), whereas others (K. Bollen, R. Dahl,

[5] Weights are defined through calibration, which is particularly based on the calculation of democracy level in countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland and on the decision of the subindices' coefficient in them as well as on the study of theoretical democracy provisions and existing models.

T. Vanhanen) specify its procedural feature. Moreover, some indices measure the level of implementation of declared rights (Indices of Political Rights and Civil Liberties). In this case, IDL includes the mentioned three aspects and in fact, it is more inclusive than the mentioned indices.

IDL consists of:

- official statistics
- developed new variables
- existing indicators regularly released by renowned international organizations

Eventually, the proposed model allows to:

1. Analyze and compare the level of democracy at different time spans
2. Compare the level of democracy of two and more states classifying them by the definition and ranking of the applicable scale
3. Identify the factors that have either the most positive or the most negative impact on the democracy of the given state by disclosing the fields where the situation is mostly needed to be repaired and improved.

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Abbreviations

Conf.	Conflict presence
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
DC	Domestic credit
Def	Budget deficit
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EE	Government expenditure on education
EFI	Economic Factors Index
FDI	Foreign direct investments

GDP	Gross domectic product
GE	Gender Equality
GINI	Gini index
GNI	Gross national income
HDIed.	Human Develoment Index Education Index
HE	Health expenditure
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom
Inf.	Inflation rate
MP	Majority in the Parliament
PF	Press Freedom
PFI	Political Factors Index
PP	Social Unrest and Political Pressure
PR&CL	Political Rights and Civil Liberties
PS	Political System
R	Religion
RL	Rule of Law
SFI	Social Factors Index
TR	External trade rate
U	Unemployment
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
W	Real wage
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 2.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF ARMENIA

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Armenia in the time span between 1995-2014[*]



[*] Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Armenia in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,413	0,255	0,444	0,318	0,315	0,355
1996	0,395	0,386	0,447	0,328	0,295	0,380
1997	0,414	0,452	0,448	0,340	0,309	0,408
1998	0,411	0,534	0,462	0,340	0,325	0,431
1999	0,399	0,447	0,460	0,352	0,338	0,406
2000	0,426	0,464	0,473	0,394	0,385	0,433
2001	0,434	0,431	0,394	0,376	0,383	0,417
2002	0,457	0,504	0,436	0,355	0,368	0,446
2003	0,451	0,557	0,463	0,356	0,390	0,463
2004	0,433	0,564	0,494	0,377	0,398	0,464
2005	0,453	0,541	0,541	0,392	0,394	0,472
2006	0,443	0,547	0,579	0,399	0,365	0,472
2007	0,435	0,574	0,632	0,426	0,357	0,483
2008	0,386	0,632	0,733	0,430	0,335	0,487
2009	0,428	0,516	0,714	0,477	0,381	0,482
2010	0,434	0,588	0,709	0,440	0,386	0,499
2011	0,431	0,686	0,723	0,434	0,343	0,520
2012	0,400	0,747	0,731	0,442	0,389	0,529
2013	0,390	0,740	0,793	0,414	0,396	0,528
2014	0,410	0,798	0,819	0,387	0,396	0,551

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

2.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

By studying the curve of Political Factors Index of democracy we see that it decreased in the period of 2010-2013 and increased in 2014. 2013 was especially active year as it was full of political events over the period observed. Moreover, the year was marked with the initiation to make Constitutional amendments. The process of Constitutional amendments and adoption of the new Constitutional model *(RA Constitution with 2015 amendments)* were one of important steps towards democratization. The adoption of the Constitution of RA and its further amendments had certain historical course. The Constitution, which is Armenia's main law, was adopted on June 5, 1995 by referendum[1]. Regulations of institutional issues were essential for newly adopted Constitution and were aimed at formation of state authorities and elaboration of mechanisms for separation of powers. All aforementioned issues were typical of all post-Soviet independent states.

Later in 1998 during the presidential elections R. Qocharyan and other candidates defined the importance of Constitutional amendments on the basis of restriction of presidential powers. However, in 2003 draft amendments weren't adopted[2] at the referendum because of the lack of quorum[3]. PACE 1361 resolution of January 28, 2014, specifically stated that Armenia's commitments towards membership to the Council of Europe should no longer be delayed and that Armenian authorities should speed up the revision of the Constitution and the

[1] On August 23 1990 Armenian SSR Supreme Council of the first convocation has adopted the "Declaration on Armenia's independence" 12th provision of which foresaw elaboration of the RA Constitution // http://www.gov.am/am/independence/ (15.01.2016).

[2] According to Article, 35, paragraph 2 of the law of the Republic of Armenia "On Referendum" (adopted on 12.09.2001) the draft submitted to referendum is considered as adopted if more than half of voters voted for it, but not less than one third of the citizens included in the lists, and according to the law on making changes and amendments in the law of the Republic of Armenia "On Referendum" (adopted on 26.12.2008) – not less, than othe one fourth of the registered voters // http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1284&lang=arm ; http://parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=3477&lang=arm (15.01.2016).

[3] See the official site of Central Electoral Commision of the Republic of Armenia http://www.elections.am/resultsr2503/ (15.01.2016).

referendum should be held no later than in June 2005[4]. According to a decree[5] adopted by the RA President R. Qocharyan on November 27, 2005, new draft Constitution was put to a referendum and adopted in comply with which presidential powers were significantly curtailed and parliamentary powers were expanded on the contrary.

New process of constitutional reforms "based on the necessity to enhance the principle of the rule of law, to improve constitutional instruments guaranteeing basic human rights and freedoms, to ensure a full balance of powers and to increase the efficiency of public administration[6]" was initiated in 2013 by decree of the President. Amendments to the RA Constitution[7] were introduced through a referendum on December 6, 2015 due to which the RA political system was shifted from semi-presidential to parliamentary system. Under the adopted changes presidential powers were greatly curtailed at the expense of the expansion of National Assembly and Prime Minister powers.

As mentioned above, Keefer's methodology *(Keefer 2012, 3-4)* was used to estimate the variable of "Political System" in the IDL model (see also Chapter 1). The variable of the Political System in accordance with the coding system of Keefer *(2012, 3-4)* is divided into following categories: parliamentary (2 points), assembly-elected presidential (1 point) and presidential (0 points). Due to Constitutional amendments and according to Keefer's codification principles, RA political system shall be considered as parliamentary. In conformity with those principles political systems with assembly-elected President are characterised as parliamentary (2 points) with the exception when the parliament cannot easily

[4] PACE 1361 /2004/ resolution on the implementation of Armenia's obligations and commitments, 28.01.2004 // http://www.parliament.am/committees.php?do=show&ID=29&showdoc=10&cat_id=26&month=all&year=2004&lang=arm (15.01.2016).

[5] See the official site of Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia http://www.elections.am/resultsr2503/.

[6] Decree of the RA President on ''formation of ad hoc committee for constitutional amendments under the RA President" of September 4, 2013. Yerevan // http://www.President.am/hy/decrees/item/947/ (available in Armenian) (15.01.2016).
See the http://www.elections.am/referendum/election-26015/ (05.02.2016).

[7] See the official site of Central Electoral Commision of the Republic of Armenia http://www.elections.am/resultsr2503/.

recall the chief executive as it needs two-thirds of votes to impeach or dissolve it. In this case, the system gets 1 point. Thus, according to the new Constitutional model Prime Minister (head of the executive branch) is appointed by the President. The appointment is a formality since the President appoints as Prime Minister the person who enjoys the confidence of the majority of deputies *(Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, article 149, paragraph 1)*. As for the National Assembly's draft resolution of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the decision shall be adopted by majority vote of the total number of parliamentarians, by open vote. If the decision is adopted the Prime Minister shall submit his resignation *(Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, article 115, paragraph 2)*. President who is the head of State is also appointed by the National Assembly for 7 years term. Moreover, one and the same person shall be elected for one term only *(Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, Chapter 5)*.

Constitutional changes will come into force step by step. In particular, the chapters relating to provisions of constitutional order, human rights and fundamental freedoms, etc, will enter into force after their official publication, whereas provisions relating to the National Assembly will come into force after 2017 parliamentary elections, and finally, provisions relating to the President and Government will be effective after the 2018 presidential elections. The Electoral Code will be adjusted in compliance with the Constitution and will come into force on June 1, 2016 *(Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, Chapter 16)*. One of significant changes in this sphere is the composition and selection procedures of the National Assembly according to which the next National Assembly of the sixth convocation will consist of at least 101 deputies elected exclusively by proportional representation *(Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, article 89)*. In this regard, it should be noted that ratio of deputies elected by majoritarian and proportional electoral systems has been changed in favor of the latter (See Figure 2).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation in the parliament of Armenia[8]



Table 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation

Electoral representation	1990[9]	1995	1999	2003	2007	2012	2017
Majoritarian	260	150	75	56	41	41	0
Proportional	0	40	56	75	90	90	101
Total	**260**	**190**	**131**	**131**	**131**	**131**	**101**

[8]Source of the data is "Constitutional law of the RA", Article 5 (adopted on 27.03.1995), "The RA Law on Amendments and Additions to the Electoral Code", Article 55, paragraphs 1 and 2 (adopted on 03.07.2002), "The RA Law on Amendments and Additions to the Electoral Code" article 57, paragraph 1 and 2 (adopted on 19.05.2005), Constitution of the RA with 2015 amendments, article 89

[9] On August 24, 1990, the Supreme Council of the ASSR has decided to rename the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Republic of Armenia, and the functioning Supreme Council of 12th convocation to be considered as the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia of the first convocation // http://parliament.am/parliament.php?id=parliament&lang=eng (10.02.2016).

Human rights and freedoms. Commitments to reform the legal system under the guidance of international standards and provisions on human rights were made by Armenia with its membership to the United Nations, Council of Europe and OSCE.

According to several reports the most significant problems and concerns in the sphere of human rights are systematic corruption and the lack of transparency in the state administrative system, limited independence and impartiality of judicial system, restriction of the right to freedom of assembly, press and so on *(HRD 2014; U.S. Department of State 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015, UN 2014)*.

The right of freedom to assembly is enshrined in the RA Constitution and laws. Moreover, the law "On Freedom of Assembly" [10] adopted on April 2011 is considered as a positive progress compared to the previous law on "Conducting assemblies, rallies, meetings and demonstrations". However, the use of force by police officers against participants and illegal restrictions of gatherings are no exception. In reference to this HRD of RA brings the example of paragraph 3 of Article 19[11] and paragraph 4 of Article 32[12] of the law "On Freedom of Assembly" noting that in many cases their interpretation and enforcement by police officers are of arbitrary character *(HRD 2014, 305-308)*.

The other problem related to human rights in Armenia is the low level of women presentation in political life as well as in decision-making positions in the public sector. At the end of 2014 ratio of women presentation was as such: 13 women out of 131 deputies in the National Assembly, 2 women out of 18 ministers in the Government and no female governors representing country's 10 regions. Furthermore, there were only 10 women out of 65 elected members of Yerevan City Council and none of 12 administrative districts in Yerevan is headed by a

[10] For more details see Republic of Armenia Law on Freedom of Assemblies (adopted on 14.04.2011), http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/16523 , Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies and Demonstrations of the Republic of Armenia (adopted on 28.04.2004, currently the Law is inactive) http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/9046 (15.02.2016).

[11] "The assembly is prohibited if the assembly will be conducted at such a distance from the residence of the President of the Republic, the seats of the National Assembly, the Government, the courts or correctional facilities, which threatens their natural activities."

[12] "The police shall be obliged to ensure free access to buildings, structures, and other premises located at the assembly venue or adjacent to it".

woman *(U.S. Department of State 2015, 28)*. At the same time, paragraph 2 of Article 108[13] of the RA Electoral Code establishes guarantees for ensuring women gender quota in the parliamentary elections. But in 2012 parliamentary elections some female candidates, meeting 20% gender quota requirement in party lists, withdrew their candidacies, as the requirement to maintain gender proportionality after the registration of the party list wasn't endorsed by legislation. After summarizing the results of the elections it became clear that the number of elected female candidates amounted to only 11%. Hence, within the framework of ODIHR NA report it was recommended to regulate more distinctively the above-mentioned provision, namely to continue providing gender quota, especially after withdrawal of women candidates *(OSCE/ODIHR 2012, 2, 28; HRD 2015, 326; U.S. Department of State 2015, 28)*. Observing GGG which is the subindex of PFI (World Economic Forum, Index of Global Gender Gap) it becomes apparent that gender inequality in Armenia is expressed mainly in political sphere. As stated by GGG 2015 data Armenia holds the 125th place out of 145 countries in the sphere of political participation. According to GGG subindices of "economic participation and opportunities", Armenia is on the 79th place and on the 35th place according to "Health and Survival". In case of the latter, the inequality is in favour of women, particularly in the sphere of higher education. Due to final calculation of GGG Armenia is on the 105th place out of 145 states[14]. Chronological examination of GGG shows that it was declining within the time span 2011-2014.

The freedom of speech and press is ensured by the RA Constitution and laws. However, print media as well as online broadcasting express views that correspond and match with the position of their owners and advertisers in many cases. Namely, print media and broadcasting have problems in reference to political

[13] Each political party or alliance of political parties shall have the right to nominate only one electoral list of candidates. A political party included in an alliance of political parties shall have no right to nominate a separate electoral list on its own behalf. The number of persons of each sex shall not exceed 80% of any group of five candidates starting from the second number of the electoral list (2-6, 2-11, 2-16, and so on up to the end of the list) of a political party or alliance of political parties and of each party included in an alliance for the National Assembly election under the proportional electoral system.

[14] See the GGG official site http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=ARM (17.01.2016).

pluralism and objective reporting *(HRD 2014, 161-163)*. Moreover, the latter serves as a preliminary information and news source in Armenia. Online media sources and social networks are preliminary sources of alternative information and they represent different political stances. Internet is available and there is no censorship of online content by appropriate agencies. People are generally free to express their critical and other viewpoints publicly or privately via internet including e-mail[15]. *(U.S. Department of State 2015, 17-20)*. In their reports experts of international human rights protection organizations express their concern on a number of cases. In particular, cases when reporters are offended by MPs and exerted to violence during civil protests *(U.S. Department of State 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015, 69-74)*.

As stated by Freedom House* press is free in Armenia. According to 2014 Freedom House data, Armenia holds the 135th place out of 199 countries and is qualified as "partly free" with 61 points. Moreover, considering the chronological series of Armenia's evolution, it becomes apparent that during 1993-2001 the press was marked as "partly free" and over 2002-2014 time period it was estimated as "not free". Freedom House experts justify that change by the presence of harassment and intimidation against journalists, by restriction of mass media tools like print, radio and TV media[16].

Political Rights and Civil Liberties are "partly free" based on the assessment of the organization. On the seven-point scale (where 1 point means maximum freedoms, and 7 points is for the absence of freedoms) Armenia was estimated with 5 points for Political Rights and 4 points for Civil Liberties. It should be mentioned that the score for Civil Liberties (4) had remained unchanged since 1993. As for political rights they had different variations. The minimum score had been particularly recorded since 2008 because of arrests of opposition members during

[15]According to the study conducted by "Enterprise Incubator" Foundation, the number of internet users (including wireless 3G and GPRS) has reached about 67%, i.e. in accordance with general data there are 2 milion users (Panorama.am 2015) http://www.panorama.am/am/news/2015/03/21/it-armenia/88397 (available in Armenian) (16.02.2016)

* Indices of Press Freedom and Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Freedom House are included in the IDL model as variables of PFI. See the Freedom House official site https://freedomhouse.org /report/freedom-press/2015/armenia (16.02.2016).

[16] See the Freedom House official site https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (16.02.2016).

presidential elections as well as other cases of political pressure. In 2012 there was a positive one-point change (5), which was maintained until 2015[17].

Another issue of concern for HRD RA and some international human rights defending organizations are deaths in the army in peaceful times, domestic violence, conditions of prisons and detention places and so on.

***Civil disobedience**.* Civil disobedience as a form of political participation is an important component of contemporary socio-political reality. The notion of "non-violent civil disobedience" as an effective political tool for the formation of civil society was formulated and justified by Henry David Thoreau *(Thoreau 1849)*. Jurgen Habermas' approach *(Habermas 1985)* on this issue is very interesting. According to it, civil disobedience is a necessary component of political culture and it underlines lack of legitimacy in law in constitutional democracies. According to John Rawlz *(Rawlz 1995, 321)*, civil disobedience is a political activity which is accompanied by public and deliberate violations of a law in order to make changes in legislative and government policies.

There have been many cases of civil disobedience that led to the revision of corresponding decisions by relevant state authorities.

The main wave of civic initiatives has begun since 2010 and an important role was taken by the initiative, named "We are owners of the city". It began in February 2012 as a ''sitting down'' strike and grew into a full-scale confrontation. The initiation succeeded in preventing installation of kiosks in green zones. Armenian civil society perceives this victory as a victory of citizens' self-determination *(ArmneniaNow 2015)*.

An important victory gained through civil disobedience was the suspension of Yerevan Municipality's decision to raise transport fares in 2013 *(Hetq 2013a)*.

[17] See the Freedom House official site https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/armenia (16.02.2016).

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was chosen for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

According to the decision the fares for minibuses, buses and trolleybuses would rise from 50/100 AMD to 100/150 respectively. The municipal government considered the fare raise of public transport as a necessary step towards the further improvement of the sphere but many citizens refused to pay higher fare as a sign of protest. In Aharon Adibekyan's opinion, director of "Sociometer" sociological centre, the major issue was not expensive transport but low salaries, given the fact that decision would relate to 65% of passengers *(ArmneniaNow.com 2013a)*. "We pay 100 drams" initiative that lasted for nearly a week unified various strata of society with significant participation of the youth in this process. In a short period of time, the number of protesters reached to several thousands. It is noteworthy to mention that though the movement was well organized it had no leader as such.

The introduction of a new pension system was in the spotlight of civic initiations at the end of 2013. According to it, people born after January 1st 1974, in addition to 24-26% of social contributions, have to transfer 5-10% of their basic income to the funds later to be contributed as a pension. Hence, "I Am against" movement was formed which entailed a series of demonstrations, marches and rallies, including the protest in the Liberty Square on March 22 2014, which was also joined by parliamentary opposition forces such as ANC, PAP, ARF and Heritage. The above mentioned four political parties appealed to the Constitutional Court of the RA with the demand to declare the law[18] as unconstitutional. On April 2 the Constitutional Court of RA declared its decision on the constitutionality of some provisions of the law on "Funded Pensions". In summary to the disputed provisions, the Constitutional Court, however, declared its "mandatory" component"[19] which implied 5-10% obligatory fees from wages to pension funds unconstitutional *(Tert.am 2014)*.

[18] Law of the Republic of Armenia on Funded Pensions (adopted on 22.12.2010թ.,) // http://parliament.am/law_docs/301210HO244eng.pdf (10.02.2016).

[19] See the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia on the claim of the NA deputies against the law "About Funded Pensions" in reference to the constitutionality of Articles 5, 7, 8, 37, 38, 45, 49 and 86 on April 2, 2014, Yerevan, (available in Armenian under ՍԴՈ-1142) // http://www.concourt.am/armenian/decisions/common/2014/pdf/sdv-1142.pdf (10.02.2016).

Unlike 2013, 2014 was not particularly distinguished with active civil disobedience initiations either of social or political nature. Moreover, in this sense 2014 was one of the most peaceful years within the time span of 1995-2015.

It is important to mention youth protests against electricity price increase in June 2015 within civil disobedience context. The demonstrators demanded that President Serzh Sargsyan cancelled RA Public Services Regulatory Commission's decision made on 17.06.2015 on increasing electricity prices[20]. According to that decision, the electricity price during daytime would rise from 41,85 to 48,78 AMD per kWh, while at nights it would change from 31,85 to 38,78 AMD per kWh. In response to the electricity tariff increase "No to Plunder" and "Electric Yerevan" civic movements organized mass rallies in the Liberty Square since June 19, then an all-day sitting down protest. Hence, by not receiving any response to their demands the protestors peacefully marched to Baghramanyan Avenue on June 22. In the morning of June 23, police dispersed the demonstrators using water cannons. As a result, 237 people were detained and 25 were provided with medical assistance. However, the demonstrations on Baghramyan Street went on during the next days. On June 27 President Serzh Sargsyan announced that there would be audit in Electric Networks Armenian (ENA). Meanwhile, the Government would meet all increased tariffs for electricity until the conclusion was made *(PanArmenian.Net 2015)*. He called on the protesters to vacate Baghramyan Avenue but the latter announced that they would continue their protest until the decision was cancelled or suspended. The next day the protesters had controversies on the location of a demonstration to be held. Meanwhile, some of them moved to the Liberty Square, yet, the majority remained on Baghramyan Street. The result was that the movement gradually faded away.

Besides civil disobedience taken place in the social sector, there were also political riots during 2013-2015 particularly with regard to the 2013 Presidential elections. On February 19 following the next day of the elections Raffi

[20] See the decision of Public Services Regulatory Commission of the Republic of Armenia, on defining the electricity tariffs for consumers by Electric Networks of Armenia CJSC and on annulling the decision of July 1, 2014 #233 made by Public Services Regulatory Commission of the Republic of Armenia, June 17, 2015, Yerevan, (available in Armenian under N 174-Ա // http://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docid=98931 (10.02.2016).

Hovhannisyan, a former presidential candidate of the "Heritage" Party, initiated a series of mass protests in the Liberty Square of Yerevan and other cities accusing the authorities of frauding election results *(ArmneniaNow.com 2013b)*[*]. On March 10 he began a hunger strike demanding Serzh Sargsyan's resignation. Hovhannisyan mentioned that his hunger strike would last until April 8 as Serzh Sargsyan's inauguration ceremony had been scheduled for April 9. On the inauguration day several thousand people headed by Raffi Hovhannisyan marched from the Liberty Square to Baghramyan Avenue. The clash between demonstrators and riot police took place at the beginning of the Avenue where several protesters, including Armen Martirosyan were inflicted with injuries. Moreover, a number of arrests followed. Thus, Raffi Hovhannisyan, a few "Heritage" party leaders as well as a part of the gathered crowd marched to Tsitsernakaberd and then returned. Following the negotiations between Raffi Hovhannisyan and Head of Police people they eventually reached the Presidential residence and then they returned to the Liberty Square *(Hetq 2013b)*.

One of the well-known cases of 2013 was the "Revolution of Values" of Shant Harutyunyan. The leader of "Tseghakron" party Shant Harutyunyan started a sit-in protest in the Liberty Square on October 31 2013 and on November 5 initiated a revolution in the Republic of Armenia naming his movement as "Revolution of Values". During the march Shant Harutyunyan and his supporters were detained because of clashes with police *(Asbarez 2014)*. Some of the detainees were released, while Shant Harutyunyan was sentenced to 6 years in prison. Meanwhile, his friends were sentenced to 4-7 years in prison, whereas his 15-year-old son was sentenced to a 4 year suspended prison sentence *(Irates 2014)*.

2013 was also marked with the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and the decision to join the Customs Union, which was followed by a series of protests. The most mass protest took place on December 2, 2013 on the day of RF President Vladimir Putin's visit to Armenia during which at least 110 demonstrators were detained by the police *(HCAV 2014, 7, 14)*.

[*] According to official results, Serzh Sargsyan has won the first round gaining 58,64% of votes, while Raffi Hovhannisyan - 36,74% of votes // http://www.elections.am/presidential/; http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/101314?download=true (15.02.2016).

Thus, there have been significant qualitative and quantitative changes of civil disobedience. Before 2010 cases of civil disobedience were politically motivated and were mainly connected with pre- and post-election processes, but after the mentioned year, the cases of civil disobedience in the legal sphere were noticeably increased and to a certain extent, were connected with social problems with an impact on state decision-making process. The latter marks the development of the Armenian civil society, understanding of their rights and effective usage of struggle mechanisms. In general, social movements and civic initiatives have legal character when citizens' socio-economic, cultural and political rights and demands are violated. And the citizens who have a high level of political culture and self-consciousness are able to influence politics, promoting communication between state and society and restoring social justice and rights. Democracy level of the state plays an essential role in preventing the transformation of civil disobedience into destructive conflicts that affect country's political stability. It is also important for authorities to be able to understand signals of civic movements and to review relevant decisions and current policies.

Regarding other political variables included in the model it is worth mentioning that indices of "Political Stability" and "Rule of Law" declined in 2014 compared with 2013[21].

Within the time span of 1998-2014 Armenia's Corruption Perceptions Index assessed by the scale of 0-10 points was improved only by 1,2 points (in accordance with 2012 methodology the ranking scale was 0-100, where 0 stands for total corruption and 100 for the absence of corruption). Thus, Armenia occupied the 94th place out of 175 states in 2014. In 2015, however, the rate declined and, as a result, Armenia held the 95th place among 168 states and regions[22].

Concluding we can note that from 1995 to 2014 period PFI in Armenia wasn't subject to drastic changes. In 2013 the index declined, but in 2014 it improved. In particular, 2013 was a year full of political events. However, the decline of the

[21] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx# reports (20.02.2016).

[22] See Transparency International official site http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results ; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/ (17.01.2016).

index was influenced by an increased amount of social unrest accompanied by political pressure compared to the following and previous years. The fact that some issues were resolved as a result of civil disobedience marks development and activation of civil society. In this regard, the 2013 presidential elections weren't also calm. It is worth mentioning that during the 1995-2014 period of time PFI with the value of 0,392 was the second lowest result since 2008 (0,386). Within the mentioned period of time, the highest result of PFI was in 2002 (0,457) due to improvement of indices of Political Stability, Rule of Law, Press Freedom and Corruption Perceptions Index. In terms of Social Unrest and Political Pressure 2002 was also the quietest year *(Aleksanyan 2015, 22-32)*.

2.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

Based on the research outcomes the EFI had a negative influence on the IDL in 2013 (0,740), and a positive influence in 2014 (0,798) (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The level of GDP prior to the crisis was restored in 2013. It should be noted that during post-crisis years industry and agriculture which are the exporting sector of economy have largely contributed to economic growth. In 2013 economy growth amounted to 3,3%, which was mainly stipulated by services, agriculture and industry sectors, as opposed to construction sector, which declined when compared to previous years (see Table 3). Though dynamics of economic growth showed signs of speeding up during the first trimesters of 2014, at the end of the year its pace significantly slowed down and the economic growth rate reached 3,5% due to a slowdown of external demand, exchange rate devaluation, reduction of remittances from Russia which slowed down the growth of income in this regard *(NSS RA and WB 2015, 24)*. Unlike the previous year, economic growth was mainly conditioned by sectors agriculture and services in 2014. Industry and construction sectors declined thus negatively influencing the economic growth (see Table 3).

Table 3

Real growth of economic sectors for 2012-2016 (with value added)[23]

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	factual	factual	factual	predicted	predicted
GDP	7,2	3,3	3,5	2,5	2,2
Industry	6,3	6,3	-0,7	4,1	3,7
Agriculture	9,5	7,6	7,8	9,5	4,0
Construction	4,8	-7,4	-4,6	1,0	1,0
Services	6,3	3,1	5,7	0,6	1,3
Product taxes (except for subsides)	9,9	3,6	1,8	-2,7	1,5

Observing the variables included in the model we can note that there was consecutive growth of GDP, External trade rate, Domestic credit and Foreign direct investments indices in 2013 and 2014 compared to the previous years[24]. Yet in 2013 EFI had a slight decline conditioned by the growth of consumer prices and Budget deficit, as well as the decline of the Index of Economic Freedom[25]. Index of Economic Freedom slightly decreased in 2014[26]. The value of the specified variable of 2014 included in our model (index of IEF for 2015) decreased compared with the previous year. Thus, Armenia held the 52nd position instead of 41st it held in the previous year *(Miller & Kim 2015, 5, 468)*. The decrease of the mentioned indicator was determined by the decrease in protection of property rights, business, job, fiscal and trade freedoms. Nevertheless, Armenia's average (67,1) is higher than the world average (60,4) *(Miller & Kim 2015, 105-106).*

Apart from IEF, Budget deficit has also shown some significant decline (-2% of GDP), but, as a result of total growth of other indicators, EFI grew in 2014.

As for 2015, the overview of the first semester statistics shows that economic development dropped mainly because of the slowdown in the service sector. Agriculture and industry have been the driving forces of economic activity in the mentioned year. Besides, foreign sector of the economy dropped in the first

[23] Source is RA projections of economic an fiscal major indicators , Part 1-B ; RA Law on'' About 2016 state budge of the RA'' (ratified 09.12.2015 թ.), pages 80-82 // http://www.parliament.am/draft_history.php?id=7712&lang=arm (01.03.2016).

[24] See the World Bank official site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (19.03.2016).

[25] See ibid.

[26] IEF for 2015 has been considered as an index for 2014 as the experts of "Heritage" generally have based on economic indicators from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.

semester of the same year as well. While trade volumes decreased, there was also a decrease in transfers and incomes *(Ministry of Finance of RA)*.

At the same time, crucial changes took place in the foreign political and economic relations of Armenia. It was a known fact that Armenia had been proposed to sign Association Agreement in the framework of Eastern Partnership and its negotiations started back in July 2010. Moreover, a negotiation process of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area started in June 2012. Nevertheless, in September 2013 President of RA Serzh Sargsyan announced about the country's willingness to join the newly created Customs Union consisting of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Right after that decision EU stated that the Association Agreement was incompatible with the Customs Union and therefore could not be pre-signed by Armenia. Presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the founding treaty of Eurasian Economic Union in May 2014[27], which came into force on 1st of January 2015 after the countries finished the ratification process. Armenia joined the treaty on 10th of October 2014[28]. EAEU assumes creation of customs area, introduction of foreign trade and customs legislation as well as implementation of appropriate tariff policy. However, costs and benefits of Armenian membership to the EAEU have not been impartially estimated until now.

2.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

Examining the trends of SFI of recent years we can notice that its influence on IDL is positive. Specifically after the decline in 2010, SFI had stable increase till 2014.

The main aim of state policy in the sphere of social protection is a significant reduction of poverty level in the country, improvement of demography and insurance of social guarantees for separate groups of the population *(MTEF 2016-2018, 232)*.

[27] Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union (ratified on May 29, 2014, Astana)" // https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0013611/itia_05062014_doc.pdf (05.06.2016).

[28] Agreement on annexation of the RA to the EEU of May 29, 2015 (ratified on October 10, 2014, Minsk) // http://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=95288 (05.06.2016).

Important quantitative indicator for assessment of the population welfare is poverty level. One of the most crucial problems of Armenia in the social sphere is unfortunately poverty. Its level went up during the first years of independence caused by the restoration of economic and social systems and in the end of 90s it reached its maximum level when more than half of population was poor. The global economic crisis had a significant blow on Armenia's restoring socio-economic situation. As a result, the poverty level mounted from 27,6% to 34,1%[29] in 2009, which had been unprecedented since 1998. In recent years, there has been declining trend of the poverty level. Thus, in 2013 the poverty rate was reduced by only 0.4 points compared with the previous year, reaching down to 32%. Moreover, in 2014 it was reduced by another 2% and reached 30% *(NSS RA and WB 2015, 30)*.

The poverty problem in Armenia is first and foremost correlated to unemployment. Its rate is among the highest in the world. The situation is also reflected in serious demographic problems such as low birth rates and high level of mortality, as well as the extremely high level of migration of the population *(EDRC 2014a, 2)*. Despite the high rate of unemployment, in recent years it showed some tendency of decrease. Alongside with economy restoration, the unemployment level was reduced from 19% in 2010 to 17,1% in 2014[30].

Social expenditures are the biggest functional items of the state budget. In 2014 one-third (27,7%) of the state budget was spent on financing the social protection area. It's carried out by 8 budget groups. The largest expenditure is directed to "Old age" (mainly pension expenditure), which composed over 70% of 2010-2014 social protection budget. "Family and children", "Social protection (not a member of any other group)", "Social exclusion" groups comprised 16,7%, 7,6% and 3,1% of the budget respectively. "Sickness and disability", "Survivors", "Unemployment", "Housing" have little significance in social protection budget *(EDRC 2015a, 10-12)*.

State policy in the sphere of social protection is based on a number of strategic documents. Some of them have more comprehensive nature, whereas others have more specific and intra-sectoral essence. We may single out the followings *(EDRC 2014a, 4-7)*:

[29] See the RA National Statistical Service official website www.armstat.am (15.03.2016).

[30] See the World Bank official site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS (19.03.2016).

- RA National Security Strategy[31],
- RA Government Program[32],
- Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025[33],
- National Strategy on Human Rights Protection[34],
- Employment Strategy 2013-2018 of the Republic of Armenia[35],
- National Strategy for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Armenia for 2006-2015[36] and so on.

2.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

In Armenia development of the educational sector is an important precondition for country's sustainable progress and development and accordingly the main priority of the state policy. Reforms in this area have begun after the declaration of the RA independence conditioned by new economic and social relations. Education quality increase in all levels of education system, their compliance with international standards, available/accessible education for all social groups are priorities to be implemented in this sector *(MTEF 2016-2018)*.

Education in Armenia includes public and professional education, extracurricular education, as well as the assistance to Diaspora educational institutions. In 2014 the overwhelming majority of education expenditure 78,9% was aimed at financing public education sector[37], and 16,2% was aimed at

[31] RA National Security Strategy (RA President Decree NH-37-N dated 07.02.2007)// http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf (10.04.2016).

[32] RA Government Program (RA Government of 19.05.2014 N 511 – A Decision) http://www.parliament.am/draft_docs5/K-529.pdf (10.04.2016).

[33] Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025 (RA Government decree N 442-N, 27.03.2014) // http://www.gov.am/files/docs/1322.pdf (10.04.2016).

[34] National Strategy on Human Rights Protection (RA President Directive NK-159-N dated 29.10.2012).

[35] Employment Strategy 2013-2018 of the Republic of Armenia (GoA Protocol Decree N 45 dated 08.11.2012) // http://www.gdf.am/images/Employment_Strategy_2013-2018.pdf (10.04.2016).

[36] National Strategy for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Armenia for 2006-2015 (GoA Protocol Decree N 44 dated 03.11.2005).

[37] Public education is a priority programme in education sector. It includes pre-school, elementary, basic and secondary education (general, vocational, special), as well as there are several programmes envisaged by public education assisting programmes. In 2006 Armenia transited to 12-years public

financing vocational education programs[38] and in 2013 it was allocated as 81,3% and 14,6% respectively *(MTEF 2016-2018, 114)*.

Analyzing the statistical data (see Table 4) it is noticeable that the gross enrollment in elementary school within the last three years was gradually decreased by 1% per year by reaching from 95,2% to 93,1%. Examination of total enrollment data indicates that there is a decline in the number of students continuing their education in high schools *(NSS RA 2012, 25, 2013, 28, 2014, 28)*. Some students (in 2014/2015 ed. year 19,1%) after graduating from the basic school continue their education in pre-vocational (craftsmanship) and vocational institutions which have the lowest gross enrollment rate in comparison with other areas of education. This means that primary and vocational education sectors are the weakest circles of the field. In contrast to this, the gross enrollment rate of students in higher education institutions is high. The average indicator of the latter for the last three years constituted 46,9% while in Georgia it was 39% and in Azerbaijan 23%[39].

Table 4

Gross enrollment rates of pupils and students, %[40]

Ed. year	Elementary school	Basic school	High school[41]	Vocational education	Technical secondary education	Higher education
2012/2013	95,2	94,8	74,1	4,1	11	44,9
2013/2014	94,1	92,6	74,0	12,2	12,2	46,9
2014/2015	93,1	92,6	72,4	7,4	12,2	46,8

education system with following sequence: elementary school (4 years), secondary school (5 years), and high school (3 years).

[38] Professional/vocational education programmes include pre-vocational (craftsmanship), vocational, higher and postgraduate education programs as well as other programs assisting the implementation of the mentioned ones. Professional institutions are: pre-vocation (craftsmanship), vocational (college) and higher education institutions (university, institute, academy and conservatoire).

[39] See the World Bank official site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR (10.04.2016).

[40] Data sources: NSS RA. 2012. «Social situation of the RA in 2012» (available in Armenian)// http://armstat.am/en/?nid=82&id=1466; NSS RA. 2013. «Social situation of the RA in 2013» (available in Armenian) // http://armstat.am/en/?nid=82&id=1590; NSS RA. 2014. «Social situation of the RA in 2014» (available in Armenian) // http://armstat.am/en/?nid=82&id=1689 (10.04.2016).

[41] Gross enrollment rate of students in high schools is low as some people of respective age after completing the basic school continue their study in pre-vocational (craftsmanship) and vocational educational institutions.

In 2005, Armenia signed the Bergen Communiqué[42] thus joining the Bologna Process. As a result, Armenia assumed the responsibility to finish implemention of basic principles of these processes in separate sectors of education by 2010 and finally to become a part of the European Higher Education Area.

Hence, membership to the latter implied conduction of reforms in secondary, higher and continuous educational systems of the RA, such as the introduction of of a three level educational system, transition to crediting system, introduction of European standards of quality assessment and assurance of vocational education and etc. Ministerial Summit in 2010 officially announced the beginning and development of a new phase of the European Higher Education Area envisaged by the Bologna declaration[43] *(Expansion programme of Integration of RA Vocational education into EHEA 2012)*.

As for the Human Development Index (HDI) included in the model, in recent years it remained unchanged (0,701). In contrast, the dynamics of government expenditure shows that in 2013 and 2014 it gradually decreased by almost 1% reaching 2,4% of GDP[44]. The latter conditioned the reduction of EdFI in 2013 (0,414) and in 2014 (0,387) thus negatively affecting the IDL (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The legal documents regulating the education sector are the following:

- The Law of RA "On Education"[45],
- The Law of RA on ''Public Education''[46],
- The Law of RA on ''Higher and Postgraduate Education''[47],
- Law of RA on ''Education Development State Program for 2011-2015''[48],

[42] "Communiqué of the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education," Bergen, 19-20 May 2005 // http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/Declarations/Bergen_Communique1.pdf (10.04.2016).

[43] The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999. Joint declaration of the European Ministers of Education // http://www.ehea.info/Uploads/Declarations/BOLOGNA_DECLARATION1.pdf (10.04.2016).

[44] See the World Bank official site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS (19.04.2016).

[45] The Law of the Republic of Armenia "On Education" (adopted on 14.04.1999) // http://www.anqa.am/en/about-us/legal-field/laws/law-of-the-republic-of-armenia-on-education/ (10.04.2016).

[46] The Law of RA on Public Education (adopted on 10.07.2009) // http://edu.am/index.php?id=3566&topMenu=-1&menu1=85&menu2=89&arch=0 (10.04.2016).

[47] The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Higher and Postgraduate Education (adopted on 14.12.2004) // http://www.armenic.am/?laid=1&com=module&module=menu&id=97 (10.04.2016).

- Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025[49] and so on.

2.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

Healthcare sector is a priority in the state policy of the Republic of Armenia and the main goals are aimed at prevention of diseases, their early detection, diagnosis and treatment, a better accessibility to medical care and the improvement of its quality *(MTEF 2016-2018, 185-231)*.

The amount of healthcare expenditure is increasing. During the time span of 2010-2014 the average annual growth was 6,4% *(EDRC 2015b, 4)*. However, health expenditure level is low compared to other expenditure allocated for the applicable sector. Moreover, Armenia's indicators in this sector fall behind the indices of EU, CIS and neighboring countries. For example, 7% of the state budget and 4,5% of GDP was allocated to health sector in 2014, whereas average indices in CIS were 10,4% and 6% respectively[50].

Financing process of this field is presented in the state budget by 5 groups. "Hospital services" accounts for the largest financial input allocated by 42,3% of healthcare expenses in 2013 and 47,2% in 2014. This group includes general and specialized, as well as mother and child medical assistance services. The next significant group is "Outpatient services", which accounted for 36,2% of healthcare expenditure in 2013 and 33,5% in 2014. The investments in the remaining groups, namely, "Public healthcare services", "Medical products, appliances and equipment", "Health n.e.c." are less and comprise only the 20% of expenditure *(EDRC 2015b, 9-11)*.

One of the most crucial problems of healthcare in Armenia is low birth rate, which amounts to 1,4 children per woman (according to the National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia), while 2,1 is needed for reproduction of the

[48] Law of RA on Education Development State Program for 2011-2015 (adopted on 23.06.2011) // http://edu.am/index.php?id=5545&topMenu=-1&menu1=85&menu2=89&arch=0 (10.04.2016).

[49] Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025 (RA Government decree N 442-N, 27.03.2014) // http://www.gov.am/files/docs/1322.pdf (10.04.2016).

[50] Sources are based on the World Bank official website and on calculations accumulated by the researcher // http://data.worldbank.org/ (15.04.2016).

population. 41,815 births were registered during January-December 2015, which is 2,8% less compared to 43,031 in 2015. Aging of the population is also among the important problems, as 10,6% of the population is equal or above 65. According to the UN aging scale, population is considered aging if it is assessed with more than 7%[51].

There are also concerns about overall health of the population. In particular, the death rate as a result of non-infectious diseases is considered to be high. Besides, there is also an increase in death rates as a result of blood circulation diseases and neoplasms during the past ten years *(EDRC 2014b, 4)*. The latter accounted for the 68,5% of deaths in 2014 *(NSS RA and WB, 17)*. At the same time, the overall death rate has increased by 5,9% during the last decade. 27,835 deaths were registered during January-December 2015, which is 0,4%[52] more compared to 2014. Nevertheless, Life expectancy shows signs of growth[53].

Policy in the sphere of healthcare includes a wide range of different strategies, concepts and programs, laws and legislative acts, among them:

- The RA Law on Medical Assistance and Service to the Population[54],
- Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025[55],
- Strategy for the Protection of Mother and Child Health for 2003-2015[56],
- National Program on Reproductive Health Improvement[57],
- National Strategy for Child and Adolescent Health and Development and Plan of Action for Introduction[58] and so on.

[51] See the UNFPA official site http://www.unfpa.am/en/demographic-situation (19.04.2016)
[52] See ibid.
[53] See the World Bank official site http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (19.04.2016).
[54] The RA Law on Medical Assistance and Service to the Population (adopted on 04.03.1996) // http://www.parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1688&lang=rus (16.04.2016).
[55] Armenia Development Strategy for 2014-2025 (RA Government decree N 442-N, 27.03.2014) // http://www.gov.am/files/docs/1322.pdf (10.04.2016).
[56] Strategy for the Protection of Mother and Child Health for 2003-2015 (RA Government Decision N1000-N of 08.08.2003) // http://www.nationalplanningcycles.org/sites/default/files/country_docs /Armenia/armenia_strategy_on_maternal_and_child_health_2003-2015.pdf (16.04.2016).
[57] National Program on Reproductive Health Improvement of 26.07.2007 N 29) // http://www.moh.am/AzgCragir/Reprod.pdf (16.04.2016).
[58] National Strategy for Child and Adolescent Health and Development and Plan of Action for Introduction (RA Government of 10.09.2009 N 37) // http://www.moh.am/?section=static_pages/ index&id=2036&subID=587 (16.04.2016).

2.6 Development Trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Armenia in the time span between 1995-2014*



The indices of democracy level are presented in Figure 3. During the observed years of 2013 and 2014 IDL had different trends. In 2013 there was a slight decline conditioned by the reduction of political, economic and education indices. 2013 was a year full of political activities. This was the year when Constitutional amendments were undertaken. In 2013 the decline of PFI (see Table 1, Figure 1) and correspondingly the reduction of the IDL were significantly influenced by the increase of the level of civil disobedience, which was accompanied by military pressures. Moreover, the rise of civil disobedience wave was linked to both socio-economic and political problems. It should be noted that some protests, in fact, influenced on decision-making process of state agencies. This fact marks the development of civil society and qualitative changes in its activities. In 2013 there were also presidential elections, and civil disobedience cases, which were on a permanent basis, were caused by election and post-election processes in Armenia. IDL was negatively influenced by Inflation, some increase of the Budget deficit, as

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

well as the fall of the IEF. The latter two kept up worsening in 2014. The fall of EdFI was conditioned by reduction of government expenditure on education. Thus, in 2013 IDL was negatively influenced by the simultaneous fall of PFI, EFI and EdFI, but the main fall was due to the rise of civil disobedience. Moreover, within the time span from 1995 to 2014 the PFI of 2013 (0,390) was the third lowest indicator since the second one was registered in 2008 (0,386).

In contrast to this, there was an increase of IDL in 2014 due to the simultaneous improvement of PFI, SFI and EFI. During the observed year, there was a decline only in EdFI once again conditioned by reduction of government expenditure on education. HFI has remained unchanged. The highest indicator of IDL was registered in 2014 during the time period from 1995 to 2014.

The low level of IDL fluctuation (st. dev. = 0,05, average = 0,46) proves that transition towards democracy in Armenia takes place smoothly and without serious upheavals.

2.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

The regression analysis illustrated the variables of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors Indices, which had a significant influence on the IDL of Armenia.

The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDL_i* and variables of Rule of Law and Political Stability/Absence of Conflict.

$$Y' = 0{,}012x_1 - 0{,}037 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}640),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of the Rule of Law), x_1 is the Rule of Law.

$$Y' = 0{,}003x_2 + 0{,}34 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}457),$$

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Political Stability/Absence of Conflict), x_2 is the Political Stability/Absence of Conflict.

A significant correlation has been established between IDL and Economic Factors, included in the model as well as between GNI per capita and Index of Economic Freedom.

$$Y' = 0{,}002x_3 + 0{,}420 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}618),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from GNI per capita), x_3 is the GNI per capita ($100).

$$Y' = 0{,}005x_4 + 0{,}161 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}495),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Index of Economic Freedom), x_4 is the Index of Economic Freedom.

A significant correlation has been denoted in the Social Factors Index, i.e. between the IDLi and Gini index.

$$Y' = -0{,}436x_5 + 0{,}659 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}689),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from Gini index), x_5 is Gini index.

The following equations were drawn from the regression analysis of the Educational Factors.

$$Y' = 2{,}2x_6 - 1{,}05 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}864),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of HDI Education Index), x_6 is the HDI Education Index.

$$Y' = 0{,}059x_7 + 0{,}3 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}382),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of the Government expenditure on education), x_7 is Government expenditure on education (% of GDP).

The following equation was drawn in reference to Health Factors Indices.

$$Y' = 0{,}02x_8 - 1{,}02 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}845),$$

where Y is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Life Expectancy), x_8 is Life Expectancy.

To sum up, the variable of Political Factors, namely Rule of Law and Political Stability significantly impact on the IDL of Armenia, where 1 unit change will correspondigly lead to the growth of the IDLi from 0,003 to 0,012 units. The mentioned variables determine 45-64% variation of dependent variables.

GNI and Index of Economic Freedom also impact on the IDL. The growth of the GNI per capita for $100 and the growth of the Index of Economic Freedom by 1 unit will lead to the rise of the IDLi correspondingly from 0,002 to 0,005 units. The mentioned variables determine 50-60% variations of dependent varibales.

Another finding illustrates that the Index of Democracy Level of Armenia is strongly affected by social indicators, where the decline of GINI with 0,1 unit will increase the IDLi with the magnitude of 0,04 units respectively, explaining the 69% variation of dependent variables.

The rise of HDI Education Index with 0,1 unit and the change in the Public Spending on education with 1% of GDP will bring the change of the IDLi with the magnitude of 0,2 and 0,06 units, respectively. Particularly, the HDI Education Index has a significant coefficient of determination, which explains 86% of the variation in democracy.

There was established a strong correlation between IDLi and variable of Life expectancy and the observations prove, that the latter affects positively and its increase with 1 unit will increase the IDL with the magnitude of 0,02%. This indicator also determines 84% of variation of dependent of the IDL.

By summarizing the above said, we can conclude that the regression analysis shows that the indicators of Political Stability and Rule of Law, Gini index, GNI per capita, Index of Economic Freedom and other Educational and Health Factors mostly affect the IDL. Nonethless, Life expectacy, HDI Education Index and in some degree Gini index possess the most significant coefficient of determination. Gini index reveals that there is an unequal distribution of incomes in the society, i.e. the existence of polarization of the population and the absence of the middle class, which negatively affect the democrary level. At the same time education level and education factors can have a positive impact on democratization processes in Armenia. And the abovementioned factors can positively influence on devepolment of the consolidation process of democracy and democratic principles in Armenia

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Abbreviations

ANC	Armenian National Congress
ARF	Armenian Revolutionary Federation
CC	Constitutional Court
CEC	Central Election Commission
EdFI	Education Factors Index
EDRC	Economic Development and Research Centre
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EFI	Economic Factors Index
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GNI	Gross national income
HCAV	Helsinki Citizens' Assembly – Vanadzor
HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
HRD	Human Rights Defender
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom
MM	Mass media
MTEF	Medium-term Expenditure Frameworks
NA	National Assembly
NSS	National Statistical Service
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PAP	Prosperous Armenia Party
PFI	Political Factors Index
RA	Republic of Armenia
RA	Republic of Armenia
SFI	Social Factors Index
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 3.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF GEORGIA

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Georgia in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Georgia in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,269	0,187	0,495	0,396	0,290	0,288
1996	0,310	0,247	0,511	0,396	0,427	0,337
1997	0,312	0,329	0,503	0,396	0,463	0,362
1998	0,295	0,362	0,513	0,396	0,393	0,358
1999	0,349	0,340	0,502	0,399	0,389	0,373
2000	0,344	0,398	0,516	0,401	0,434	0,393
2001	0,347	0,406	0,525	0,398	0,491	0,403
2002	0,317	0,417	0,525	0,404	0,550	0,400
2003	0,316	0,487	0,536	0,393	0,546	0,418
2004	0,335	0,517	0,543	0,446	0,557	0,441
2005	0,380	0,548	0,558	0,419	0,568	0,468
2006	0,398	0,698	0,587	0,450	0,564	0,520
2007	0,357	0,722	0,629	0,439	0,558	0,512
2008	0,351	0,649	0,714	0,449	0,610	0,507
2009	0,372	0,523	0,705	0,473	0,682	0,492
2010	0,415	0,591	0,693	0,457	0,680	0,524
2011	0,427	0,638	0,725	0,440	0,649	0,540
2012	0,531	0,665	0,789	0,396	0,610	0,588
2013	0,487	0,711	0,818	0,396	0,542	0,577
2014	0,515	0,783	0,810	0,396	0,557	0,608

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

3.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The PFI of the IDL experienced a certain decrease in 2013, but it recovered in the next year. Meanwhile, the indicator registered with the value of 0,531 points in 2012 was the highest within the observed period.

The year of 2012 was marked by the change of power in Georgia. It should be mentioned that it has been the first peaceful change accompanied by preservation of democratic norms and constitutional procedures since its independence. Thus, Zviad Gamsakhurdia the first President of Georgia was ousted from the power by use of military force and was compelled to escape and hide. The second President Eduard Shevardnadze left the government as a result of the "Rose Revolution". In reference to the third Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, despite his pre-planned steps to remain in the government, the process of his removal from the political arena began in 2012 when the opposition won the parliamentary elections. According to the opposition, M. Saakashvili initiated the constitutional amendments as he was indented to stay in power in the post of a Prime Minister after serving his second term of presidency.

Thus, the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia was adopted on August 24, 1995. It reflected the classical tradition of distribution of state bodies' powers by which the presidential system of the government was also reinforced. In comply with the Constitution of 1995, the President was the head of state and the executive elected by the citizens with the term of five-years. There was no post of a Prime Minister as such and the ministers were directly appointed by the President with the consent of the Parliament and were accountable to him. Moreover, the Parliament was not empowered to dismiss ministers *(the Constitution of 1995 of the Republic of Georgia, Articles 69, 70, 73)*. Nevertheless, the President had no powers to dissolve the Parliament.

Before the "Rose Revolution", 23 amendments and additions were made to the Constitution of the RG during the next 15 years *(Chedia 2011, 64-65)*. The increase of the threshold from 5% to 7% enforced by the amendment of the Constitution in 1999 was one of those changes mentioned above *(The Constitution of the RG with amendments in 1999, Article 50, paragraph 2)*.

Many constitutional amendments were introduced during M. Saakashvili's presidency which resulted to the qualitative changes in the government system. According to the constitutional amendments, Georgia has shifted from presidential to a semi-presidential form of government since 2004. However, the opposition had a pessimistic attitude towards them claiming that those changes would only strengthen the foundations of the authoritarian state *(Caucasian Knot 2004)*. Indeed, a President, on one hand, was vested with additional powers to dissolve the Parliament pursuant to those changes, whereas, on the other hand, the Prime Minister institution was created and the latter would form the government with the consent of the President *(The Constitution of the RG with amendments in 2004, Article 73, paragraph 1(b))*. The fourth chapter of the Constitution titled "The President of Georgia" has been modified by the addition of a new chapter, titled "The Prime Minister of Georgia," which specifically states, the government ensures the implementation of external and internal policies, fulfills the executive power, is accountable to the President and Parliament. In case of no confidence called by the Parliament, the President may dissolve the Government as well as the Parliament by the established law, if the latter will call for a vote of no confidence again within the specified period *(The Constitution of the RG with amendments in 2004, Article 78, paragraph 1).*

The Parliament of Georgia voted for the implementation of changes in the Electoral code (later in the Constitution) in 2008 and accordingly 7% threshold was again reduced to 5% defined for political parties to enter parliament *(CoE, Parliamentary Assembly 2008, 12)*.

However, it should be noted that the most extensive changes to the Constitution of Georgia had been made since October 2010. Hence, right after the 2013 presidential election in comply with those changes Georgia made a transition to a new parliamentary model of state governance. As a result, the powers of the President were curtailed, whereas the role and functions of a Prime Minister were correspondingly expanded. The President of Georgia was no longer a representative body. In accordance with the constitutional amendments he is not only the head of the state, but also a guarantor of unity and national independence as well as the former Commander-in-Chief of All Armed Forces and represents the country in foreign relations *(The Constitution of the RG with amendments in*

2010, Article 67, 73, 74, 78). As for the government's expanded powers, it is the supreme body of executive power at present, which exercises internal and foreign policies of the country and is accountable to the Parliament. The appointment of the Prime Minister by the President is a formality. The President shall nominate the candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the electoral subject having the best results in parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister shall appoint candidates of ministers and shall present a report to Parliament on the realisation of the governmental program *(The Constitution of the RG with amendments in 2010, Article 78, 79, 80)*.

The adoption of the package of constitutional reforms has been an essential step towards democratization and Europeanization of the political system of Georgia.

These abovementioned significant changes contributed to the activation of opposition forces, who were convinced that the constitutional amendments were aimed at the protection of incumbent M. Saakashvili's powers. Therefore, the unity of the opposition fostered the victory in the parliamentary elections in 2012, leading to the first peaceful change of powers in the history of independent Georgia.

So, October 1, 2012 marked the end of ruling period of "United National Movement" (UNM) party. Prior to the official announcement of the election results, M. Saakashvili declared that the UNM would act as opposition. The newly elected legislative body was formed by two political forces unlike the previous Parliament and 41 parties participated in the elections. As a result, "Georgian Dream" Coalition won 85 seats with 41 majoritarian and 44 proportional representation. The "United National Movement" had a mandate of 65 seats with 32 majoritarian and 33 proportional representation respectively. On October 25, the Parliament approved the new government headed by Bidzina Ivanishvili in the post of the Prime Minister *(Chedia 2012, 60-61)*. The candidate of the “Georgian Dream” Coalition Giorgi Margveslashvili was elected President by wining 62% of vote in the 2013 presidential election. Hence, the Constitutional amendments initiated by M.Saakashvili in 2010 were aimed at changing to parliamentary political system and entered into force in 2013 *(Freedom House 2015b)*. A month later the presidential election, Ivanishvili, who had repeatedly declared about his leaving the post of a Prime Minister, introduced his successor Garibashvili. The

candidacy was approved by the Parliament by balloting *(Freedom House 2014)*. G. Kvirikashvili replaced him on Decemebr 30, 2015 *(Freedom House 2016)*.

After the change of power, experts and politicians had been expressing various opinions on possible shifts in the foreign political policy course of Georgia. Given Ivanishvili's ties with Russia, it was probable that Georgia, moving sternly towards European integration vector, would implement more balanced foreign policy, which would eventually contribute to the improvement of relations with Russia. In this regard, it should be mentioned that occupation of the Georgian territory by Russia, risk of a new military aggression as well as terrorist acts organized by Russia from the occupied territories were listed in the agenda of National Security Concept of Georgia[1] as the main threats and challenges for the country. The latter was adopted by the Parliament in December 2011 *(Civil.ge 2011)*. After the change of power on March 7, 2013 the "Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on Basic Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy" reads that "Georgia carries out a dialogue with Russia using international mechanisms available in the Geneva as well as in a bilateral framework. The goal of this dialogue is to resolve the conflict, to establish and to develop good neighborly relations". The resolution also notes that integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures represents the main priority of the country's foreign policy course *(Georgia Online 2013)*.

Country's active involvement in European integration processes and aggravation of relations with Russia were strongly conditioned by the position Georgia took in relation to Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts. After the exploitation of "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan" oil pipeline in 2006 along with "Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum" gas pipeline, Georgia gained energetic independence from Russia, which further aggravated the relations between the two countries and culminated into Russian and Georgian War in 2008.

On December 10, 2010 during the negotiations on the Association Agreement in Brussels, EU reaffirmed its support for the country's territorial integrity, as well as its adherence to the "non-recognition policy" *(Civil.ge 2010)*.

[1] See the official site of the Minisry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia at: "National Security Concept of Georgia" // http://www.mfa.gov.ge/MainNav/ForeignPolicy/NationalSecurity Concept.aspx?lang=en-US (20.07.2016).

It should be noted that Georgia has an important geopolitical location, where particular interests of the West and Russia clash conditioned by the possibility of planning the routes of transportation of energy resources and by the fact that Georgia is a corridor between Europe and Asia*.

Human rights and freedoms. The Republic of Georgia is a member of UN, the Council of Europe, OSCE and etc. and, it has assumed the obligations aimed at protection of human rights and freedoms within the framework of the international organizations. Despite the efforts recently undertaken by the country to provide protection of human rights and freedoms, international organizations have voiced their concern relating to a number of issues.

The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports referred to the issues of selectivity of the Court of Justice of Georgia and politically motivated investigations. The government of "Georgian Dream" Coalition continues to investigate the criminal cases of some high-ranking officials who were in office during the resign of a former "United National Movement" party. The abovementioned cases were drawn by the complaints of thousand citizens and were presented when the ruling UNM party was defeated in 2012 parliamentary elections. The representatives of the UNM at the same time point out that accusations and prosecutions are politically motivated and members of the UNM are the main target of those processes *(Human Rights Watch 2016, 273).*

The investigation of Gigi Ugulava's case, a former Mayor of Tbilisi and a member of opposition at present is similar in its essence. He was put into custody on charges of embezzlement of public funds in 2013. In September 2015 the Constitutional Court considered illegal his detention for more than a nine-month period as provided by law. However, after criticism and pressure imposed by senior officials on the judges Ugulava was charged with the same accusations and was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment *(Amnesty International 2016, 163; Human Rights Watch 2016, 273)*. Later pro-government groups organized several rallies at the house of the chief of the Constitutional Court, threatening the

* South Caucasus is the main transit corridor to export the energy resources of the Caspian Sea to Western markets, and the tension in the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish relations increases Georgia's role in those processes.

President and his family members. The mentioned groups also organized attacks on UNM offices, which were caused by the fact, that a prohibited video containing material on sexual harassment conducted to political prisoners in prison was posted online. Those devastating actions took place when the aforementioned party was in administration. Meanwhile, the police were present during the attacks and made no interference. Prime Minister Garibashvili publicly called the opposition UNM party a criminal and considered the aggression towards them natural *(Amnesty International 2016, 163; Human Rights Watch 2016, 274-275)*.

An example of manifestation of Georgian authorities exerting pressure on the opposition referred to a most-watched "Rustavi-2" TV channel. Kibar Khalvashi, a former co-owner of TV station went to court to reclaim his shares, stating that he was forced by the authorities, namely by the UNM party to sell them in 2006. The court satisfied the claim of the former owner and it also ordered by its verdict to remove the managing director and financial manager of the company from the management. International organizations and local NGOs were concerned with the issue by qualifying it an interference of the government in media activities and restriction of the freedom of speech aiming to deprive the opposition of its main "mouthpiece" *(Amnesty International 2016, 45, 163-164; Human Rights Watch 2016, 273, 275-276)*.

Despite the above-mentioned problems in the media sector, according to Freedom House* data, Georgia is considered the freest among the South Caucasus countries as well as in 9 countries, observed in the research. In reference to diverse media environment, Georgia was rated as "partly free". By studying the values of the consecutive years in Georgia it should be noted that the "Press Freedom" was qualified as "not free" only in 1995. It later gradually improved with the exception of the indicators registered in 2007-2008, when it was almost recorded as "not free". According to the 2015 report of the organization (covering events of 2014), Georgia appeared in 93rd place among 199 countries by getting 48 points *(Freedom House 2015a, 22)*. According to Freedom House experts' opinion, political polarization and close ties between mass media and state officials and political parties are the main issues of the media sector in Georgia[2].

[2] See the official site of "Freedom House" at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/georgia (16.02.2016).

According to the research conducted by Freedom House the areas of political rights and civil liberties are also "partly free". Since 2012 (report of 2013) Georgia received 3 points for the level of Political Rights and Civil Liberties estimated by scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for the highest freedom indicator, and correspondingly 7 for the lowest[3].

According to the Global Gender Gap report of the WEF, Georgia took the 82nd place out of 145 countries in 2015. The GGG evaluates the gender equality in four main areas, according to which Georgia holds: 1) the 114th place for Women Political Empowerment; 2) the 60th place for Economic Participation and Opportunity; 3) 120th place for Health and Survival and 4) 31st place for Educational Attainment Subindices. Gender inequality is mainly manifested in the area of political participation, but a completely equal distribution is observed in the education sector with a high level of women enrollment in higher educational institutions *(World Economic Forum 2015, 178-179)*.

Human rights organizations also point out issues of violence against women. 22 women were murdered and there were multiple reports of violence, harassments and family conflicts in Georgia 2014. According to "Georgian Women's Movement", 5448 complaints of domestic violence were received through police hotline in 2013, but this number does not fully reflect the current situation, since many are simply intimidated to speak out on issues alike *(Nikuradze 2014a)*.

Torture and in particular ill-treatment by law enforcement officials are important issues in the sector of human rights. The lack of effective mechanisms to conduct an independent investigation of the crimes committed by law enforcement bodies leads to their impunity. The Georgian Young Lawyers' Association received at least 41 such applications and 23 were related to the use of violence by the police and 18 referred to the cases of violence exerted by prison officers in 2015 *(Amnesty International 2016, 164; Human Rights Watch 2016, 275)*.

[3] See the official site of "Freedom House" at: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (16.02.2016).

***Civil disobedience**.** Freedom of assembly is endorsed by the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia and the ''Law of Georgia o Assemblies and demonstrations''[4]. In comply with Article 25 of the Constitution "everyone, except members of the armed forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs, has the right to public assembly without arms either indoors or outdoors without prior permission''.

In overall, the right to freedom of assembly is protected by the Constitution of Georgia and is envisaged by the law. As a result, authorities regularly give their permission. Nevertheless, human rights protection organizations have expressed their concern in relation to the provision of the law according to which political parties and other organizations shall file a written report to the local authorities five days prior to a rally, which in essence restricts the possibility of spontaneous demonstrations *(U. S. Department of State 2015, 25)*.

According to Freedom House, the civil society in Georgia has been sufficiently established, although it is mainly concentrated in the capital. However, trade union activities are weak.

Protests of sexual minorities have recently intensified in Georgia, which are usually ended by a collision between demonstrators, on one hand, and the police with public against them, on the other hand. Thus, on May 17, which is observed as the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, thousands of their opponents, including representatives of Georgian Orthodox Church tried to prevent the march by attacking and throwing stones at the participants in 2012 and 2013 *(Amnesty International 2013; Megrelishvili, Shorena 2014)*. Demonstrations continued in the following days, protesting against the disruption

* Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

[4] See "Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations" (No. IIc-763 of 12 June 1997). http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/84113/118638/F-161771408/GEO84113%20Eng.pdf (15.07.16).

of a peaceful march and condemning the use of violence against sexual minorities (*Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013a)*. Human rights organization accused police of not ensuring peaceful course of the march and not protecting the demonstrators. The next year in 2014 demonstrators refused to organize any activity on the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, stating that the authorities could not guarantee the security of the participants *(Amnesty International 2015, 160)*.

In 2013 and 2014 the demonstrations were diverse, but they were mostly related to social issues. Nonetheless, some of them can be mentioned and they are: protest of students of Agrarian University in 2013 *(Nikuradze 2013; Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013b)*, protest against new taxi licensing system *(Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013c)*, protests on religious issues *(Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013d)*. Demonstrations of workers organized in Poti in 2013 *(Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013e)*, in Zestaponium *(Freedom & Democracy Watch 2013f)*, in Tbilisi in 2014 *(Nikuradze 2014b)* and in many other regions were also significant, as participants demanded to rise their salary and to improve their working conditions.

One of the large-scale protests organized by transport trade unions was a synchronized protest in different cities of Georgia in 2014. On July 22, drivers in Tbilisi, Poti, Batumi, Gori, Rustavi and in several other regions stopped cars and minibuses at 14:00 pm and for a minute horns were beeping in protest. The reason of the protest was an insufficient response of responsible bodies to Valery Esvanjia's case who had died of a passenger's attack few days ago. The protesters were demanding severe punishment of the culprit *(Freedom & Democracy Watch 2014)*.

16-day long mass protests against violence against women were also launched in 22 cities and regions on November 25, which was observed as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women *(Nikuradze 2014a)*.

In relation to other political variables included in the model, it should be stated that the indicators of "Political Stability" with 35,92 points and "Rule of Law" with 64,42 points increased in 2014, which were the highest registered over

the period. Moreover, the indicator of the "Rule of Law" in Georgia is the highest out of 9 countries studied in this research[5].

Corruption Perceptions Index measured by ranking scale of 0-100, (where 0 implies the total corruption and effectively 100 indicate its absence) was improved by 34 points in 2014 and Georgia occupied the 50th place out of 175 countries and territories within the mentioned period of 1999-2014. The indicator wasn't changed in 2015 and the country held the 48th place out of 168 countries and territories[6]. Corruption Perceptions Index of Georgia was the highest among 9 countries within the mentioned period.

By summarizing, it should be noted that the curve of the PFI had a positive trend within 1995-2014 period. The indicator of the PFI with 0,269 points registered in 1995 with some fluctuations had been gradually improving and reached to 0,515 points in 2014. The best indicator of the PFI was recorded with 0,531 points in 2012 mostly due to the peaceful change of power consistent with the Constitution and expressed by parliamentary majority of the opposition "Georgian Dream" Coalition (see Figure 1, Table 1). The next 2013 decline was caused by the victory of "Georgian Dream" Coalition candidate in the presidential elections. Moreover, constitutional reforms entered into force and the following situation emerged: legislative and executive powers were concentrated in one force, precisely in the hands of "Georgian Dream" Coalition by violating the principle of separation of powers. Meanwhile, the variable of Political System has grown since 2013, as a result of the transition to a new parliamentary model of governance. Thus, the growth of the PFI was stipulated by the increase of the indicators of Political Stability, Rule of Law, Social Unrest variables as well as indicators of Global Gender Gap (see Figure 1, Table 1).

[5] See the official site of the WB at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (20.02.2016).

[6] See the official site of the Transparency International at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results ; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/ (17.01.2016).

3.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

In accordance with the results of the research, the EFI had a positive impact on the IDL in 2013/2014. The EFI has had a stable growth since 2010 and the highest indicator of 0,783 points was registered in 2014 (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The growth of the GDP of Georgia was recovered and valued 4,6% compared to 3,4% in the previous year *(World Bank 2015, 2)*.

The severance of diplomatic relations with Russia resulted from the Russian-Georgian conflict, the world crisis followed by a Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014, the Russian economic crisis, decline of oil prices as well as other factors have had an impact on economic developments in Georgia. Economic problems in Russia led to the decline of Georgia's export volumes and tourism as well as reduction of remittances. And despite unfavorable external economic factors listed above, the internal economic activity of the country wasn't reduced.

The economic growth was mainly stipulated by the recovery of private investments and domestic demand in 2014 *(World Bank 2015, 2; EDRC 2015, 44)*. The construction sector contributed to the growth of total investment by 16,3% in 2008 reached to 28,5% of GDP, which has been the highest indicator since the crisis (*World Bank 2015, 2)*. However, negative impact of external factors slowed down the economic growth, reaching down to 2,8% in 2015. External trade, which is the largest sector of economy suffered the most *(World Bank 2016, 1)*.

Not only Georgian-Russian trade relations were improved, but also volumes of export to Russia were increased. According to the data accumulated in 2014, Georgia, after Azerbaijan and Armenia, is the third country that exports goods to Russia *(EDRC 2015, 46-47)*.

On observing the variables included in the model, we can denote that within the indicated period the consecutive growth of GNI, indices of External trade, Domestic credit, Economic Freedom as well as FDI were registered in 2013-2014 compared to the previous years[7].

[7] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (19.03.2016).

It should also be noted that FDI has significanly increased and 2% indicator registered in 2012 went up to 10% of GDP in 2014[8]. Moreover, 40% investments were from the EU states *(EDRC 2015, 49)*.

According to the 2015 report[9], in relation to the Index of Economic Freedom, Georgia is ranked 22nd out of 178 countries. Georgia 73,0 rating is above the global average of 60,4, which qualifies its economy as "mostly free" *(Miller & Kim 2015, 4, 72, 217-218)*. In particular, trade and investment regimes are free in Georgia. It does not define quantitative trade restrictions, meanwhile, 90% of goods and services are not imposed with import tariffs, and it has free trade agreements with CIS and all neighboring countries *(EDRC 2015, 52)*.

On June 27, 2014 the Association Agreement was signed between Georgia and the EU as well as "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area"[10] agreement. It will lay the foundation for Georgia's gradual integration into the EU economy, to the growth of investment and trade volumes, as well as for further economic and political reforms.

3.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

The observation of the curve of the SFI denotes that it had a positive trend in 1995-2014. Particularly, the growth of the last decade was more intensive and hence the indicator of 0,818 recorded in 2013 was the highest over the indicated period (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The social protection is one of the most vulnerable sectors of public life in Georgia. In recent years the Georgian government has been taking steps to

[8] See ibid.

[9] The value of the Index of Economic Freedom in the IDL model was accepted and observed as an index of 2014, since to value the Index of Economic Freedom the experts of "Heritage" Foundation mainly counted the indicators accumulated within the period from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014.

[10] See "Association agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part", Official Journal of the European Union, 20 August 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/pdf/eu-ge_aa-dcfta_en.pdf (20.07.2016). The parliament of Georgia ratified it on July 18, 2014, whereas the EU Parliament on December 18, 2014. The Agreement came into force on July 1, 2016 and prior it has been ratified by all legislative bodies of the EU MS.

improve its social situation. "Georgian Dream" Coalition when coming into office increased social expenditure. Thus, 38,1% of the state budget was allocated to healthcare expenditure and social security system in 2015 *(Ministry of Finance of Georgia 2015, 8)*. The increase of social expenditure resulted in the opportunity to lower social assistance threshold and to raise minimum pensions (in April and September 2013). Almost half of social expenditure (17,3%) allocated from state budget was directed to provide pensions in 2015. However, social policy reforms have not yet contributed to the substantial reduction of poverty, which is one of major problems of the country's social sector *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 21)*.

Poverty reduction trend continued in 2014. Thus, the poverty rate US$2,5 per day (PPP adjusted) decreased from 47% registered in 2010 to 32,8% in 2014. Despite this, a significant difference in poverty rates between rural and urban areas still persists. 43% of rural population poverty is two times more compared to 21% of urban population poverty *(World Bank 2016, 6)*.

One of important social issues is the polarization of the society in terms of income. Gini index of 42,1 points rose sharply in 2009-2010 due to the crisis, and gradually decreasing in 2013 it reached to 40 the level of which is estimated as high[11].

Unemployment decreased by 1,2% and reached to 13,4%[12] in 2014 and it is also one of vulnerable sectors in Georgia. Meanwhile, urban unemployment rate has been continuously high caused by the low labour force demand *(World Bank 2016, 6)*.

Despite these positive trends and social reforms in 2014, SFI had a slight decline conditioned by the reduction of Real wage because of inflation[13].

[11] See the official site of World Bank at. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end= 2013& locations=GE&start=1996 (01.07.2016).

[12] See the official site of World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS? locations =GE (01.07.2016).

[13] The source is National Statistics Agency of Georgia at: http://www.geostat.ge/ (01.07.2016), calculations of the researcher.

3.4 Educational Factors Index (EFI)

The EdFI has lately remained unchanged and the trend of post-crisis years is negative. The EdFI indicator equaled to the level registered in 1995 and the best one was recorded in 2009 (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The improvement of educational quality and learning outcomes are important issues in Georgia. According to international studies, the majority of pupils and students in Georgia have below average levels in reading, mathematics and science. One of government initiatives aimed at improving educational quality was "Main Directions for Education and Science Development, 2014–2024" programme, which includes the strategic vision of development and reforms of the sphere. Ongoing school curricula reforms, introduction of a new teacher evaluation and professional development system, computer testing of final exams as well as special attention to higher education reforms and quality control were other initiatives outlined by the government *(World Bank 2015, 7, 2016, 7-8)*.

Georgia joined the Bologna system in 2005, effectively eliminating the corruption in examining process with the introduction of national examinations system. Nevertheless, this increased the demand for private tutors *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 21)*.

As for HDI Education Index included in the model, it remained unchanged (0,70) in recent years. In 2014 mean years of schooling were 12,1 years and 13,8 were calculated as expected years of schooling[14]. Moreover, mean years of schooling in Georgia increased by only 0,4 years, whereas expected years of schooling for 1 year within the period mentioned *(UNDP 2015, 2-3)*.

In contrast, trends for government expenditure on education have been negative in recent years and they have gradually reduced since post-crisis years[15].

[14] HDI education index is measured by mean of two indicators, 1. mean years of schooling for adults aged 25 (average schooling years of maximum 15 years spent in school and / or vocational training institutions) 2. expected years of schooling for children of school entering age (maximum of 18 years of schooling that children are expected to have (including master's degree studies)).

[15] See the official site of the WB http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS (19.07.2016).

3.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

HFI increased by fluctuations during 1995-2009, meanwhile it had a stable trend of decrease during 2010-2013. Hence, the indicator was imporved only in 2014. It is worth mentioning that the highest indicator of HFI (0,682) was recorded in 2009 just like in case of EdFI (see Figure 1, Table 1). The decrease of HFI in the last years had been conditioned by the reduction of Health Expenditure. In fact, it decreased from 10,2% to 7,2% of GDP in 2013. Nevertheless, a slight increase to 7,4% was noticed in 2014. The mentioned indicators are below the average low compared to the EU and Central Asia countries. In contrast to Health Expenditure, Life expectancy at birth, which is another variable of HFI, had been gradually increasing. Hence, in 1995-2014 it was increased by 4,5 years and respectively it went up from 70,2 years up to 74,7[16].

Significant progress was made in implementing the Millennium Development Goals. In fact, mortality under age 5 per 1000 live births was reduced from 47 to 13, whereas maternal mortality per 100000 live births fell from 50 to 41 in 1990-2013 *(World Bank 2016, 7)*.

Georgia is quickly shifting to universal public health programs. Public health program was introduced in 2012, according to which medical expenses are partially or totally met by the state for all citizens only with the exception of those, who receive private health insurance *(World Bank 2015, 6)*.

[16] See the official site of World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS?locations=GE (19.07.2016).

3.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 2

The Index of Democracy Level of Georgia in the time span between 1995-2014*



Observing the data provided in Figure 2, it can be stated that the IDL trend was positive in 1995-2014. Moreover, the IDL decrease was also noticed in 2013 compared to 2012. A sharp increase of the latter was stipulated by competitive parliamentary elections and a peaceful change of power endorsed by the Constitution. It is of no coincidence that the IDL of 2012 with 0,588 points is the second highest value registered in 1995-2014.

The decrease of PFI and HFI indicators influenced on the decrease of the IDL in 2013. In reference to 2014, the IDL was registerd with the highest indicator of 0,608 over the period of 1995-2014. The rise of the IDL curve was due to the increase of PFI, EFI as well as HFI indicators and with the stability of EdFI. The

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

lowest indicator of the IDL of Georgia was recorded in 1998 with the value of 0,358 points.

According to the data accumulated by "Caucasus barometer" in 2015, 47% of the population preferred democracy to other systems. Moreover, that indicator was equal to 65% in 2011 and it indicates the growth of public skepticism towards democratic norms and principles in the state. Meanwhile, only 2% of the population considered Georgia a democratic country, yet 45% considered it a democratic with major problems as well as 17% assume that it is not democratic at all *(CRRC 2015)*.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that in comparison with South Caucases countries, the progress of the country in the reforms of public administration sphere, liberalization of market relations, fight against corruption, holding competitve elections as well as enforcing processs of other democratic norms is evident.

The low level of the IDL fluctuations (St. dev.=0,09, mean=0,46) denotes the smooth course of democratization and consolidation in Georgia.

3.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

By means of regression analysis, the variables which had a significant influence on the IDL of Georgia were cleaned.

A significant correlation has been established between the IDLi* and political

indicators, such as Political Stability/Absence of Conflict, included in this model.

$$Y' = 0{,}01x_1 + 0{,}289 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}794),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Political Stability/Absence of Conflict, x_1 is Political Stability/Absence of Conflict.

The following correlation has been established between the IDLi and variables of SFI External trade rate and Domestic credit.

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

$$Y' = 0{,}005x_2 + 0{,}091 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}795),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the index of External trade rate), x_2 is the index of External trade rate (% of GDP)

$$Y' = 0{,}007x_3 + 0{,}275 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}835),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the index of Domestic credit), x_3 is the index of Domestic credit (% of GDP).

The following equation was calculated for health indicators

$$Y' = 0{,}06x_4 - 4{,}05 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}957),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Life expectancy), x_4 is the Life expectancy.

$$Y' = 0{,}036x_5 - 0{,}17 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}196),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Health expenditure), x_5 is Health expenditure (% of GDP).

In accordance with the accumulated data, the variable of the Political Stability of the PFI played a significant role on the democracy in Georgia and the positive change with 1 unit will lead to the increase of the IDLi with 0, 011 unit. The mentioned variable explaines 80% of IDLi variation.

The variables of the External trade rate and Domestic credit also influenced on the IDLi of Georgia. 1% growth of the External trade rate and Domectic credit of GDP will lead to the increase of IDLi respectively with 0,005 and 0,00 units. The Economic Factors have particularly the highest determination coefficient and explain 79-83% of IDLi variation.

Life expectancy change with 1 year and the 1% increase of Health expenditure will bring the increase of the IDLi respectively with 0,06 and 0,036 units. It must be mentioned that the variable of Life expectancy explains 96% of IDLi variation, which is indeed a very high indicator.

There was no significant correlation between the Social and Educational Factors included in the model

In fact, The Political Stability, the External trade rate, Domestic credit, Life expectancy and Health expenditure mostly affect the IDLi.

The process of reforms in aforementioned areas shall be continued for ensuring progress and consolidation of democratic processes.

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Abbreviations

CIS	Cooperation of Independent States
CoE	Council of Europe
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EFI	Economic Factors Index
EU	European Union

GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
MM	Mass media
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFI	Political Factors Index
RG	Republic of Georgia
RG	Republic of Georgia
SFI	Social Factors Index
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNM	United National Movement

CHAPTER 4.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF AZERBAIJAN

VAHAN HUNANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Azerbaijan in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Azerbaijan in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,199	0,092	0,598	0,414	0,148	0,232
1996	0,230	0,364	0,606	0,425	0,179	0,321
1997	0,253	0,415	0,614	0,421	0,157	0,342
1998	0,260	0,407	0,619	0,417	0,171	0,344
1999	0,284	0,327	0,623	0,468	0,180	0,340
2000	0,230	0,343	0,589	0,446	0,155	0,314
2001	0,267	0,374	0,597	0,431	0,158	0,337
2002	0,248	0,472	0,665	0,410	0,170	0,361
2003	0,247	0,599	0,672	0,418	0,299	0,409
2004	0,281	0,641	0,695	0,428	0,388	0,447
2005	0,262	0,588	0,715	0,406	0,399	0,426
2006	0,284	0,570	0,726	0,383	0,320	0,421
2007	0,276	0,542	0,764	0,386	0,274	0,410
2008	0,273	0,528	0,800	0,379	0,244	0,405
2009	0,281	0,533	0,850	0,431	0,332	0,430
2010	0,275	0,538	0,865	0,409	0,309	0,425
2011	0,251	0,570	0,903	0,389	0,294	0,424
2012	0,259	0,600	0,949	0,368	0,316	0,440
2013	0,248	0,624	0,969	0,391	0,327	0,448
2014	0,241	0,639	0,987	0,391	0,357	0,454

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

4.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

PFI of the IDL of Azerbaijan has declined since 2010 (see Figure 1, Table 1). This has been stipulated with recent developments in the country. Ilham Aliyev and his entourage have achieved their main goal, which is to sieze the control of all state institutions, neutralize the last representatives of the opposition, subjugate civil society, and punish those, who dared even slightly go against the course set by ruling elite, and, as a result, create uncontrollable authoritarian regime where all decisions are made by the President.

All this abovementioned has been achieved due to marginalization of the political opposition, extreme restrictions on the media, violent crackdown on peaceful gatherings and protests, as well as making the penalty instruments of some laws stricter and more severe. During the last two and three years, the authorities have silenced and imprisoned almost all civic activists, independent journalists, human rights defenders. The criticism voiced by the human rights organization and various international platforms has been neglected and disregarded by officials in Baku. The situation is being deteriorated and we can hardly expect any positive developments in the future.These processes take place in the context of consolidation of the Aliyevs' clan in Azerbaijan. In March 2009, referendum on amendments to constitution was held as a result of which restriction of the right for the same candidate to be elected more than twice was abolished de facto granting Aliyev with the opportunity to become a lifelong President. In 2013 presidential elections, Ilham Aliyev predictably won receiving 84,5 % of the vote (result typical of Eastern dictatorships) and became the President for the third time.

Since 1995 parliamentary elections, Milli Mejlis has always been under the control of the President and "New Azerbaijan" ruling party and since 2005 up to present "New Azerbaijan" party has had an absolute majority in Milli Mejlis[1]. In

[1] For more details on 2013 presidential and 1995-2010 parliamentary elections, see Hunanyan Vahan 2015. The IDL of Azerbaijan// Comparative Analysis of the Index of Democracy Level: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Moldova, edited By Arusyak Aleksanyan. Yerevan; Yerevan State University publication, pages 79-83.

fact, Azerbaijani parliament has turned into a "rubber stamp" body which expresses its consent to legislative initiatives of the executive without any serious or critical discussions. It's noteworthy that none of the elections held in Azerbaijan so far have been considered free and fair by internatioanl observers and intimidation of voters as well as carousel voting and ballot stuffing have become commonplace (Freedom House 2015).

On November 1, 2015 the fifth parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan. The main opposition parties, which participated, but hadn't received any mandates in the previous elections, this time boycotted the elections claiming that they did not see any possibility to hold fair elections. The OSCE/ODIHR refused to send an observation mission citing restrictions created by the government and ongoing crackdown on dissent (BBC 2015).

Although the European Parliament also decided not to send observers, the representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) were in Azerbaijan to fulfill the observation mission. It should be mentioned, that a significant number of PACE MPs are known to be under the influence of Azerbaijani caviar diplomacy and, therefore, it is not surprising that the elections were positively assessed by this delegation. Nevertheless, the observation mission positive report was not unanimously adopted with the corresponding correlation of 16 to 7 votes. Such a split in opinions was unprecedented in the history of the PACE observation missions. Moreover, three other members of the mission adopted a separate critical opinion about the election (Human Rights House Network 2015).

In accordance with the assessment and a long-term election monitoring conducted by independent international NGO "European Platform for Democratic Elections", the process of parliamentary elections were accompanied by numerous incidents of political imprisonment, violations of freedom of assembly and expression and pressures exerted against the candidates. The election campaign was characterized with limitations, such as the absence of televised debates. Besides, the candidates were not given free air time and administrative resources were used in favor of the ruling party and candidates supported by it (European Platform for Democratic Elections 2014). As it was expected the ruling party won

receiving 71 seats thus maintaining an absolute majority in a 125 seat parliament. 42 independent candidates as well as 11 other parties passed into Mejlis. From these 11 parties each received a mandate with the exception of one. It should be noted that these small parties as well as the prevailing majority of independent members of parliament are under the control of the government *(Guliyev 2015, 2-3)*. In fact, the main purpose of their existence is to create an appearance of democracy and pluralism.

Table 2

Ratio of the seats received by the political parties in the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan (Parliamentary elections in 2015)[2]

Political Parties, blocs and participants	2015
	Majoritarian representation
"Great revival" Party	1
"Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front Party"	2
''Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment" Party	1
''Great Liberation Party ''	1
"New Azerbaijan" Party	71
"Social justice" Party	1
"Civil Solidarity" Party	1
"Civic Union" Party	1
"Party of Democratic Reform"	1
Unity Party	1
Non-Partizans	42
"Democratic Party of Azerbaijan"	1
"Motherland" Party	1
Total	***125***

[2] The source of the data: European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2015, Azerbaijan, November, 20 // http://www.europeanforum.net/country/azerbaijan#top (12.02.2016).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation[3]



Table 3

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation in Milli Mejlis

Electoral representation	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Majoritarian	100	100	125	125	125
Proportional	25	25	0	0	0
Total	**125**	**125**	**125**	**125**	**125**

Human rights and freedoms. Taking advantage of the fact, that international community has been preoccupied with the events happening in Syria and Ukraine, the Azerbaijani authorities since 2013 have launched an unprecedented attack to completely suppress any manifestations of the freedom of opinion or dissent as well as to oust the western human rights organizations working in the country. In

[3] The source of the data: Heinrich, Andreas. 2010. "The Formal Political System in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A Background Study." Research Centre for East European Studies 107:1-63, http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/images/stories/pdf/ap/fsoap107.pdf (28.02.2016); Guliyev, Farid. 2015. "The 2015 Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan: The Neglected Category of Independents." Caucasus Analytical Digest 79:1-19.

order to silence the critics within the country, the authorities have used diverse arsenal of tools such as beatings, threats, fabrication of criminal cases for drug use, illegal possession of weapons, hooliganism, incitement and even treason *(Economist 2013)*.

For "smoothing" the foreign criticism, the strategy of Azerbaijan involves the use of caviar diplomacy skills, in particular, the bribing of the various western politicians to neutralize the criticizing reports and resoultions on human rights situation in Azerbaijan on the international platforms and, as a result, to create positive image of the country worldwide (ESI 2012). Also, one of the favourite tools of Baku is accusations of the critics with Islamophobia or accusations of bribery by the Armenian lobby.

To suppress the independent "voices" of the civil society the government significantly restricted the scope of activities of local and international NGOs by reducing their financial capacity and increasing administrative responsibility for them in accordance with the new amendments to the law[4] on NGOs' activities having been adopted in 2013 (Muradova 2013). The situation deteriorated even further with the additional restrictions being introduced the next year. The consent of the Ministry of Justice was necessary to receive international grants, besides that, unregistered NGOs were forbidden to receive funds from donors (Hug 2015, 14).

Meanwhile, the state supports the activities government-organized non-governmental organizations, which promote the goals preferred by the government and hamper the activities of independent NGOs.

The renowned international NGOs, such as IREX, NDI and Oxfam terminated their activities in the country due to violent actions and pressure, undertaken by the authorities of Azerbaijan in 2013-2014 *(RFE / RL's Azerbaijani Service 2014a)*.

The US President Barack Obama in his speech referred to an unprecedented wave of repressions in Azerbaijan, noting that "laws make it incredibly difficult for NGOs even to operate *(White House Office 2014)*. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Muižnieks sharply criticized Baku for the "totally

[4] "Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on non-governmental organizations, public associations and funds" on 13 June 2000 №894-IQ http://www.base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=2619 (12.02.2016).

unacceptable" situation in the field of human rights (Kramer and Kauzlarich 2014).

New restrictions were imposed on media sector, which had been almost completely controlled by the government anyway. In May 2013 the Parliament amended the law on defamation extending the sentence of a three-year imprisonment also for the materials published on the Internet (Lejava and Breitmaier, 2014). In Azerbaijan, journalists and bloggers who freely express their opinion find themselves in a situation where they have three choices: "shut up, flee abroad or be jailed on trumped-up charges"*(Reporters without Borders 2014)*. In December 2014, the Azerbaijani authorities as a part of ongoing crackdown on free media forced to shut down RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service *(RFE / RL's Azerbaijani Service 2014a)*. Earlier in 2009 BBC, RFE/RL and Voice of America radio broadcastings were banned and international journalists more or less critical of Azerbaijani government de facto are not allowed to enter the country. The fact that media is in unbearable conditions is proved by the index of freedom of the press of Azerbaijan, evaluated by the Freedom House. The index has been continuously declining from 71 points in 2003 (the year Ilham Aliyev came to power) to 87 points in 2014. As such, Azerbaijan's score has approached "the worst of the worst" group where, for example, North Korea[5] is included.

In accordance with the list published in October 2013 by Human Rights Club organization located in Baku, 142 journalists, religious activists and human rights defenders were political prisoners *(Antidze 2013)*. Under such circumstances, the most astonishing and "ridiculous" is the fact that when the report on political prisoners in Azerbaijan was introduced by German MP Strasser in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan by using its caviar diplomacy skills, prevented its adoption.

The main arguments brought forward by the MPs who were against the resolution, was that Strasser hadn't visited Azerbaijan to get acquainted with the real situation on the ground. And this is in the case, where Azerbaijani government has denied the entrance to the German MP. Later, President Aliyev using the failure of the resolution while visiting Brussels announced that there were no political prisoners in the country, as the PACE rejected the

[5] See the official site of "Freedom House" at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (21.01.2016).

abovementioned resolution *(RFE / RL 2014)*.

The Azerbaijani government used its methods of getting rid of the critics not only local and international NGOs or individuals, but international organizations as well. In 2014 upon the request of Azerbaijan the mandate of the OSCE office in Baku was significantly reduced (the following year the office was eventually closed). OSCE/ODIHR observers constantly criticized organization of the elections in Azerbaijan noting numerous violations. The presidential elections in 2013 also were severely criticized. OSCE/ODIHR particularly pointed out that the elections were characterized by the restriction of the freedom of expression, assembly and association and by the intimidation of the candidates and voters as well as by the restrictive media environment. Moreover, 58% of counting of votes in the obsereved polling stations were assessed as bad or very bad *(RFE / RL's Azerbaijani Service 2013a).* That assessment appeared to be the "last straw" for Aliyev and he decided to get rid of the organization's control.

Given the situation in Azerbaijan, the EU only in 2014 issued 17official statements and in September, the same year, European Parliament passed a resolution calling to impose sanctions against official Baku *(European Parliament 2014; European Commission 2015)*.

It is noteworthy, that irrespective of close cooperation with the EU in the energy sphere, Azerbaijan refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, as it would be obliged to implement democratic reforms as a result. Besides, the country is currently not eligible to sign the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade agreement, which is an integral part of the Association Agreement, due to its non-membership of the WTO. More importantly, Azerbaijan has no interest in the agreement. In reality, the Azerbaijani authorities want to have Strategic Modernization Partnership with the EU *(Alieva 2015)*. This, in fact, will enable Azerbaijan to sustain the cooperation with the EU in energy or in any other desired areas, by simultaneously getting rid of conditions connected with human rights and democracy, which, in turn, is unacceptable for the Union. As a result, EU-Azerbaijan relations have stalled. Recently, signing of the Visa facilitation agreement in November 2013 and Readmission Agreement in February 2014, were important developments in the EU-Azerbaijan relations. These agreements came into force in September 2014. Furthermore, EU and Azerbaijan signed an

agreement on the Mobility Partnership in December 2013 *(European Commission 2016a).*

In accordance with the estimations, carried out by Freedom House both the Political Rights and Civil Liberties were rated as "not free". These two indices were estimated with 6 units out of the 7, where 7 rates completely not free and 1rates completely free. Moreover, the Civil Liberties were assessed with 5 within the time span of 2000-2012, but in 2013 and 2014 the number went down to 6, due to intense pressure and intolerance of dissent. Political Rights had a value of 5 units only in 1991-1992, and after that period the constant 6 units[6] have been sustained so far.

Civil disobedience*. The right to freedom of assembly has been constantly violated in Azerbaijan. Since 2005 the authorities haven't allowed the opposition to hold any rallies in the center of Baku *(Chatam House 2013)*. In November 2012 and May 2013, parliament amended laws[7] increasing the fines by more than hundredfold for involvement in unauthorized protests and increasing the maximum jail sentence from 15 to 60 days for minor public order offenses *(Human Rights Watch 2014)*.

Despite those limitations, many cases of civil disobedience were registered in 2013. The record shows that electoral years such as 2013 are accompanied by mass demonstrations and clashes with the police.

Nevertheless, the year started with the expressions of protests of not so much political but social nature. During winter, a number of large-scale protests were held in Baku and in other several cities as well as Ismayil, located 200 kilometers

[6] See the official site of "Freedom House" at https://freedomhouse.org/reporttypes/freedom-world (10.02.2016).

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was chosen for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

[7] "Law on the Freedom of assembly in Azerbaijan" on November 13, 1998 a №537-IГ // http://base. spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=2680 (10.02.2016).

north-east from Baku. Protests in Ismayil were caused by the abuse of power by the local elites, corruption and growing social inequality.The protesters were demanding the resignation of the Ismayili mayor appointed by the authorities. The Baku protests were caused by deaths of soldiers in peacetime and unhealthy atmosphere in the army on the whole and were accompanied by demands of resignation of the Defense Minister Abiyev *(Geybullayeva 2013)*. Regardless of the fact that the government had been resorting to force to disperse the demonstrations, protests were held on a continuous basis throughout the year.

Prior to the demonstration scheduled on March 10, the government arrested seven leading members of the NIDA youth opposition movement, who were charged with an alleged plan to instigate violence at a peaceful protest as well as drugs and illegal weapons possession and were sentenced accordingly *(Human Rights Watch 2014)*.

There were also demonstrations of mainly social nature that took place in Bina Trade Center. Nearly 1,000 traders gathered to protest a sharp increase in rents by blocking one of the main highways in Baku. The police forcefully dispersed the participants as it was usually done in those cases *(RFE / RL's Azerbaijani Service 2013b)*.

In 2013 the Aliyev regime implemented the necessary measures to cement its rule. Opposition politicians Ilgar Mammadov (who was planning to run for presidency) and Tofig Yagublu were charged with inciting violence in Ismayil town and were subsequently imprisoned. Renowned activist Anar Mammadli was arrested on fabricated charges and was confined to imprisonment when observer organization headed by him criticized the government for many shortcomings registered during the presidential elections. And despite the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which the authorities shall release Mammadov and pay compensation, he has been in prison thus far *(Gogia 2014)*.

In response to growing western and international criticism, Ramiz Mehdiyev, head of the Presidential Administration (and in fact the second most influential person in the country), accused the US of creating the fifth column and an agent network with the help of non-governmental organizations and by that preparing a color revolution in Azerbaijan. He also qualified the investigations of the independent media as an anti-Azerbaijani activity directed from outside

(Mehdiyev 2014). Hence, this demonstrates Azerbaijani elite's perception of independent civil society representatives as foreign agents and a group of traitors aiming to overthrow government by a revolution.

After Ilham Aliyev's "overwhelming success" in the presidential elections, the opposition organized protests claiming that numerous violations had taken place and demanding to annul the results. As before, the protests were dispersed with the use of force (*Grove 2013)*.

After the presidential elections Aliyev, taking advantage of the fact that international attention was concentrated on the Ukrainian crisis, toughened repressive measures. The arrests of human rights defender and lawyer Leyla Yunus and her husband Arif Yunus, a prominent journalist Rauf Mirkadirov and Khadjia Ismayilova and an activist Anar Mammadli on trumped-up charges such as treason and spying for Armenia were only some vivid examples of the wave of repressions that struck the country. This process continued unabated even after Azerbaijan assumed the presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

Despite the ongoing repression, the opposition continued to organize mass demonstrations and protests, which got especially intensified in the fall. The main organizer of protests was the National Council of Azerbaijani Democratic Forces which united opposition parties. The main demands of the protestors were the release of political prisoners, stopping human rights violations and end of Ilham Aliyev's 11-year rule *(RFE / RL's Azerbaijani Service 2014b)*.

Referring to other variables included in the model, it should be mentioned that the 2014 index of Political Stability in comparison with 2013 declined by 3,5 points, whereas the index of the "Rule of Law" rose by 0,9 points[8]. In Global Gender Gap (GGG) report by the World Economic Forum included in the PFI aims to assess the gender equality and Azerbaijan occupied the 99th place in 2013 and the 94th place in 2014 respectively. The progress was achieved in the context of improvements in subindicies of educational, health and especially economic opportunities of the GGG index, and at the same time, some decline in political participation. Azerbaijan has low indicators in health and political participation of

[8] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx# reports (20.02.2016).

the GGG, and relatively better indicators in economic and educational subindex[9].

The Corruption Perceptions Index of Azerbaijan went up by 0,1 points in 2014. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is considered one of the most corrupted countries and occupied the 126th place out of 175 states and territories[10]. In the last two-three years, international media have published many articles on Aliyev's and his closest circle's businesses registered in different countries worldwide. It is of no coincidence that one of international NGOs involved in the investigation of corruption named Ilham Aliyev as the top face of the corruption in 2013 *(Coalson 2013)*. Another revelation of Ilham Aliyev's as well as his family members multimilion wealth was made after the publication of the famous Panaman papers *(Euronews 2016)*. Also, a well-known journalist Khadija Ismayilova was punished exactly for revealing to the public the results of the investigation of Aliyev's assets. The analysis of data shows (see Figure 1 and Table 1) that the PFI declined both in 2013 and 2014. Moreover, the value in 2014 was higher only of the results registered in the years of 2000, 1996 and 1995. This is not surprising taking into account that unprecedented repressions were applied in Azerbaijan by the regime during the mentioned period. One of the observers describes this period in Azerbaijan as dark times. Within the observed two-year period, the reasons for the decline of the PFI was worsening state of Press Freedom, low results registered in Political rights and Civil liberties (similar result was registered only in 1995), an increasing number of cases of social unrest and civil disobedience.

4.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

During the last decade, the considerable growth of GDP was recorded stipulated by the sales of hydrocarbons.

In 2014 the GDP of Azerbaijan increased by 2,8%, which is 3% lower than in the previous year *(World Bank Group 2015, 2)*. Therefore, the Gross national

[9] See the World Economic Forum of the Global Gender Gap at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=AZE (20.02.2016).

[10] See the official site of Anti-Corruption Center of Transperancy International at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (03.02.2016).

income per capita (GNI) showed relatively modest growth in 2014. It goes without saying, that the decline of oil prices in the international market played a major role in this case. In December 2013 the price per barrel was about US $ 106, whereas it was about $ 61 the next year *(IndexMundi 2015)*. In addition to the ongoing decline of oil prices in international markets, the country has passed the ultimate limits of its oil production and oil reserves will be exhausted approximately in 2034 *(Asian Development Bank 2014, 2)*. The expected exploitation of new gas reserves will start to be implemented at best from 2020 (in particular, the second phase of the Shah Deniz). All these above-mentioned will not be sufficient to offset the downfall of the revenues of the country in future.

Despite numerous statements made by the government about the development of non-oil sector, the country was unable to cope with the so-called Dutch Disease[11], caused by the intensive exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves. Oil exports make up 95,7% of the country's annual exports and 66% of the state budget revenues and 38% of GDP *(CESD 2015)*.

Exports from oil and non-oil sectors had declined in 2014 by 9% and 5,4% respectively. Because of the decreased demand the volume of imports dwindled by 10,6% *(World Bank Group 2015, 2)*. As a result, the trade of Azerbaijan decreased by about 6% in 2014[12].

The EU is the first trade partner of Azerbaijan, accounting for 42,4% of the country's trade turnover. But the bilateral trade has been recently decreased. The following depicts the situation: Azerbaijan exported goods equivalent to 14,4 billion to the EU and imported 3,7 billion euros in 2013; the volume of exports equaled to 13,2 billion, whereas the volume of import was 3,5 billion in 2014 and at last, 10,7 billion and 3,5 billion respectively in 2015. It should be noted, that in February 2014 the EU made a decision to defer GSP+ preferences from Azerbaijan, taking into account the fact that Azerbaijan was classified as an upper-middle income country by the World Bank *(European Commission 2016b)*. The major part of FDI is allocated in oil and gas sector. In comparison to 2013 the FDI rose by

[11] See more details on the Dutch Disease in Economist.2014. "What Dutch disease is, and why it's bad," 05 November. http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-2 (12.02.2016).

[12] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS (12.02.2016).

2,3%[13] in 2014 due to the final decision made on the exploitation of the second stage of Shah Deniz field.

Domestic credit remained almost unaltered within the years 2012-2013. Nonetheless, it increased significantly in 2014[14] and it could be conditioned by the government's attempts to enliven the economy and prevent the GDP from declining.

In 2013 the GDP of Azerbaijan registered 0,6% surplus, but there was 0,5% of GDP deficit in 2014[15]. It is necessary to note that more than half of the budget is financed through transfers from the State Oil Fund and this trend has been strengthening in the recent years. In 2013 more than 58% of the state budget revenues were allocated from the fund, whereas the transfers made in 2007 constituted only 9,7% of the budget *(Asian Development Bank 2014, 2)*. However, the proclaimed goal of the Fund creation was to collect revenues from the sales of hydrocarbons and to preserve them for future generations. As a comparison, transfers from similar fund in oil-exporting Norway may constitute to no more than 4% of the state budget *(Chatham House 2013, 3)*.

Over period under consideration inflation in Azerbaijan was relatively low – 2,4%, in 2013 and 1,4%[16] in 2014. Nonetheless, the Central Bank made significant monetary interventions to maintain the rate of the manat against the US dollar in 2014. As a result, US dollar reserves of the Central Bank were reduced more than three times - from 15,2 billion to 5,1 billion within the period from July 2014 to December 2015. Despite this, Azerbaijan was forced to adopt floating rate for manat in December 2015, resulting in the drastic devaluation of the manat. In February 0.78 manats were rated to 1 US dollar, but after the devaluation it was changed to a manat rate of 1,55 per 1 US dollar *(Zeynalova 2016)*. The devaluation

[13] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (05.03.2016).
[14] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS (05.03.2016).
[15] See the official site of the State statistical service of Azerbaijan at: http://www.stat.gov.az/indexen.php (05.03.2016).
[16] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG (05.03.2016).

of the manat had its certain negative impact on the inflation causing the rise of the indicator to 4,2%[17] in 2015.

The Index of Economic Freedom remained almost on the same level in 2014 recording a slight slump of 0,3 points compared to the previous year. Given the decline of the income from the sales of hydrocarbons, it will be necessary for Azerbaijan to carry out and implement reforms in the sphere of economy and to significantly liberalize it. The ruling elite already lost oppurtunity to do it when oil prices were high.

As it can be seen the EFI has been experiencing a continuous growth since 2010 and it has had a positive impact on the level of the IDL (Figure 1, Table 1). However, the pace of the growth has been slowed from year to year and in 2013-2014 the increase was correspondingly two times less than in 2011-2012.

4.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

Over the past decade, Azerbaijani government has managed to solve certain social issues that were troubling country since independence and has significantly reduced the level of poverty in the country with help of large revenues gained from the sales of hydrocarbon resources. The State Program on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2008-2015 aims to solve the poverty related issues in the country[18].

As in previous years, real wage continued to grow in 2013 and 2014. At the same time there is a considerable difference in the amount of salaries paid in various sectors of the economy and the division is as follows: high salaries are allocated in oil related industry and incomparable lower salaries in non-oil industry. There is also a considerable difference between incomes earned in the capital and in the regions *(European Commission 2014, 12)*. For that reason, State

[17] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG (05.03.2016).

[18] "State Program on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2008-2015" // Approved by the Decree #3043 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated of September 15, 2008 http://www.cled.az/pdf/others/Azerbaijan%20Poverty%20Program%20for% 202008 - 2015.pdf (20.03.2016).

Program on Socio-Economic Development of Regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2009-2013 Years aims to develop regions of the country[19].

Unemployment rate is stable and low around 5% in recent years[20]. Meanwhile, the European Commission in reference to this numbers stated that the methodology used was controversial and real unemployment rate was probably higher *(Ibid)*. In accordance with the estimations of Bertelsmann Foundation up to 25% of the population is unemployed *(BTI 2016, 28)*.

One of the problems of the country indicated by The World Bank when compared to most countries in Europe and Central Asia was the fact, that Azerbaijan allocated less resources for social protection, especially in the areas targeting the development of labor market policies and social assistance *(World Bank Group 2015, 5)*. Only one fourth of recipients of social assistance live below the national poverty line and this fact outlines the ineffectiveness of the mentioned program *(UNICEF 2014, 2)*.

Problems anticipated in the near future in the social sector of Azerbaijan will be caused by the sharp decline of oil prices in the world market and accordingly, less government revenues amassed from that very sector. This will trigger difficulties in the attempts to ensure social stability. Even though the official data have denoted a decline of inequality in the society during the recent years, the lion's share of the country's wealth is in the hands of the President, his family and subordinates and oligarchs *(Freedom House 2015, 93)*.

Judging from the diagram, it is evident that the SFI is growing and has a positive effect on the IDL (Figure 1, Table 1). The growth of the SFI was slight in 2013 and 2014, which can be explained by the fact that due to a slowdown in the economic growth, the government is less capable to commit resources to the social sector.

[19] "State Program on Socio-Economic Development of Regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2009-2013 Years." Approved by the Decree of Azerbaijan Republic dated April 14, 2009. http://www.cled.az/pdf/others/Azerbaijan%20Regional%20Development%20Programe%20for%202009-2013.pdf (20.03.2016).

[20] See the official site of Eurostat at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/european-neighbourhood-policy/enp-east/data/database (20.03.2016).

4.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

One of the greatest problems of the educational system is the very low level of enrollment in preschool and higher education institutions. Preschool enrollment amounted to 14,8% in 2013, which is decline compared to the previous result of 16,9 % in 2011*(UNICEF 2013, 2)*. Nonetheless, the level of enrollment in elementary and secondary schools is quite high with corresponding indicators of 95%[21] and 88%[22] in 2014. It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the state revenues have increased the money directed to education have been reduced. Azerbaijan allocated 2,5%[23] of its GDP to education in 2013 (the lowest 2,1% was recorded in 2012) which is low compared to the most countries that have upper-middle income.

World Bank experts believe that the most important problems in the higher education system are related to the low level of enrollment and poor education quality. Enrolment in higher education institutions is 20% which is the second lowest indicator in the regions of Europe and Central Asia.

In addition, regardless of the fact that the country joined the Bologna process in 2005, higher education system does not meet with modern requirements necessary for providing proper education quality and the credibility of Azerbaijani diplomas and degrees are under the question *(World Bank Group 2015, 5)*. It is noteworthy that according to the Global Competitiveness Report in terms of the quality of education Azerbaijan occupies the 114th place among 144 countries and takes the 110th place in the fields of mathematics and sciences *(World Economic Forum 2014)*. In 2009 within the framework of international students' assessment program for 15 year-olds, Azerbaijan occupied the 64th place in reading skills, 63rd place in science and 45th in mathematics among 65 participating countries, and as a result of this, the country refused to participate in the test again in 2012. Similarly, according to numbers issued by the State Admission Commission, results of applicants are worsening year by year, which resulted in attaining the lowest

[21] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR/countries (08.05.2016).
[22] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.NENR/countries (08.05.2016).
[23] See the official site of the WB at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS (08.05.2016).

score threshold for admission to universities in order to be able to ensure the necessary number of students *(BTI 2016, 30)*. In 2013 Azerbaijan adopted a national strategy for the development of education in order to improve the quality of education[24]. Moreover, educational reforms are a priority for the 2014-2017 EU-Azerbaijan European Neighborhood Policy Instrument *(European Commission 2014, 21)*.

HDI (Human Development Index) Education Index (HDI.ed) had remained unchanged since 2011 and equals to 0.7 points. We can see that the lowest indicator of the EdFI was registered in 2012, the next year its value equaled to that registered in 2011 and it had not been changed ever since (Figure 1, Table 1).

4.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

Health expenditure constitutes to only 20,4% of total healthcare expenditure in the country[25] in 2014, which is the lowest indicator among other Eastern Partnership countries. In recent years, total health expenditure is fluctuating within the range of 5-6% of GDP[26].

Given little involvement of the state in meeting the healthcare expenses, the majority is paid by the population. Thus, 72,1% of the expenditure made in healthcare were "out of pocket" payments[27] in 2014. As a result, it becomes very difficult for socially vulnerable groups use the modern healthcare possibilities provided. According to the 2011 survey, 10% of Azerbaijani families were poor due to additional, out of pocket payments for healthcare *(World Bank Group 2015, 7)*.

During the last years some success has been recorded in efforts aimed at reducing an infant mortality rate. The mortality rate of children under 5 has been in correlation of 35 per 1000 live births in Azerbaijan, which is rather a high

[24] "National strategy for the development of education of October 24, 2013 http://azertag.az/ru/xeber/Gosudarstvennaya_strategiya_po_razvitiyu_obrazovaniya_v_Azerbaidzhanskoi_Respublike-109168 (25.01.2016).
[25] See the official site of the World Bank at: World Development Indicators: Health systems http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.15 (15.05.2016).
[26] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS/countries (15.05.2016).
[27] See the official site of the World Bank at: World Development Indicators: Health systems http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.15 (15.05.2016).

indicator for a country with an upper-middle income. Nonetheless, that number decreased two times when compared to the results recorded in the 90's *(UNICEF 2013, 2)*.

Life expectancy index generally has had a positive development and the country has made a significant progress in this direction since the 1990s'. However, the progress has slowed down in the past decade, and the indicators only slightly differ from each other within the last five years[28].

From analysis of Figure 1 and Table 1 it is clear that a certain progress was registered in 2013-214 in the HFI, thanks to the increase of the Life expectancy at birth and Healthcare expenditure.

4.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Azerbaijan in the time span between 1995-2014*



[28] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (25.01.2016).

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Figure 3 shows the dynamics of IDL within 1995-2014. As we can see, some growth of the IDL was registered in the observed years of 2013 and 2014, and it was higher in 2013 than in 2014. From Table 1, it is apparent that the growth of the IDL was stipulated by the EFI, SFI, EdFI an HFI, whereas PFI on the contrary decreased during two years. The hydrocarbon prices were still on a high level in the period examined and it served as a strong impetus for the development of the country's economy and respectively large-scale social expenses were made with help of gained revenues.

As it can be assumed from the results, the economic and social factors mainly enhance the growth of the IDL, whereas small increase in educational and health factors denotes that little attention is paid to that sector. The continuous decline of political factors is an evidence of the country's policy carried out by the repressive regime. It is interesting to note that the situation in Azerbaijan is similar to the examples of the so-called petro-authoritarian states of the past and the present, which are illustrated by the extreme restriction and control of political and civilian sectors of the public life while protesting attitudes as a result of this are mitigated by large-scale social subsidies.

4.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Vahan Hunanyan

Within the framework of the research the regression analysis illustrated the variables of Political, Economic, and Health Factors Indices, which had a significant influence on the IDL of Azerbaijan.

The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDL_i* and variables of Rule of Law and Corruption Perceptions Index.

$$Y' = 0{,}008x_1 + 0{,}211 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}630),$$

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the Rule of Law) and x_1 is the Rule of Law:

$$Y' = 0{,}105x_2 + 0{,}169 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}518),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Corruption Perceptions Index) and x_2 is the Corruption Perceptions Index.

The significant correlation has been established between the IDL_i and the EFI variables of the Budget deficit and Index of Economic Freedom.

$$Y' = 0{,}006x_3 + 0{,}059 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}706),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Index of Economic Freedom) and x_3 is the Index of Economic Freedom:

$$Y' = 0{,}031x_4 + 0{,}404 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}595),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the Budget deficit) and x_4 is the Budget deficit.

The significant correlation was established between the IDL_i and HDI Education Index.

$$Y' = 1{,}693x_5 - 0{,}768 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}554),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the HDI Education Index) and x_5 is the HDI Education Index.

The following equation has been done for the health indicators.

$$Y' = 0{,}022x_6 - 1{,}097 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}676),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the Life expectancy at birth) and x_6 is the Life expectancy.

So, from political factors the variables of the Rule of Law and the Corruption Perceptions Index have a considerable impact on the IDL of Azerbaijan and one unit change of both will lead to 0,008 and 0,105 units change in IDL_i respectively. 63 % variations of the dependent variable is conditioned by the Rule of Law, and 52% variations are conditioned by Corruption Perceptions Index.

From economic factors the Index of Economic Freedom as well as the Budget deficit/proficit both have an impact on the IDL of the country. The growth of the

index of economic freedom with 1% will bring to 0, 006 unit change on IDLi and respectively the positive increase with 1% of GDP will lead to 0,031 unit change on the IDLi. It should be noted that the Index of Economic Freedom has the highest determination coefficient of 71% of the variation of democracy. From educational factors, the growth of HDI Education Index by 0,1 unit will result in the growth of the IDL_i with 0,17 units. And from health factors the positive change of the Life expectancy by 1 year will bring to the growth of the IDL_i by 0,022 units.

The regression analysis shows, IDL of Azerbaijan mostly influenced by the Corruption Perception Index, Rule of Law, Economic Freedom, Budget deficit, HDI Education index and Life expectancy.

Hence, it is of essential importance to pay attention to the fight against corruption, to administer and further strengthen the rule of law. In the field of economy, Budget deficit should be as small as possible, improve the quality of education in the country and focus on healthcare in order to increase Life expectancy.

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Abbreviations

CB	Central Bank
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EFI	Economic Factors Index
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
MP	Member of Parliament
OSCE/ODIHR	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PFI	Political Factors Index
SFI	Social Factors Index
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 5.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF RUSSIA

ASHOT ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Russia in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Russia in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,344	0,189	0,506	0,398	0,145	0,306
1996	0,345	0,257	0,603	0,414	0,186	0,340
1997	0,343	0,307	0,603	0,414	0,295	0,364
1998	0,327	0,395	0,549	0,414	0,263	0,371
1999	0,315	0,448	0,493	0,414	0,195	0,366
2000	0,301	0,453	0,511	0,432	0,152	0,361
2001	0,317	0,422	0,526	0,452	0,170	0,366
2002	0,325	0,416	0,541	0,498	0,175	0,374
2003	0,309	0,460	0,553	0,488	0,152	0,377
2004	0,291	0,499	0,573	0,480	0,142	0,380
2005	0,293	0,502	0,599	0,504	0,144	0,387
2006	0,297	0,578	0,632	0,510	0,187	0,417
2007	0,285	0,587	0,685	0,519	0,218	0,425
2008	0,260	0,608	0,734	0,528	0,272	0,432
2009	0,290	0,455	0,694	0,535	0,371	0,412
2010	0,320	0,511	0,744	0,536	0,345	0,442
2011	0,304	0,593	0,783	0,536	0,361	0,462
2012	0,306	0,610	0,818	0,536	0,370	0,472
2013	0,325	0,670	0,842	0,536	0,395	0,501
2014	0,286	0,614	0,813	0,536	0,395	0,467

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

5.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The observation of PFI curve of the IDL shows that reforms of public administration and local self-government bodies, formation of new constituent entities within the Federation and redistribution of powers of local self-government bodies, Eurasian integration trends, barriers for participation of civil society organizations, tension in geopolitical and military situations in Western European countries, sanctions imposed by the Council of Europe, EU and US were of key importance in country's transition processes to democracy in 2013/2014.

The annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol city to the RF and creation of new entities in the RF was essentially important and had a strong influence on country's political and democratic processes in 2013-2014. This process has caused new geopolitical tensions and as a result, various assessments were made by international community. Anti-Russian sanctions were applied by EU, Council of Europe as well as Western European and NATO countries in response to which the RF also imposed anti-Western sanctions. Russia's further actions of "opposing" diplomacy stemmed from the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation[1], National Security Strategy[2] and provisions of Military Doctrine[3].

The PFI curve of the IDL of Russia increased in 2013 compared to 2003-2012 equaling to the indicator recorded in 2002. However, it declined again in 2014 compared to the previous years, recording 0,286 points. Thus, Figure 1 shows that the curve of the PFI declined in 2014 with 0,286 points compared to its value estimated by 0,344 points in 1995 over the period observed, which shows that the political factors negatively affected transitional processes of democratization in Russia. The low level of PFI was mainly conditioned by tensions of internal situation in Ukraine in November 2013 and by intensification of anti-Russian

[1] See "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" (Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on June 28, 2000). Accessed 11.07.2016. http://www.scrf. gov.ru/ documents/25.html.

[2] See "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020" (Approved By Decree of the President Of the Russian Federation 12 May 2009 No. 537). Accessed 11.07.2016. http://www.scrf. gov.ru/documents/99.html.

[3] See "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" ((Approved By Decree of the President Of the Russian Federation 5 February 2010). Accessed 11.07.2016. http://kremlin.ru/supplement/461.

sentiments. All aforementioned were caused by Russia's actions that were aimed at maintaining political stability and economic relations with Ukraine, countering against Ukraine's integration with the EU and protection of Russian population interests in Crimea, Sevastopol city and in southeast regions. Given the importance of Black Sea Fleet, Crimea and Sevastopol on one hand and Ukraine's territorial integrity on the other hand, the maintenance of good relations with Ukraine was always significant in Russia's foreign policy. They guaranteed Russia's political and economic presence especially in those areas. The point is that after the breakup of the Soviet Union serious problems threatened Russia's military security, because "70% of the fleet appeared out of Russia's borders". *(Markedonov 2014)*: Thus, according to the Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020[4] and "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation", the Black Sea Fleet and military base in Sevastopol city are of geopolitical and socio-economic importance. In post-Soviet times, the status of military base in Sevastopol was periodically the main cause of tension in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The problems were legally regulated in 1997 and 2010 by Russian-Ukrainian agreements[5] on the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet with a base in Sevastopol.

The change of power in February 2014 and actions of a new ruling elite aimed at restoring the country's political stability stirred up "frozen'' ethnic and political problems *(Aleksanyan 2014a, 2014b; Борко 2015, 18-27; Мироненко 2015, 54-68; Center for current policy 2016).* Political tension, clashes and civil disobedience in Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, Lugansk and other regions of Ukraine are a striking example of the situation.

[4] See "Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020" (APPROVED President Russian Federation Vladimir Putin 27 July 2001, Pr-1387). Accessed on 11.07.2016 http://www.scrf.gov.ru/ documents/ 34.html.

[5] See "Agreement Between Russia and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Stay on the Territory of Ukraine" (May 28 1997г.). Accessed on 11.07.2016 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_076, "Agreement Between Russia and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Stay on the Territory of Ukraine" (April 21, 2010). Accessed on 11.07.2016. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_359, "Federal law of 29.04.2010 № 67" on ratification of the agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the presence of Black Sea Fleet of the RF on the Territory of Ukrainian". Accessed on 11.07.2016 http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/31000.

After the referendum on separation of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine and their accession to the Russian Federation *(RIA Novosti 2014)*[6], international organizations[7] and Western countries radically changed their attitude to Russia in terms of partnership and cooperation. Moreover, on April 2, 2014 Russia unilaterally annulled the 2010 Russian-Ukrainian agreement on Black Sea Fleet, where a number of economic benefits were also set out for Ukraine[8].

During this period elections of federation council members and deputies of the legislative bodies of the Federal Assembly of the RF were held.

On September 8, 2013 Russia's single voting was conducted in 46,455 polling stations of 80 constituent entities of the Federation, in which 40,395,359,000 voters, 104,499 candidates, 54 parties and 12 NGO[9] took part. On that very day, 94 local referenda and voting were conducted in 9 constituent entities as well as elections of high-ranking officials were held in 8 constituents[10].

On September 14, 2014 single voting was also held at different levels of the Federation. Elections of senior officials were held in 30 entities in Russia, and elections of deputies of legislative bodies in its 14 entities[11].

Extraordinary elections of a Mayor of Moscow city held on September 8, 2013 could be singled out in terms of activity of Russia's internal political processes. Opposition parties nominating their candidates actively participated in them. The

[6] See ''Decree of President of the Russian Federation of 17 March 2014 № 147 "on recognition of Republic of Crimea". Accessed on 11.07.2016. http://rg.ru/2014/03/19/krym-dok.html, " Decree of President of the Russian Federation of 17 March 2014 № 63 "On agreement between the RF and the republic of Crimea on accession of the republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and on forming new constituent entities within the RF. Accessed on 11.07.2016 http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38197.

[7] See ''Territorial integrity of Ukraine." (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27.03.2014 (A/RES/68/262)). Accessed May 19, 2016. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262&referer=https://ru.wikipedia.org/&Lang=E.

[8] See "Agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the Status and Conditions of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet's Stay on Territory of Ukrainian" (April 21, 2010) Accessed on 11.07.2016. http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_359, Federal Law № 38 "on termination of the agreements covering the presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the Territoryof Ukranian" (April 2, 2014). Accessed on 11.07.2016. http://kremlin.ru/events/President/news/20673.

[9] The source of the data is the official site of the CEC of the RF at: http://www.cikrf.ru/banners/vib_arhiv/electday/vib_080913/vib.html (19.07.2016).

[10] See ibid.

[11] The source of the data is the official site of the CEC of the RF at: http://www.cikrf.ru/news/relevant/2014/12/17/01.html (19.07.2016).

elections were specific due to following factors: 1) the number of voters included in the electoral registers comprised 7,250,879,000 and only about 32% of voters participated in the elections *(Lenta.ru 2013; RIA Novosti 2013a; Novaya Gazeta 2013a; Expert.ru 2013)*, 2) political participation, on the level of competition on a simple change in local self-government electoral system (mayor elections were last held in 2003), 3) activation of civil society organizations, 4) development of post-election processes.

According to official data, Sergei Sobyanin won 51.37% of the vote in the first round as the Mayor of Moscow City, whereas his opposition Alexei Navalny came second and polled 27.24% of the vote respectively (see Table 2)[12].

Table 2

Votes of the Mayor of Moscow City candidates expressed in percentage[13]

Candidates	Elections of the Mayor of Moscow City	
	September 8 2013	
	Per cent	*Votes*
Mikhail Degtyarev (LDPR)	*2,86%*	*66532*
Nikolay Levichev (Just Russia Party)	2,79%	64778
Ivan Melnikov (CPRF)	10,69%	248294
Sergey Mitrokhin ("YABLOKO")	3,51%	81493
Aleksei Navalny (PARNAS, NDP, OCC)	27,24%	632697
Sergei Sobyanin (ER)	***51,37%***	***1193178***

The results of the elections were rejected by A.Navalny and oppostion parties, therefore mass demonstrations and marches were held *(Slon.ru 2013; Nezavisimaya Gazeta 2013; Klin-news.ru 2013; TASS 2013a).*

Human rights and freedoms. In 2013-2014 procedures for the protection of human rights and freedoms were of persistent urgency. According to data of Freedom House, Political Rights and Civil Liberties of Russia *(Freedom House*

[12] The source of the data is the official site of election committion of Moscow city at http://www.moscow_city.vybory.izbirkom.ru/moscow_city/ik (19.07.2016).
[13] See ibid.

2014a, 2015a, 2016a) as well as Press Freedom were considered "not free" in 2013-2014 *(Freedom House 2014b, 2015b, 2016b)*. According to the same source, negative trends of Press Freedom were mainly conditioned by the creation from authorities of legal restrictions and "disguised" censorship of TV and radio channels, printed media, news agencies, online mass media as well as social networks *(Freedom House 2014b, 2015b, 2016b)*. The authorities usually resort to restriction of the principles of freedom of expression and dissent only in cases when mass media of various political positions and legal status show active public participation.

The human rights protection organizations denote that the federal law[14] „on non-commercial organizations" is one of the main restrictions of human rights and freedoms in the RF *(OHCHR 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b)*, in accordance with which non-commercial organizations funded from abroad and engaged in political activities are considered "foreign agents" *(VOA - "Voice of America" 2013b)*.

According to Human Rights Watch data, there were ongoing restrictions placed against civil socities, mass media and freedom of expresson on the internet *(Human Rights Watch 2014, 2015)*. In Human Rights Watch report it has been denoted that "the adoption of a new law by the parliament and its new practice brought forward the country's isolation and the growth of anti-European hysteria, which has reached an unprecedented level in the newest history of the RF" *(Human Rights Watch 2015)*. One of the vivid examples is the legislation and legal procedures that coordinate activities of CSOs and hence, their activities are either suspended or terminated at all *(Human Rights Watch 2015; Amnesty International 2015; United States Department of State 2013, 2014, 2015)*. The control of state authorities over activities of CSOs, social mass media and civil journalist increased due to crisis in Ukraine and it caused new political tensions *(Human Rights Watch 2015)*.

Terrorist explosions and expressions of violence directly threaten protection of human rights and freedoms in the RF. In particular, 36 people died and 129 were

[14] See Federal Law of 12.01.1996 N 7 (editied on 30.03.2016) "on non-commercial organizations". Accessed on 27.06.2016 https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_8824.

injured because of terrorist acts committed within the peroid from May to December 2013 *(RIA Novosti 2013b; TASS 2013b)*.

Four prisoners arrested on "Bolotnaya case'' charges were granted amnesty on December 19, 2013 *(Radio Svoboda 2013a)*. Besides, "Pussy Riot" punk band members, (*AIF.RU 2013a, 2013b*) as well as crew members of "Arctic Sunrise'' ship were released on December 23 and on December 25 respectively *(BBC 2013d; Radio Svoboda 2013b)*. After long years of imprisonment Mikhail Khodorkovsky former Yukos CEO was pardoned on December 20, 2013 by decree of the President[15].

Civil disobedience:* Protests held by opposition parties, movements and civil society organizations had greater impact on social and political life in 2013-2014 in this regard. Social unrest shape a new culture of public participation and social responsibility in Russia's political system *(Барсукова 2015; Ерпылева, Алюков, Желнина и др. 2015; Тишков, Бараш 2014, 7-14; Тюрина 2014, 333-358; Колесникова, Рябова 2016, 155-224).*

For example, on January 13, 2013 marches called "March Against Scoundrels" were held in Moscow and St. Petersburg demanding to stop violations of rights of orphans and abolish the so-called "anti-Magnitsky Act'' which baned the adoption of Russian children by American families *(BBC 2013a, 2013b)*.

"Left" movements[16] and political parties organized a mass rally "For rights of Muscovites'' on March 2, 2013. The main demands of the protesters were to protect social rights of Muscovites, abolish the "Draft Law"on registration, prevent human rights violations in the capital "according to the permanent residence"

[15] See Decree of the President of the RF of 20.12.2013 № 922 "on pardoning M.B. Khodorkovsky". Accessed on 27.06.2016. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/37895.

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was chosen for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

[16] "Moscow Council'' movement, Civil Forum of Moscow, «For Human Rights» All-Russian public movement, "Settlers of Moscow'' movement, "Left Front'' movement.

principle, and to stop illegal building in green areas *(VOA - "Voice of America" 2013; Agency for Social Information 2013).*

A mass demonstration under "For Freedom" slogan was conducted in Moscow "Bolotnaya Square" on April and May 6, 2013 in support of those who were arrested on charges of "Bolotnaya case", demanding to cease political persecution *(Radio Station "Echo of Moscow" 2013; Novaya Gazeta 2013b; BBC 2013c; Radio Svoboda 2013)*.

Alexei Navalny, opposition activist and leader of civil movements earlier detained for political reasons of "Kirovles" case, was sentenced by the District Court of Kirov to a five-year imprisonment on July 18, 2013. As a result, Navalny was unable to participate in the elections of Mayor of Moscow city *(Panorama.am 2013; Graniru 2013a, 2013b)*. However, Navalny was set free the next day due to mass political disobedience in Moscow and in other main cities.

On September 9, 2013 a mass protest was held, where the participants demanded to recount the results of the Mayor of Moscow elections *(Klin-news.ru 2013; Tvrain.ru 2013; Kommersant.ru 2016).*

On October 27, 2013 a protest attended by 10.000 people was held in the center of Moscow in support of the "Bolotnaya prisoners" *(Kommersant.ru 2016).*

All-Russian demonstration called "Stop the collapse of Education and Science!" was held on December 1, 2013 and was attended by representatives of trade unions, political parties and different social groups *(Autonomous Action 2013)*. The main demands of the demonstration were: 1) to suspend the collapse of basic science and high-quality free education system, 2) to review a number of federal laws[17] and to conduct an independent investigation, 3) to provide accessible and high quality education on all levels, 4) to increase expenditure on science and education in federal budget draft for 2014-2016 *(Autonomous Action 2013)*.

[17] See Federal Law of 29.12.2012 N 273-FZ (edited on 02.03.2016) "On Education of the Russian Federation." Accessed on 02.07.2016. https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_140174, Federal Law of 27.09.2013 N 253-FZ "About the Russian Academy of Sciences, reorganization of the state academies of Sciences and modification of separate legal acts of the Russian Federation on Russian Academy of science." Accessed on 02.07.2016. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_ doc_ LAW_152351, Federal Law of 02.11.2013 № 291-FZ "About the Russian scientific fund and modification of separate legal acts of the Russian Federation". Accessed on 02.07.2016. http://kremlin.ru/ acts/bank/37761.

On February 24-28, 2014 rallies were continued by opposition movements and civil society organizations in support of the "Bolotnaya prisoners'' *(Kommersant.ru 2016).*

On March 15, 2014 several mass rallies were concurrently held in Moscow, where the participants expressed their opinions of referendums to be held in Crimea and Sevastopol. Moreover, anti-war "Peace March" attended by about 50,000 demonstrators was the largest in number *(Kommersant.ru 2014a).*

The first sanctioned "Strategy-31" rally was held on May 31, 2014 in Moscow and its participants stressed the importance of the observation of Article 31 of the Russian Constitution by the authorities, guaranteeing the right to freedom of assembly, rallies and marches. During that demonstration Eduard Limonov, the leader of "The Other Russia" political party not officially supporting the armed struggle demanded the Russian authorities to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics *(Kommersant.ru 2014b).*

Another "anti-war" peace march organized by opposition forces took place on September 21 in Moscow and in other Russian cities where 26,000 participants demanded to stop military operations in Ukraine, to respect the Constitution of the Russian Federation and human rights and international commitments *(Kommersant.ru 2014c).*

Russia's civil society organizations are in the processes of formation. According to data accumulated by the Ministry of Justice of the RF, 221,073 non-profit organizations were registered in the public register as of March 14, 2013. Nonetheless, 192,956 of them can be considered as the "third sector"[18] organizations and only 13,5% of them is socially oriented. Thus, employment in the "third sector" organizations equals to 1,1% of the economically active population which is equivalent to 828,000 people *(Civil Society Development Foundation 2013).*

The state assistance allocated for "third sector" organizations comprised 8,285 billion roubles, whereas 2,37 billion roubles were provided as grants in 2013 (*Civil Society Development Foundation 2013).*

[18] Source of the data is the offical site of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOs.aspx (07.06.2016).

During this period mass rallies were held by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia[19] (FNPR) and they continued to demand the federal government to protect employees' social and labor rights as well as to monitor the implementation of International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions. FNPR often makes references to "Russian Federation's Public safety concept[20]" to reduce and resolve risks of social and labor issues in the Russian Federation.

Russian trade union activities in 2013-2014 were mainly aimed at settlement of socio-economic clashes and conflicts, such as salary, staff change, violations of working conditions, bankruptcy or liquidation of an enterprise, cessation of production by an employer as well as violations of the collective agreement and social partnership procedures[21]. In overall, there were 78 social and labor conflicts in the first half of 2013, whereas there were 66 in 2014[22]. It should be noted that during the observed period social and labor conflicts were most intense in the following entities of the Russian Federation, namely in St. Petersburg, Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Udmurtia, Siberia, Trans-Baikal Territory, Irkutsk, Samara and Sverdlovsk regions[23].

Referring to other variables of PFI included in the model, it should be noted that according to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2013 Russia was ranked 127th out of 177 countries, meanwhile it occupied 136th place out of 175 countries in 2014 and the 119th place out of 168 countries in 2015 respectively.

[19] The source of the data is the official site of he Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia http://fnpr.ru (07.06.2016).

[20] See "The Russian Federation's public safety concept" Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/19653, "Materials of the intentional scientific conference on ''Social and labour conflicts of the RF, their identification, resolution and prevention Материалы международной научно-практической конференции "', October 16-17 2014, Saint-Petersburg." (22.10.2014). Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://industrialconflicts.ru/lib/13/materialy_mezhdunarodnoy_ nauchno-prakticheskoy_ konferen.html.

[21] See Bulletin of "Social and Labour Conflict'' Project for 2013. Humanitarian University of Trade Unions, St. Petersburg 2014. Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://fnpr.ru/pic/a-2013.pdf.

[22] See "Analysis of social and labour situation of the RF during the first six months of 2014." (15.09.2014). Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://industrialconflicts.ru/lib/12/analiz_sotsialyno-trudowoy_ obstanowki_w_rossiyskoy_fed.html, "Analysis of social and labour situation of the RF in the first quarter of 2 (23.06.2014)." Accessed on 12.03.2016 http://industrialconflicts.ru/lib/9/analiz_ sotsialyno-trudowoy_obstanowki_w_rossiyskoy_fed.html.

[23] See ibid.

According to the data of Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) in Global Gender Gap Report 2014, it continued to remain the lowest in Russia according to which the Russian Federation was ranked 94th out of 136 countries in 2013 and respectively 125th out of 142 countries in 2014. The lowest indicator of Political Opportunities subindex of GGGI was registered over the period of 2006-2014 and due to final countdown Russia occupied 61th and 75 th places in 2013-2014 respectively.

In summary, the PFI decline in 2014 was mainly due to geopolitical events, as well as sanctions imposed by the EU, European countries and US against Russian over the mentioned period. Those sanctions were caused by events in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and they were of political, socio-economic and military nature. It should be noted that further international sanctions will persistently have a negative impact on Russia's domestic and foreign policies, because they are deferred for an indefinite period of time.

New threats and challenges to national and international security changed Russia's geopolitical priorities, and they still continue to deteriorate country's role and reputation.

5.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

The study of EFI dymanics show that economy of the RF had a development trend during 2013, but it declined in 2014 compared to the previous year. The highest 0,670 indicator of the latter was registered in 2013 over 1995-2014 years. Despite the fact, EFI indicator of 0,614 points decreased in 2014, it was low only in 2013. The EFI indicator went up in 2014 (see Figure 1, Table 1).

According to a long-term socio-economic development concept of the RF, the state continued to implement a number of commitments aimed at creating a highly competitive institutional environment, providing structural diversification and innovative development, expanding of global competitive advantages, strengthening foreign economic position, providing balanced regional

development and other areas[24] *(Financial University under the Government of the RF 2014; The main directions of the budget policy 2014; Рогожин 2015, 18-26; Курзанцева 2016).* In 2013-2014 international standards in line with the provision of capital, labor and products and services competitiveness, stabilization of financial infrastructures, liberalization of economic environment, reduction of business risks and addition of investment actions, maintenance of macroeconomic balance and stability of rouble exchange rate, curbing inflation and other issues played a pivotal role in balancing economic system of the RF. According to the abovementioned concept has envisaged 3.8 times growth of GDP in 2030 compared to 2007[25].

Consequences entailed from global economic integration and structural crisis whicj had started since 2012 were still significant for Russia's economic system in 2012 *(Хансль и др. 2014, 2015*). According to World Bank experts' report, in 2014 the incident is defined as "shocks" in the RF economy caused by the decrease in the volume of Russian natural resources export and stages of dependence on raw materials in global markets *(Хансль и др. 2015, 6).* Given the importance of the energy sector for the development of other sectors of economy, a number of strategies[26] were adopted to increase efficiency of energetic resource management (*Хансль и др. 2015, 6).*

Geopolitical tensions in 2014 led to financial sanctions widely applied against Russia. Within the period from July to December 2014, oil prices reduced more than twice, the rouble fell by 46% compared to the US dollar in March, monetary policy became stricter and crediting value increased *(Хансль и др. 2015, 6)*. Due to all those factors, investments became very risky in Russia and prices of foreign bonds were significantly raised for banks and companies. Moreover, the entry of major banks and companies by state participation was restricted in Western international financial markets.

[24] See "Long-term socio-economic development concept of the RF for 2020." (ratified by decree of President of 17 November 2008 № 1662-p). Accessed on 06.07.2016 http://www.ifap.ru/ofdocs/rus/rus006.pdf.

[25] See ibid.

[26] See "Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020", Moscow, May 2003. Accessed on 06.07.2016. http://www.cpnt.ru/userfiles/_files_normativ_energosafe_energostrategy.pdf, "Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030" (ratified by the government on 13 November 2009г. № 1715-p)." Accessed on 06.07.2016 http://www.infobio.ru/sites/default/files/Energostrategiya-2030.pdf.

Regional economic integration processes, the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union[27] (EAEU) on May 29, 2014 and change of commitments[28] set within the scope of World Trade Organization (WTO) also had an impact on EFI indicators in 2014. the Eurasian Economic Union shall provide "goods, services, free movement of capital and labor, as well as implement a systematic and a commonly agreed policy in the field of economy among its members"[29].

Domestic credit had a positive impact on the EFI curve in 2014 compared to the previous years (48,7% in 2013 and 52,4% in 2014 of GDP[30]). Indicators of Index of Economic Freedom also improved during the period reaching from 51.9 to 52.1 points and volumes of Foreign direct investments (3,3% of GDP) also increased in 2013. Meanwhile, the reduction of FDI volumes with 1.2% of GDP, Inflation with 7,8%, reduction of GNI per capita ($ 13220) [31] and devaluation of Russian rouble in 2014 negatively impacted on decline of EFI indicators compared to the previous year.

Economic sanctions against Russia led to the improvement of domestic economic freedoms as there was formed an urgent need for expansion of national production. In response to economic sanctions, Russia restricted import volumes of agricultural products, food and raw materials from countries that had imposed economic sanctions against the country *(Panorama.am 2014).* Meanwhile, Russia's responsive sanctions were mainly aimed at those areas of economic cooperation, which could be replaced by domestic resources as well as imports from other countries *(Panorama.am 2014).*

Table 3 shows that during this period most of federal budget expenditure were made in areas of national economy, such as agriculture and fishing, transport, roads construction as well as areas of applied scientific research.

[27] See "Treaty on the EEU (adopted on 29.05.2014 – entered into force on 01.01.2015)." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=ru#info:

[28] See "Agreement on the function of the Customs Union with the WTO commitments." (September 2015). Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/trade/SiteAssets/Russias_commitments_in_the_WTO_2015.pdf.

[29] See "Treaty on the EEU (adopted on 29.05.2014 – entered into force on 01.01.2015)." Accessed on 12.03.2016 http://www.eaeunion.org/?lang=ru#info.

[30] See the official site of the WB: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS?end=2014&locations=RU&start=1995 (25.30.2016).

[31] See the official site of the WB: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (25.30.2016).

Table 3

Federal budget expenditure on national economy area in 2013-2014 (milliard roubles)[32]

Name	*2013*	*2014*
General social issues	19,63	21,46
Complex of energetic and fuel issues	19,46	24,76
Research and use of space area	32,86	30,68
Reproduction of mining and raw materials base	34,56	39,08
Agriculture and Fishimg	219,70	179,96
Water Economy	24,26	20,00
Forest Economy	29,18	31,54
Transport	258,44	301,01
Roads economy (roads funds)	504,54	527,03
Communication and Informatics	41,89	35,13
Applied scientific researches in national economy areas	265,34	268,78
Other issues of national economy area	399,44	1583,49

5.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

The curve of SFI increased in 2013, but it decreased the next year. Figure 1 denotes that the SFI curve increased with some fluctuations during the observed period. Hence, the highest indicator of the latter was registered in 2013 stipulated by the growth of Real Wage, which was also the highest over the period of 1995-2014.

Sanctions imposed against Russia as well as the EU and US restrictions and international isolation steps negatively affected the SFI decline in 2014.

According to Russia's long-term socio-economic development concept for 2013-2014[33], development of human potential was highly prioritized. Moreover,

[32] See "Single Budget portal of the RF, E-budget for 2013-2016, Ministry of Finance, Federal Treasury." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://budget.gov.ru.

[33] See "Russia's long-term socio-economic development concept for the period up to 2020." (ratified by the order of the government of the RF on 17 November 2008 № 1662-p). Accessed on 09.07.2016. http://www.ifap.ru/ofdocs/rus/rus006.pdf.

increasing the minimum wage to the minimum level of consumption basket, implementation of new employees' salaries for budgetary institutions, overcoming poverty problems of pensioners, development of social institutions and its policy were also envisaged in the concept *(Капелюшнико, Ощепков, Прокопов 2015, 79-129; Овчарова, Якобсон 2015, 130-170; Синявская, Бирюкова 2015, 290-341).* Importance and implementation of the projects that will lead to a reduction of absolute poverty by 6-7% and relative poverty by 22%, an increase of the middle class population to more than half of the total population, 12 times reduction of population stratification by income level[34] were set as the main targets in the context of social policy.

Table 4 shows that a significant portion of the federal budget expenditure were directed to areas of public social security and pension provisions.

Table 4

Federal budget expenditure on social policy area in 2013-2014 (milliard roubles)[35]

Name	*2013*	*2014*
Pensions provisions	2729,01	2250,70
Social service of the population	9,86	10,40
Social security of the population	828,68	856,23
Family and Childhood protection	258,21	323,12
Applied scientific researches in social policy area	0,33	0,14
Other issues of social policy area	7,04	11,77

5.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

The EdFI curve was stable for the period observed, as it can be seen from Figure 1. It had development trends in 1995- 2014 and sustained its stability conditioned by the increase of government expenditure on education as well as the growth of the HDI indicator. Thus, according to the 2013 UN Human Development

[34] See ibid.

[35] The Source of the data is "Single Budget portal of the RF, E-budget for 2013-2016, Ministry of Finance, Federal Treasury." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://budget.gov.ru.

Programme report, Russia was ranked 57th out of 187 countries by Education subindex with 0,780 points *(Human Development Report 2015)*.

The implementation of state assistance programmes[36] carried out by renowned universities of the RF were of much importance for the improvement of EdFI indicators in 2013-2014. Implementation of state programmes of educational development for 2013-2020[37], higher educaiton system reforms undertaken within the scope of Bologna process and etc., were very essential for the improvement of EdFI indicators *(The European Higher Education Area 2015)*.

Table 5 shows that a significant portion of the federal budget expenditure were directed to higher and post-gradute education areas.

Table 5

Federal budget expenditure on educational area in 2013-2014 (milliard roubles)[38]

Name	*2013*	*2014*
Pre-school education	57,73	55,83
General education	67,04	30,19
General Junior Middle School	4,80	-
Vocational Junior Middle School	4,51	10,1
Vocational trainings, trainings and skills development	6,77	8,09
Higher and post-graduate education	495,59	498,18
Youth and healthy policy for children	5,59	7,26
Applied scientific researches in educational area	8,64	15,34
Other issues of educational area	21,60	13,37

[36] See Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated March 6, 2013 #211-p "On state support of leading Russian universities to raise the competitiveness of leading Russian universities among the top world research and education centers." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&prevDoc=102349659&backlink=1&&nd=102163785.

[37] See Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated April 15 2014 r. N 295, Moscow "On state programme of the RF, education development for 2013-2020". Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://rg.ru/2014/04/24/obrazovanie-site-dok.html.

[38] The Source of the data is "Single Budget portal of the RF, E-budget for 2013-2016, Ministry of Finance, Federal Treasury." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://budget.gov.ru.

5.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

Figure 1 shows that the curve of HFI grew in 1995-2014 and it was stable over that period. Moreover, the indicators registered in 2013-2014 were the highest over the period 1995-2014, which was due to healthcare system development and implementation of state programmes[39]. Moreover, these measures would be implemented during the first stage of the project for 2013-2015[40]. Given the urgency to solve economic problems of Russia *(Шишкин 2015, 204-238)*, 11 sub-projects, which included all areas of healthcare, were developed[41].

Table 6 shows that a significant portion of the federal budget expenditure was directed to healthcare areas of inpatient and outpatient medical care.

Table 6

Federal budget expenditure on healthcare area in 2013-2014 (milliard roubles)[42]

Name	*2013*	*2014*
Inpatient medical care	227,01	275,21
Outpatient medical care	99,49	112,80
Rehabilitation and physical therapy	41,81	38,63
Collection, procession, storage and safety of Donor blood and its components	6,37	6,84
Sanitary and epidemiological events	14,85	17,49
Applied scientific researches in healthcare area	24,06	16,82
Other issues of healthcare area	88,39	67,74

[39] See Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated April 15 2014 r. N 294, Moscow "On state programme of healthcare system development of the RF." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://government.ru/media/files/NfyPj24TXpc.pdf:

[40] See ibid.

[41] See ibid.

[42] The Source of the data is "Single Budget portal of the RF, E-budget for 2013-2016, Ministry of Finance, Federal Treasury." Accessed on 12.03.2016. http://budget.gov.ru:

5.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 2

Index of Democracy Level of the Russian Federation in the time span berween 1995-2014*



The IDL of the Russian Federation is depicted in Figure 2 over the period of 1995-2014. It kept on increasing in 2013 and it went up from 0,501 to 0,467 points, but it declined in 2014. The highest indicator of the IDL was registered in 2013.

As it can be seen from Figure 2, the growth of IDL curve was stipulated by a constant growth of PFI, EFI, SFI, HFI as well as EdFI indicators.

Integration processes in the post-Soviet territory and intensification of "Russian" vector, strengthening of the geopolitical positions and status, as well as efforts aimed at deepening international cooperation and regulating relations with NATO contributed to democratic progress in Russia in 2013.

Low indicators of PFI, EFI and SFI had a negative effect on the decline of IDL curve in 2014. Meantime, EdFI and HFI indicators were stable over the period.

Difficulties of Russia's democratic transitions were mainly due to ensuring Russian military and political interests in the post-Soviet territory, events in

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Ukraine, referendum for Crimea independence, its annexation to Russia as well as issues connected with "rights" of Crimean Tatars.

After collapse of the Soviet Union, geopolitical developments and US/EU pressure against Russia were unprecedented, which led to the deepening of political and economic confrontation, the exclusion of Russia from "G-8", "freezing" of Russian relations with EU, CoE, US and NATO and with a number of Western European countries and organizations

5.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Ashot Aleksanyan

Within the framework of the research the regression analysis illustrates the variables of Political, Economic, and Health Factors Indices, which had a significant influence on the IDL of the Russian Federation.

According to the regression data, there was a significant correlation between IDLi* and variables of political as well as economic, and social factors, meanwhile there was no significant correlation between IDLi and EdFI and HFI.

According to the analysis of the data, among the political indicators included in the model, a significant correlation was maintained between the IDLi and variables of Political Stability/Absence of Violence and Rule of Law.

$$Y' = 0{,}007x_1 + 0{,}291 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}372),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Political Stability/Absence of Violence), and x_1 is Political Stability/Absence of Violence.

$$Y' = 0{,}006x_2 + 0{,}276 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}168),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Rule of Law), and x_2 is the Rule of Law .

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

Among the Economic Factors included in the model, a significant correlation was maintained between the IDL and FDI.

$$Y' = 0{,}019x_3 + 0{,}364 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}201),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from FDI), and x_3 is FDI (% GDP).

A notable correlation is seen in the Social Factors Index among the IDLi and Real wage as well as Unemployment.

$$Y' = 0{,}012x_4 + 0{,}367 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}770),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from Real wage), and x_4 is the Real wage ($100).

$$Y' = -0{,}017x_5 + 0{,}523 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}503),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from Unemployment), and x_5 is Unemployment.

According to the regression analysis, the IDL of Russia is notably affected by variables of Political Stability/Absence of Violence and Rule of Law. Hence, positive change of the latter by one unit will contribute to the growth of the IDLi by 0,007 and 0,006 units correspondingly

Among the Economic Factors, the growth of FDI had a significant impact on the IDLi and the increase of the latter with 1% will lead to the growth of IDLi by 0,019 units.

The Real wage and Unemployment are the Social Factors that according to the study have significant impact on the level of democracy. The growth of the Real wage by 100 dollars and the reduction of Unemployment by 1% will bring to the growth of the IDLi by 0,012 and 0,017 units respectively. The Real Wage of the SFI has a high coefficient of determination and it forms 77% of variation of the IDLi.

To improve the IDL of the RF it will be efficient to pay attention to the PFI, EFI and SFI which are of great influence on democratic transformations of the government and public administration system.

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Abbreviations

CoE	Council of Europe
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
ER	United Russia Party (Yedinaya Rossiya)
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investments
FRP	«Just Russian (Fair Russia) Party
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
ILO	International Labour Organization
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MM	Mass media
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCC	Russian Opposition Coordination Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PARNAS	People's Freedom Party
RF	Russian Federation
SR	"A Just Russia" political party (Spravedlivaya Rossiya)
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization
Yabloko	Russian United Democratic Party
YABLOKO	Russian United Democratic Party

CHAPTER 6.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF BELARUS

ASHOT ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors of Belarus affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Armenia in the time span between 1995 and 2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Belarus in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,387	0,078	0,549	0,612	0,323	0,342
1996	0,355	0,237	0,582	0,557	0,300	0,365
1997	0,349	0,323	0,577	0,587	0,315	0,389
1998	0,347	0,413	0,577	0,587	0,278	0,408
1999	0,340	0,297	0,549	0,618	0,274	0,374
2000	0,355	0,367	0,557	0,630	0,304	0,404
2001	0,334	0,354	0,573	0,615	0,318	0,394
2002	0,355	0,420	0,589	0,615	0,295	0,419
2003	0,357	0,383	0,606	0,615	0,318	0,414
2004	0,308	0,458	0,643	0,600	0,330	0,417
2005	0,345	0,432	0,679	0,610	0,343	0,433
2006	0,312	0,540	0,718	0,633	0,331	0,452
2007	0,337	0,591	0,746	0,587	0,362	0,477
2008	0,346	0,651	0,789	0,577	0,343	0,498
2009	0,331	0,622	0,759	0,574	0,349	0,482
2010	0,284	0,582	0,805	0,629	0,319	0,459
2011	0,287	0,803	0,721	0,597	0,293	0,502
2012	0,302	0,672	0,742	0,615	0,339	0,484
2013	0,312	0,660	0,880	0,619	0,413	0,508
2014	0,320	0,693	0,894	0,607	0,408	0,520

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

6.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The PFI of the IDL of Belarus increased duirng the years 2013/2014. However, 0,387 indicator registered in 1995 had still remained unchanged in the time span between 1995 and 2014 (see Figure 1, Table 1). This proves that the PFI are quite important for the institutionalization of democracy in Belarus.

Elections of local councils, European and Eurasian integration processes as well as presidential pre-election (*Korosteleva 2016; Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies (CSFPS) 2014)* and activities of civil society organizations (*Krotov 2014; Kogut 2015; Meghevich 2016)* mainly affected the PFI of the IDL within 2013 and 2014.

In 2013 opposition parties and forces began the preparation process of the coming presidential elections that were to be held in 2015. Opposition parties initiated negotiations aiming to bring together opposition politicians and civil society organizations.

The elections of 1,328 deputies of local councils held on March 23, 2014 impacted on the internal political processes of Belarus and, as a result, 18,809 deputies were elected[1]. According to the Constitution of Belarus, local self-government by the citizens is implemented by the deputies of local councils. The system of the deputies of local councils consists of regional, main and primary levels, including provincial, municipal, district, town and village councils[2].

The impact of "integration challenges" was of much significance on the foreign political processes of Belarus by keeping "the union state model of integration" with Russia and by developing new relations with the EU (*MoFA of the RB 2015; Belarusian-Russian news 2013).* The subsidiarity principle of integration requires to adequately harmonize "the Union" Eurasian and European standards in the Belarusian political arrangements.

[1] The source of the data is the official site of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda "On the results of the elections of deputies of Local Councils of twenty-seventh convocation of 18.04.2016 at: http://rec.gov.by/ru/arhiv-vybory/vybory-deputatov-mestnyh-sovetov-deputatov-respubliki-belarus/dvadcat-sedmogo-sozyva.

[2] The source of the data is the official site of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda on "About the elections to the Local Councils of the Republic of Belarus on 18.04.201 at: http://rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS27-about.pdf.

After the change of the political power in Ukraine in 2014, the improvement of the Belarusian-Ukrainian bilateral relations, the implementation of mediatory mission and the preservation of Belarusian-Russian strategic partnership has become quite essential for the political elite of Belarus.

According to the Freedom House "Nations in transition" reports, Belarus was considered the country of "consolidated authoritarian regime" during the years 2013-2015[3]. This fact was proved by the fifth presidential elections in Belarus carried out on October 11, 2015. As a results, the incumbent President again won the election with 83,5% of the vote in the first round of the elections. The elections were noteworthy and unpresedented for the fact, that the first female presidential candidate participated in the election and accumulated 4,44% of vote (see Table 2). The OSCE/ODIHR final report positively estimated this step which was also stipulated by the fact that presidential amnesty was granted to political prisoners followed by their release in August 2015. Nonetheless, the latter could not run for presidency in comply with the legislation (*OSCE/ODIHR 2016).*

Table 2

Votes of the RB presidential candidates, expressed in percentage [4]

Candidates	*Presidential elections of Belarus*
	2015
	1st round
Alexander Lukashenko	*83,47*
Tatsiana Karatkevich (BSDP)	4,44
Sergei Gaidukevich (LDP)	3,30
Nikolai Ulakhovich (BPP)	1,67

The consecutive presidential elections once again aggravated the current contradicitons and conflict among the President, opposition members and Civil Society Organizations. In accordance with the OSCE/ODIHR final report, the

[3] The source of the data is the official site of the Feedom House at: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit (17.07.2016).

[4] The source of the data is the official site of the Central Commission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referenda at: http://rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-PRB2015-Soob3.pdf (17.07.2016).

Constitution and the Electoral Code continue to contradict the principles of democracy, and the amendments thereto are approved without proper public debates *(OSCE/ODIHR 2016, 7).*

Human rights and freedoms. According to Freedom House data, Political Rights and Civil Liberties, as well as Press Freedom in Belarus were estimated as "not free" in 2013-2014[5]. Moreover, Freedom House also denoted that negative impacts on the status of human rights and press freedom were conditioned by unfavorable legal, political and economic environment in Belarus. During the observed period non-democratic restrictions and pressure imposed on civil society activists and on activities of about 25 independent mass media were still preserved. The absence of a multi-party system and issues of fundamental freedoms and personal autonomy within the scope of the protection of political rights (*Equal Rights Trust 2013)*, priorities of "presidential majority" and non-party deputies in the Parliament are still the main challenges in Belarus.

In accordance with Human Rights Watch organization, Belarus has been the only country in Europe where capital punishment is still practiced (*Human Rights Watch 2016)*. During the mentioned period false charges and arbitrary arrests as well as pressure against human rights defenders and civic activists continued to take place *(Human Rights Watch 2016)*.

The 2013/2014 activities of the Belarusian National Platform (BNP) of the EaP Civil Society Forum (CSF) were very significant and were aimed to overcome the abovementioned domestic problems *(EaP CSF 2013, 2014)*. In 2013, Coordination Council of BNP particularly adopted a number of decisions to expand the modernization of the Belarusian society and development of the potential of the European dialogue. The process of unification and consolidation of CSOs was parallelly continued. In 2014 activities of the BNP were aimed at strengthening capacities of CSOs, deepening and developing EU-Belarus relations and implementing the commitments undertaken by Belarus back in 2009 and etc. In 2014 the BNP organized and initiated a number of meetings with EaP CSF Secretariat to enhance the effectiveness of civil partnership in the country.

[5] See the official site of the Freedom House at: www.freedomhouse.org (31.05.2016).

The consultative meetings held among the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Programme and the Belarusian authorities *(Makei 2013)* as well as research institutions and CSOs played an important role in the improvement of human rights protection procedures during the time span of 2013-2014 *(EaP CSF 2013, 2014)*. The issues discussed by the parties were directed to the implementation of human rights activities as well as measures to improve their quality and the results gained by the accomplishment of the international commitments by Belarus.

Some problems have risen in Beralus in connection with the activities of the political groups of a Pro-Russian orientation, by claiming it a threat to social solidarity. Hence, in January 1, 2013 the court of Lenin district in the city of Mogilev fined 'the organizer of the "Slavic march" D. Denisenko *(NN.BY 2013)*, in compliance with the law "on mass events in Belarus." This, in turn, gave an opportunity for municipal authorities to ban another "Slavic March" in Gomel which was scheduled to be held on February 24, 2013. The aim of the latter was to protect the traditional spiritual and moral values, ideas of Slavic unity and social justice *(REGNUM 2013).*

During this period the most outrageous cases were "A. Gaydukov's case" who was an opposition *(Radio Liberty 2013)*, case of the priest known as "V. Lazar's Case" *(Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta (Belarusian Business Newspaper) 2013; NN.BY 2014)* and the arrest of the "Uralkali" CEO V. Baumgartner in Minsk at the end of August 2013 *(BBC 2013)*.

***Civil disobedience**[*]*. There had been a number of authorized and unauthorized rallies, which were mainly directed to political, socio-economic, cultural and legal regulations as well as other issues in the observed time period. They were generally organized by opposition forces, NGOs and trade unions (*Naviny.by 2016*). In overall, 127 cases of civil disobedience were registered in 2014 and the number

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of thePFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

seemed to increase compared to 2013 (*Belsat TV 2015*). In particular, the number of referenda was increased by 26% by reaching up to 81 in 2014, whereas the cases of social conflict went up by 18% by reaching to 46 (*Belsat TV 2015*). Minsk was persistently the main location where mass demonstrations were held.

The issues of forming national identity and "Belarusian civilization" as well as issues of European and Eurasian integration were continually urgent for Civil Society Organization *(Kozlyakov 2016, 206-211; Kryuchek, Sergeyev 2016, 217-221; Fabricant, Tsarik 2009)*. The aforementioned issues would cause confrontation from time to time by impeding Russian-Belarusian relations (*Sputnikipogrom 2014*). Russia takes efforts not to create problems with Belarus on the international level, whereas on the contrary, the question of ethnic and cultural identity preservation on the state and civil society levels become more and more active in Belarus *(Shiptenko 2015; TUT.BY 2013)*. The abovementioned was evidenced by the development of the draft law on "about Belarusians abroad" in 2013 and its further adoption in 2014[6]. Moreover, an advisory body on the issues of Belarusians abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus was established in the same year *(Mnistry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus 2015)*.

During the observed period a number of protest and demonstrations organized by the Russian community were held in the capital. The main reason for the aggravation of intercultural relations was due to the fact, that in 2013 "Rus", a Russian Culture of Minsk company was dissolved by the decision of the City Court in Minsk, hence giving rise to various interpretations in the Russian Federation. *(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013; Shiptenko 2015; Public diplomacy 2015)*. A similar situation was also applied in reference to the Minsk City Court's denial of state registration of public association in 2013 as well as the denial to satisfy the claim of the "Russian World" initiative group.

An annual "Chernobyl Way" meeting attended by both opposition parties and representatives of CSOs was organized in Minsk on April 26, 2013 against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Grodno region (*Regnum.ru 2013*). On this occasion, the President of the Republic of Belarus A. Lukashenko stated that "there

[6] See the Law №162-3 of the RB on "About Belorusians abroad" of June 16 2014 at: http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=69864.

was a competitive struggle and the Europeans incited the Belarusian opposition to fight against a nuclear power plant construction" *(Era.by 2013)*.

On Novemebr 3, 2013 an authorized march was held to the mass burial place of the victims of the violence in Minsk by the Conservative-Christian Party[7] which was dedicated to "Dziadi" Ancestors Remembrance Day *(TUT.BY 2013)*. The ideas to strengthen the independence of Belarus and the country's rebirth were highlighted in speeches made by the march organizers with the demand for the government to pay more attention to the development of national culture and preservation of identity and to the teaching of the Belarusian language *(TUT.BY 2013)*.

To support Ukrainian authorities a flash mob against Russian authorities was organized by football fans in "Borisov-Arena" stadium and it raised great public interest in 2014. After it, the police arrested more than hundred football fans *(Belsat TV 2015)*.

15 parties, 37 trade unions, 400 charity organizations, 2,665 public associations and 100 national minority organizations[8] have been registered in the republic of Belarus as of January 1, 2016 *(Shendik 2015, 145-153*). The federation of trade unions of Belarus has more than 4 million members. Accordingly, "Belaya Rus" (White Russia) public association has more than 161,000 members[9], the Belarusian Republican Youth Union has more than 480,000 members[10] and the Belarusian Republican Pioneer Organisation has more than 626,000 members[11] *(Shendik 2015, 145-153)*.

In reference to other variables included in the model, the Corruption Perceptions Index declined in 2013, but it increased in 2014 reaching to the previously registered 2012 level[12]. The subindices of Political Stability and the Rule of Law recorded with the growth in 2014 had positive effects on the growth of PFI. It should be noted that Political Stability index of Belarus with the value of 51,94 is

[7] See the official site of the Conservative Christian Party at: http://www.narodnaja-partyja.org/06--Gistoryc_ja--fr--pg (17.07.2016).

[8] See the official site of the President of the Republic of Belarus at: http://President.gov.by/ru /society_ru (17.07.2016).

[9] See the official site of «Belaya Rus» public associationat: http://www.belayarus.by (31.05.2016).

[10] See the official site of the Belarussian Republican Youth Union at: http://brsm.by (31.05.2016).

[11] See the official site of the Belarussian Republican Pioneer Organisation at: http://brpo.by (17.07.2016).

[12] See the official site of Transparency International at: http://www.transparency.org (31.05.2016).

the highest among the observed countries, while the indicator of the Rule of Law with the value of 22,6 is the lowest[13].

By summarizing, it should be stated that the PFI curve underwent a decline in 2013/2014 compared to 1995, despite the fact that the curve of the PFI was registered with an increase in 2013-2014 compared to 2010-2012. The growth of the PFI within the selected period was mainly due to the acceleration of European and Eurasian integration processes. (See Figure, Table 1).

6.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

The indicators of EFI of Belarus show that the EFI curve was registerd with a decline in 2013 but the next year it preserved a growing trend (see Figure 1, Table 1).

The processes of Eurasian, social and economic integration had a significant impact on the indicators of EFI of Belarus within the period stated (*EEC 2013, 2015)*.

48,8% of the total external trade volume of Belarus was allocated to Russia (*EEC 2015*). Thus, according to the data, the average trade turnover between Belarus and Russia amounted to 37,6 billion US dollars in 2014, where the volume of export amounted to 15,3 billion and the volume of Russian import amounted to 22,3 billion US dollars (*EEC 2015*).

The decrease of the EFI was mainly caused by the decline in the trade of goods and services as well as the budget deficit. The law "On Counteraction to Monopolistic Activities and Promotion of Competition"[14] was ratified in 2013. Moreover, the law on "the state regulation of trade and public catering[15] in the RB" was also adopted in 2014. These two laws were adopted to fight against corruption and monopoly as well as exposures of unfair competition in the economic system of Belarus.

[13] See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (31.05.2016).
[14] See the Law № 94-3 of 12 Dec 2013 on"Counteraction to Monopolistic Activities and Promotion of Competition" at: 17.07.2016. http://www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=H11300094&p1=1.
[15] See the Law N 128-3 on the state regulation of trade and public catering of the RB of 8 Jan 2014 at:
http://www.mintorg.gov.by/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2030&Itemid=738&lang=ru 17.07.2016.

The increase of the EFI of Belarus was mainly due to the Gross national income (GNI), Domestic credit to the financial sector, Foreign direct investments and improvement of Economic Freedom, as well as due to the trends aimed at inflation reduction. These were reflected in the Budget proficit registered in 2014.

6.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

The SFI went up sharply in the observed time span (see Figure 1, Table 1). The SFI was assessed with 0,549 points in 1995, then it had 0,880 points in 2013 and respectively 0,894 points in 2014, which were the highest values during the studied years. The increase of Real wage and a relative stability of Gini index stipulated the growth of the SFI.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Belarus continued to implement a number of projects in order to improve social integration and social situation. They had been aimed at improving the social status and at raising the effectiveness of social protection, the quality of social services and the level of accessibility[16] for those with limited abilities[17] as well as at providing demographic security[18] and creating favorable conditions[19] for socio-economic development[20].

[16] "Complex Programme of the social service development for 2011-2015 (Decree № 1126 of the Council of Ministers on 29 Jul 2010). Accessed on 21.04.2016 at: http://www.mintrud.gov.by/system/extensions/spaw/uploads/files/kompleksnaya-programma-razvitiya-socialnogo-obsluzhivaniya-na-2011-%E2%80%93-2015-gody.pdf.

[17] "Council of Ministers Decree N 1602 of 01 Nov 2010 ''On the State program to create a barrier-free environment for people with physical disabilities in 2011-2015'' (decrees of the Council of Ministers of 09.07.2011 N 936; of 04.09.2014 N 864)." Accessed on 21.04.2016 at: http://www.mintrud.gov.by/system/extensions/spaw/uploads/files/Programma-po-sozdaniju-bezbarjernoj-sredy-1.pdf.

[18] "National Demographic Security Programmenof the Republic of Belarus, 2011 – 2015 (ratified by № 357 decree of the President of the RB on 11 Aug 2011). Accessed on 21.04.2016 at: http://www.mintrud.gov.by/ru/min_progs.

[19] "Resolution of Council of ministers of Republic of Belarus of 29.06.2010 N 982 " About the approval of the Republican target program for improvement of conditions and labor protection for 2011 – 2015 .Accessed on 21.04.2016 at: http://www.mintrud.gov.by/system/extensions/spaw/uploads/files/ 982.pdf.

[20] "Decree of the President of Republic of Belarus of 11.04.2011 N 136 "About the approval of the Program of social and economic development of Republic of Belarus for 2011-2015. Accessed on 21.04.2016 at: http://www.economy.gov.by/ru/macroeconomy/programma_soc_econom_razvitia.

In accordance with World Bank data, the unemployment rate amounted to 6% in Belarus in 2013 and to 5,9%[21] in 2014. After the independence of the country the number of working age people decreased and labor protection and growth trends were of great significance in the context of overcoming the challenges in 2013-2014. Report on labour force development showed that within the mentioned years of 1990-2009 the decline in the labor force was valued with 5,280,633,000 to 4,429,643,000 going down to 4,482,881,000 people in 2014[22]. Despite the worsening situation in the labor force, from 2010 onwards some positive changes have been ensured in 2013-2014 with the provision of social support of the population and annual labour force as well as alleviation of extreme poverty.

The Belarusian government efforts aimed at ensuring a gradual increase in the level of women and men[23] participation in the labor force development can have a positive impact on the social progress in future.

6.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

EdFI increased in 2013, whereas it decreased in 2014 within the observed years (see Figure 1, Table 1). The EdFI was assessed with 0,612 points in 1995, then in 2013 it was valued with 0,619 points and accordingly with 0,607 points in 2014.

The HDI of Belarus increased in 2013 registering 0,796 points in 2013 and 0,798 points in 2014 and by placing the country on 50th and respectively 51st position out of 188 states *(Human Development Report 2015)*. The government expenditure on education form 5,1% of GDP and the level of literacy of adults comprises 99, 6% *(Human Development Report 2015)*.

Joint educational policy in state and private universities are developed and implemented by the Ministry of Education of Belarus[24]. National Higher Education

[21] The source of the data is the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS (21.07.2016).
[22] The source of the data is the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN (17.07.2016).
[23] The source of the data is the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.MA.ZS, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS (13.05.16).
[24] See the official site of the MInistry of Education of the RB at: http://edu.gov.by (13.05.16).

Institutions Rectors Council established by Presidential decree is the highest advisory body[25] in the system of higher education. At present, there are more than 8,000 educational institutions with the enrolment of more than 3 million children, pupils, students and learners as well as around 430,000 workers[26]. In accordance with the results of the rank assessment conducted by Webometrics in 2015, seven Belarusian universities have been included among 4000 world best universities[27] and the Belarusian State University has been gradually improving its ranking by occupying 589th place in 2016[28].

The official accession of Belarus to the Bologna Process of the European Higher Education Area in May 2015 played an essential role in the context of educational reforms *(National Institute for Higher Education 2015)*.

6.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

The HFI curve increased with certain fluctuations during the years of 1995-2014 (see Figure 1, Table 1). In 1995 the HFI was estimated with 0,323 points, 0,413 points in 2013 and 0,408 points in 2014, which were the highest values within the observed period. The growth of life expectancy indicators as well as an increased funding from the GDP aimed at the health sector contributed to the improvement of the HFI in 2013. The Ministry of Health carried out a number of state programs directed to the improvement of the level of the health system and services provided[29] *(Ministry of Health of the Republic of Belarus 2013)*.

The actions targeting the modernization of the health system and electronic management methods, the optimization of hospital infrastructure and the introduction of single informative portal in the health system had an essential impact *(Zharko 2014, 4-8; Yakab, Tsuros 2014, 4-14; Ministry of Health of the*

[25] See the official sit of the President of the RB at: http://President.gov.by/ru/university_ru (13.05.16).
[26] See ibid.
[27] The source of the data is "Webometrics Ranking of World Universities" at: http://www.webometrics.info/en/Europe/Belarus (17.07.2016).
[28] See ibid.
[29] See the official site of the Ministry of Health of the RB (17.07.2016).

Republic of Belarus 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d; Ministry of Health of the Republic of Belarus 2015).

The Ministry of Health of the RB in collaboration with the UN agencies had been actively working to enhance and promote a healthy lifestyle and to implement social programs in that field[30]. During this period the UN Framework Programme was to support the cooperation in the following areas of the abovementioned sector: 1) to strengthen the national health system, 2) to fight against HIV/AIDS, 3) to fight against tuberculosis, and 4) to promote healthy lifestyles. The Ministry of Health was actively involved in activities implemented within New United Nations Development Partnership Framework 2016-2020.

6.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Belarus in the time span between 1995-2014*



[30] See the official site of the Ministry of Health of the RB at: http://minzdrav.gov.by/ru/static/international_cooperation/mejdunarodnye_organizacii, «Single Portal of elentronic service» http://portal.gov.by/PortalGovBy/faces/home?_adf.ctrl-state=1az3dlxsn5_4&_afrLoop= 314939696460804 (17.07.2016).

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

An inter-agreement dialectics aimed at democratization of PFI, EFI, SFI, EdFI and HFI showed the IDL of Belarus within the observed years of 1995-2014. Each reveals a correlation and influence on the IDL depending on the particular situation.

Figure 3 depicts that the curve of IDL of Belarus had a growth trend within the years stated. The lowest indicator of the IDL of Belarus was registered with the value of 0,342 in 1995, whereas the highest one was recorded in 2014 with the value of 0,520 (see Figure 3).

The growth of the IDL was stipulated by the activation of PFI, SFI, EFI, EdFI and HFI. In particular, the PFI, SFI, EdFI and HFI had a positive impact on the indicators of the IDL in 2013, but the subindices of the PFI, EFI and SFI were the main reasons for the growth in 2014 (see Figure 1, Figure 3, Table 1).

Public institutions and processes of democratic transformation, as well as procedures of the rule of law, civic culture, human rights and freedoms protection were still challenging Belarus in 2013-2014.

6.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

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According to the regression analysis, a significant correlation was not maintained between the IDL_i* and the PFI included in the model.

Among the Economic Factors included in the model, a significant correlation was maintained between the IDLi and the following variables:

$$Y' = 0{,}004x_1 + 0{,}342 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}466),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Domestic credit), and x_1 is Domestic credit (% of GDP).

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

$$Y' = 0{,}010x_2 + 0{,}001 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}631),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the variable of Economic Freedom), and x_2 is the Index of Economic Freedom.

$$Y' = 0{,}023x_3 + 0{,}452 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}344),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from the Budget deficit/proficit), and x_3 is the Budget deficit/proficit.

A significant correlation is seen in the Social Factors Index between IDLi, Real wage as well as Gini index.

$$Y' = 0{,}023x_4 + 0{,}408 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}744),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from Real wage) and x_4 is Real wage ($100).

$$Y' = -2{,}6x_5 + 1{,}163 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}582),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL cleaned from GINI) and x_5 is Gini index.

A significant correlation was not maintained between IDL_i and the EdFI and HFI included in the model.

Among the economic factors of the IDL, the increase of the volume of Domestic credit, Index of Economic Freedom, and Budget deficit/proficit has a significant impact on the democracy of Belarus. The Index of Economic Freedom has a high determinant and 1 unit growth will bring to the increase of the IDLi by 0,01 units, thus conditioning 63% of variation of the dependent variable.

Real wage and Gini index of the SFI have a considerable influence on the democracy of Belarus. The growth of Real wage by 100$ and the decrease of Gini index with 0,1 unit will cause the growth of the IDLi with corresponding 0,023 and 0,26 units. The mentioned variables are conditioned by 58%-74% variation of the dependent variable.

In conclusion, it is noteworthy that according to the results of the regression analysis, Domestic credit, Budget deficit, Real wage, Gini index, as well as Index of Economic Freedom have mostly influenced on the IDL in Belarus. The latter reveals the neccessity to implement democratic reforms in the mentioned spheres of public life.

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Abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
BNP	Belarusian National Platform
BPP	Belarusian Patriotic Party

BSDP	Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada)
CoE	Council of Europe
CSF	Civil Society Forum
CSF	Civil Society Forum
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EU	European Union
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RB	Republic of Belarus
RF	Russian Federation
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 7.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF KAZAKHSTAN

ASHOT ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Social, Economic, Educational and Health Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Kazakhstan in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Kazakhstan in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,286	0,152	0,524	0,455	0,107	0,276
1996	0,304	0,276	0,540	0,460	0,067	0,313
1997	0,314	0,273	0,545	0,488	0,095	0,323
1998	0,323	0,243	0,552	0,473	0,107	0,320
1999	0,312	0,381	0,543	0,458	0,113	0,349
2000	0,316	0,529	0,553	0,431	0,101	0,386
2001	0,309	0,592	0,551	0,443	0,073	0,397
2002	0,299	0,569	0,576	0,436	0,087	0,391
2003	0,302	0,503	0,592	0,412	0,088	0,374
2004	0,295	0,612	0,622	0,388	0,102	0,402
2005	0,307	0,608	0,646	0,406	0,109	0,411
2006	0,300	0,698	0,675	0,431	0,099	0,437
2007	0,316	0,708	0,723	0,443	0,081	0,450
2008	0,320	0,717	0,755	0,429	0,122	0,461
2009	0,339	0,637	0,759	0,456	0,192	0,459
2010	0,327	0,521	0,793	0,448	0,203	0,427
2011	0,288	0,571	0,828	0,451	0,205	0,429
2012	0,282	0,565	0,871	0,452	0,239	0,433
2013	0,303	0,542	0,891	0,445	0,265	0,440
2014	0,327	0,497	0,871	0,448	0,305	0,441

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

7.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The PFI of the Republic of Kazakhstan were registered with the growth in 2013-2014 when compared to 2011-2012. Nevetheless, the indicator registered in 2009 was continuously recorded as the highest during the years of 1995-2014 (see Figure 1).

The reduction of a number of social unrest and political pressure mainly impacted on the increase of the PFI in 2013-2014 compared to the previous years. In this regard, 2014 has been recorded as the calmest year out of all observed years since 1995.

Given the ideological nature of the political regime of Kazakhstan and the dominance of the President in the political life of the country, steps and programs initiated by the President were of essential importance in the agenda of public policy. Presidential political system promotes the principles of centralization of constitutional norms and institutions of the state power as well as features of civic culture and its identity. In this regard, it is worth referring "The Path to the Future"[1] mentioned in the address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on November 11, 2014 and development and implementation of national measures arising from it on realization of President's address[2]. The latter is outlined by the "Kazakhstan 2050" Strategy[3] aiming to provide a stable growth and progress. A complex programme of scheduled events formed new priorities of the political agenda for state and local government bodies in line with the current situation.

[1] See the official site of the President of the RK "State of the Nation Address by President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. November 30, 2015 ''Nyrly Zhol – The Path to the Future." (Astana, November 11, 2014). Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://www.akorda.kz/ru/addresses/poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan-nnazarbaeva-narodu-kazahstana-11-noyabrya-2014-g, "The Address of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev to the people of Kazakhstan. November 11, 2014, № 955 on "measures on realization of President's address to the nation, Nyrly Zhol – The Path to the Future''. Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31639361#pos=3;-285.

[2] See "National Plan of the measures on the realization of President's address to the nation on November 11, 2014; Nyrly Zhol – The Path to the Future, ratified by № 955 decree of the President of Nov 17, 2014. Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31639361#pos=31;-293.

[3] See the official site of the RK on the "Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy"at: http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/strategies_and_programs (12.06.2016).

The appeal submitted by the Ministry of Justice of the RK on December 25, 2014 as well as the decision made by a specialized inter-district economic court of Almaty city "on the liquidation of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan" had a negative impact on the party system of the country *(CEC RK 2015; OSCE/ODIHR 2015; Zakon.kz 2015; International News Agency "Kazinform" 2015)*. The decision entered into force on October 3, 2015 and it resulted in the violation of the right of political pluralism and unions.

The inner political procedure directed to the realization of the state national policy is implemented by the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK)[4], which provides the principles of complementary policy in the context of steps initiated by the President. APK acting as a carrier of "state ideology" has a decisive role in the political life of the country, particularly when taking essential decisions. The extraordinary presidential elections initiated by APK on February 15, 2014 were one of its vivid example *(Ria Novosti 2015)*. They were supported by "Nur Otan" party having the majority of seats in the Parliament, by the "Civil Alliance of Kazakhstan" and some other organizations *(NUR.KZ 2015; Kazakhstan Today 2015).* Once again APK supported the policies presented by the President and by that promoting the raising of the effeciency of the "presidential" system as well as the internal unity. A considerable number of experts believed that the appointment of extraordinary presidential elections was conditioned by several factors. First, opposition forces and their representatives were deprived of an opportunity to make ''any practical step". Second, the President and the ruling political elite had aspired to a ''self-assertiveness''. Third, Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Economic Union faced a number of socio-economic challenges. And the fourth, Islamic extremism activated and an intricate geopolitical situation was created *(Deutsche Welle 2015; Russian Institute for Strategic studies 2015; Tengrinews.kz 2015)*.

[4] The Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (APK) takes the central place in system of the state national policy formed by the decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on March 1, 1995, the Assembly of the people of Kazakhstan. Its aim is to provide the protection of rights of ethnic groups and their freedoms. The APK elects 9 deputies of the lower house of the Parliament under the control of the President. The Assembly works according to the Constitution of Kazakhstan, special laws and regulations. All its decisions are obligatory for consideration by public authorities and civil society institutions. (For more details see the official site of the Assembly of People og Kazakhstan at http://assembly.kz/ru (12.02.2016).

In fact, the fifth presidential extraordinary elections were held on April 26, 2015[5] and an acting President eventually won in the first round with 97,75% of vote.

Table 2

Votes of the RK 2015 presidential candidates, expressed in percentage 2015[6]

Candidates	Presidential elections of the RK
	2015
	I round
Nursultan Nazarbayev	***97,75***
Abdelghazy Kussainov	0,64
Turghyn Syzydyqov	1,61

The structural and functional difficulties encountered in party system came to the surface during the extraordinary parliamentary elections held on March 20, 2016[7] *(Lenta.ru 2016a)*. Mazhilis of the fifth convocation was dissolved by the decree of the President on January 22, 2016 on the basis of the initiative taken by 103 deputies of the RK Parliament on January 13, 2016ж. *("Akorda" Residence of the President 2016; Lenta.ru 2016b)*. This step was taken by Nazarbayev due to the worsening of the social and economic situation and its indicators *(BBC 2016; JCSC "NTV TV channel" 2016; Segodnya.ua 2016)*. Nonetheless, its main reason was to strengthen the President's position by means of new shifts and changes within the parliamentary system *(TUT.BY 2016)*.

[5] See decree № 1018 on the appointment of extraordianary elections of the President of RK of 25 Feb 2015. Accessed on 15.05.2016 at: http://www.government.kz/images/ukazy2015/03/rus/U150000101820150225.htm.

[6] The source of the data is the OSCE/ODIHR reports 2015. "Republic of Kazakhstan: Early Presidential Election, 26 April 2015." Accessed May 19, 2016. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/153566?download=true, OSCE/ODIHR. 2015. "Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 29 July 2015." Accessed May 19, 2016. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true:

[7] See decree on the dissolution of Mazhilis of the fifth convocation and on the appointment of early parliamentary elections of the deputies of the RK. Accessed on 15.05.2016 at: http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=37474543#pos=1;-263.

The extraordianry elections of the lower house once again proved that the APK, provided with the right to elect 9 deputies since 2007, is the procedure to fill in the lack of legitimacy of the legislative power and to ensure the legality for the elections (see Table 3, Table 4).

Six political parties participated in the extraordinary elections in 2016 and 3 of them "Nur Otan" with 82,15%, "Ak Zhol" party with 7,18% and Communist People's Party with 7,14% entered the Parliament (see Table 3). Other 3 parties "Auyl" Kazakhstan Social Democratic Party[8], Nationwide Social Democratic Party[9] and "Birlik" political party didn't cross the threshold by gaining respectively 2,00%, 1,18% and 0,29% (see Table 3).

Table 3

Ratio of seats received by the political parties in Mazhilis, the parliament of the RK[10]

Parties, Unions, Participants	RK Mazhilis Elections 2016	
	P	Others[11]
"Nur Otan"	84	
"Ak Zhol" Party	7	
Communist People's Party	7	
"Auyl" Kazakhstan Social Democratic Party	0	
Nationwide Social Democratic Party	0	
"Birlik" Political Party	0	
Assembly of People of Kazakhstan		9
Total	***98***	***9***

[8] See the official site of the "Auyl" Kazakhstan Social Democratic Party http://auyl.kz/ru/pages/istoriya_ksdp_auyl (12.02.2016).

[9] See the official site of Nationwide Social Democratic Party (NSDP): http://www.osdp.info (12.02.2016).

[10] The source of the data is the OSCE/ODIHR reports on elections 2016. "Republic of Kazakhstan: Early Parliamentary Elections, 20 March 2016." Accessed May 19, 2016. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/222541, OSCE/ODIHR. 2016. "Election Observation Mission Final Report. Warsaw, 27 June 2016." Accessed May 19, 2016. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/248781?download=true.

[11] The election of 9 deputies to the Parliament by the APK (see the official site of the APK http://assembly.kz/ru/deyatelnost-assamblei-naroda-kazahastana (17.07.2016).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation[11]



Table 4

Ratio of seats received by the political parties in Mazhilis

Electoral representation	1994	1995	1999	2004	2007	2012	2016
Majoritarian	177	67	67	67	0	0	0
Proportional	0	0	10	10	98	98	98
Other	0	0	0	0	9	9	9
Total	**177**	**67**	**77**	**77**	**107**	**107**	**107**

Human rights and freedoms. According to the data accumulated by Freedom House and Human Rights Watch organizations, the protection mechanisms of political rights and civil liberties and the national respect towards them still arises some concern[12] *(Human Rights Watch 2015; NGO «Қадір-қасиет» 2014; NGO of Kazakhstan 2014)*:

[12] The source of the data is` "Ситуация со свободой слова в Казахстане в первом полугодии 2014 года (Аналитический доклад (по материалам Международного фонда защиты свободы слова

In accordance to reports conducted by Freedom in the World, Freedom House organization, Kazakhstan was estimated as "not free" in 2013-2015 *(Freedom House 2014a, 2015a, 2016a)*. The indicators of press freedom assessed by Freedom House also caused a certain concern and the reports revealed that the country was estimated with "not free" mass media outlets in 2013-2015*(Freedom House 2014b, 2015b, 2016b)*.

The rights to freedom of expression, conscience, religion or belief and freedom of assembly were expressively restricted in the country per reports provided by Human Rights Watch organization during the period observed *(Human Rights Watch 2015)*. A number of new legislative procedures, which were incompatible with the international criteria of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, were particularly introduced to the country in 2014 *(Human Rights Watch 2015)*.

The UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the EU, the USA as well as a number of committees expressed their concern about the deteriorating situation and the lack of pluralism in human rights field *(OHCHR 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g; European Parliament 2013; United States Department of State 2014, 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015; Программа DCI Европейского Союза для Казахстана 2015).*

According to monitoring results collected by Kadir-Kasiet NGO within 9 months, the period from July 2013 to March 2014 was mainly reported with cases of 345 threats and various types of harassment directed against 169 human rights defenders and activists *("Kadir-Kasiet" NGO 2014, 5)*. The incidents of violation were also mentioned in the semi-annual analytical report conducted by "Adil Soz" International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech *("Adil Soz" International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech 2013, 2014)*. In this respect, activities implemented by NGOs and human rights protection organizations concerned with human rights are of essential value, since they

«Адил соз»))." Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=7401&l=ru, "Казахстан Представление Универсального Периодического обзора ООН: 20-я сессия Рабочей группы по УПО (представлен 15 марта 2014г.). Совместное представление: Коалиция НПО Казахстана против пыток; Центр исследования правовой политики; Общественный фонд «Хартия за права человека»." Accessed on 15.05.2016 at: http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=7099&l=ru .

conduct alternative reports in reference to civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and freedoms. They estimate levels of protection and promotion of the rule of law, individual rights, the right to liberty and autonomy of socially vulnerable groups. Thus, human rights NGOs are consistently working to define problems and needs for the protection of human rights by ensuring national, humanitarian, moral and legal assistance to the victims of violence and representatives of vulnerable groups. Moreover, they inform the latter about domestic legislation and international laws, about the right to the freedom of expression, personal autonomy and the right to freedom from discrimination. The Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (KIBHR) is one of those organizations, which in its alternative reports exposes many key issues to be urgently solved in terms of human rights[13] *(KIBHR 2013, 2014, 2013, 2014)*.

Civil disobedience:* A decline in civil activity is quite noticeable during this period and it is typical of the states with "consolidated authoritarian" regime. The "Parliamentary Development in Kazakhstan" NGO, Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan (KSPK), Eco "Mangystau'' NGO as well as Union of Crisis Centers of Kazakhstan (CRIN), "Feminist League and "Child Foundation in Kazakhstan" took an active part in the civil society system *(Eco "Mangystau" NGO 2013; 2014)*.

According to KIBHR data, there were totally 119 cases of peaceful assembly where 58 were conducted in Almaty, 26-in Astana, 4-in Aktau, 2-in Shymkent, 10-

[13] Source: "Monitoring of a situation of human rights defenders' safety,'' November 2013. Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=6554&l=ru, " Monitoring of a situation of human rights defenders' safety December 2013" Accessed 15.05.2016. http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id =6627&l=ru, "Monitoring of a situation of human rights defenders' safety January-July 2014" Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=496&page=1, "Monitoring of a situation of human rights defenders' safety August-Decemeber 2014" Accessed on 15.05.2016. http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?n_id=496&page=0.

* Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the Political Factors Index and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

in Pavlodar, 22-in Uralsk and 6-in Karaganda (see Table 5)[14]. It should also be mentioned that 15% of them was authorized, whereas 85% unauthorized. In total 3,343 people[15] particiapted in the aforementioned gatherings. The main reason was the public mistrust of local authorities, hence the people preferred to hold unauthorized rallies. It has to be stated that 74 incidents of civil disobedience were directed to the socio-economic and 45 to public and politial issues[16].

Table 5 denotes that there was a significant decline in the dynamics of assembly from October 2012 to September 2013 when compared to previous years (see Table 5). The researches conducted by KIBHR show that artificial restrictions, illegal pressures and threats against the participants as well as cases of criminal prosecution against human rights defenders were the main reason for the reduction of peaceful demonstrations.

Table 5

The indicator of the activeness of gatherings during 2012-2013[17]

City / Year	*Ocotber 2012 - March 2013*	*Dynamics of changes Compared to the previous year*	*October 2012 - September 2013*	*Dynamics of changes Compared to the previous year*
Almaty	4,0	- 37%	5,3	- 17%
Astana	2,3	+ 35%	2,1	+35%
Aktau	0,5	- 79%	0,3	- 85%
Pavlodar	0,16	- 84%	0,1	- 90%
Uralsk	2,8	+ 7.8%	1,8	- 24%
Karaganda	0,5	- 17%	0,5	- 17%
Shymkent	0	0	0,2	-72%

[14] The source of the data is the report on conducting peaceful gathering in thr RK sfrom October 2012 to March 2013. Accessed on 15.05.2016 http://www.bureau.kz/news/download/379.pdf, "the report on conducting peaceful gathering in the RK from October 2012 to September 2013." Accessed on 15.05.2016 http://bureau.kz/news/download/402.pdf .

[15] See ibid.

[16] See ibid.

[17] See ibid.

In reference to other political factors included in the IDL, it should be stated that the indicators of Political Stability and the Rule of Law were improved by experiencing some fluctuations within the years of 1995-2014. Furthermore, these trends were factually fixed in the studies of Worldwide Governance Indicators published by the World Bank, according to which the Control of Corruption indicators[18] were also improved within the observed period of 1996-2014. Nonetheless, all mentioned above indicators declined in 2013 compared to the previous and next years.

In accordance to data of the Global Gender Gap report published by the World Economic Forum in 2014, Kazakhstan took the 43rd position out of 142 countries *(Report 2014, 224-225)*. It occupied 66th place by Political Opportunity subindex, 33rd place by the Economic Participation subindex and 48th place by the level of education subindex of The Global Gender Gap *(The Global Gender Gap Report 2014, 224-225)*.

By summarizing, it is worth mentioning that the PFI curve grew up in 2014 in comparison with 1995. The PFI was valued with 0,286 points in 1995 then the value was estimated with 0,327 points in 2014 respectively. The growth of the curve in 2013/2014 was mainly conditioned by Eurasian integration processes along with the efforts aimed at eradicating lack of political legitimacy. All these were reflected in the increase of indices of Political Stability (47,57), Rule of Law (34,13) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (29). Meanwhile, the highest indicator of the Rule of Law was registered in 2014 within the period indicated in this study.

7.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

The study of the curve of the EFI of RK shows that it experienced a decrease in 2013/2014 compared to 2011 (see Figure 1, Table 1) and the EFI indicator decreased in 2014 compared to 2000-2013 (see Figure 1, Table 1). Its decrease was mainly conditioned by the reduction of Trade rate, Domestic credit and FDI

[18] See Control of Corruption of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project: http://info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (17.05.2016).

toghether with the increase of the Consumer Price Index.

In terms of economic reform Strategy "Kazakhstan-2050" and "Concept of transition of RK to Green Economy"[19] are worth special importance. They attach great importance to the development of alternative energy sources, establishment of effective and sustainable economic model, which is based on the "green economy"[20]. The aim of the latter is to provide a stable development of the population and a high quality of life, a rational use of natural resources and environment preservation[21]*(World Bank 2013; World Bank and Ministry of Enviroment Protection and of Water Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2013).* The assistance of the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), EU, UN Development Programme, the US Agency for International Development as well as Germany international cooperation company play a key role in providing the energetic efficiency, comprehensive management of agriculture and water resources, the comprehensive use of forestry and other natural resource. *(World Bank 2013).* In particular, the development of appropriate strategies for transport and other means of communication alongside for the sectors of agriculture and rural areas will enhance the process of attracting investors by ensuring simultaneous development of a number of prioritized sectors of the economy.

"Path to the Future" address of the President made on November 11, 2014 was of high significance and it was entailed by the plan of national events. Modernization of the economic system and provision of sustainable economic growth were its core issues. It was adopted in line with the State Program for Infrastructural Development for 2015-2019[22], which aimed to develop an effective infrastructure system through the integration of macro-regions into the single market by fostering a long-term economic growth, by supporting the implementation of anti-crisis measures and by increasing the competitiveness of the economy (see Table 6).

[19] See "CONCEPT for transition of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Green Economy" (approved by Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on May 30, 2013 #557) Astana, 2013." Accessed on 12.05.2016 at: http://www.led-ca.net/assets/files/Concept_Rus-GreenEcon-Kaz.pdf.
[20] See ibid.
[21] See ibid.
[22] "State Program for Infrastructural Development for 2015-2019 (ratified by the decree of the President of the RK on April 6, 2015 №1030), Astana, 2015." Accessed on 12.05.2016 at: https://strategy2050.kz/storage/documents/eb/d6/ebd64e912b99c8c4d7b2b2a28d49a9ab.pdf.

Table 6

The indicators of macro-regions in 2013[23]

Macro-regions	*Population (in millions)*	*Share in GDP*	*GDP per capita (US dollars)*
Southern	6,6	17%	7720
Central-Eastern	3,5	18%	12030
Western	2,6	27%	25660
Northern	2,2	9%	8907
Almaty city	1,5	19%	28523
Astana city	0,8	10%	26790

The deepening of national political and economic cooperation would enable Kazakhstan to provide its economic inclusion and sustainable competitiveness within the framework of global and Eurasian economy. Moreover, it implies to reveal and implement the competitive advantages of the country in foreign markets by means of mutual actions *(World Bank 2014a, 2014b).*

7.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

The study of the curve of the SFI reveals that it increased in 2013 compared to the previous and next years within the observed 1995-2014 period (see Figure 1, Table 1). Moreover, the SFI indicator registered in 2013 was the highest (see Figure 1, Table 1). The curve of the SFI declined in 2014 compared to the previous year by reaching to the level registered in 2013 and remaining high above the level of the years 1995-2011(see Figure 1, Table 1). The increase of SFI indicators was mainly due to the rise of the Real wage, to the reduction of Unemployment rate and to the improvement of Gini index in 2013.

An increase of social benefits and pension, quantitative changes of labor resources and continuous growth of labor productivity are very important for the progress in the social context of the country.

[23] The source of the data is Strategy "Kazakhstan 2050" https://strategy2050.kz.

According to WB data on labour force participation, quantitative changes of labor resources amassed to 9,197,976 people registered in 2013. Nevertheless, the number went up to 9,284,810 people registered in 2014[24]. In line with the high level of employment[25] which was also stable, the level of unemployment was continuosly decreasing by reaching to 5,2% in 2013 and to 4,1% in 2014[26].

The policy aimed at the development of social protection was accompanied by the growth of population welfare and further improvement of the rights of social groups. In this regard, the implementation of international commitments ratified by Kazakhstan were of strategic importance for social protection sector. In particular, the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development of RK is preparing the 2nd periodic report on the implementation of the RK obligations imposed by UN International Committee on ''Economic, Social and Cultural Rights''[27]. According to the latter, the handicapped comprise 3% of the total population, equal to 672,000 people[28] and the solution of a number of urgent issues such as health, education, employment, raising of public awareness, social partnership, improvement of accessibility are outlined for them. The fulfillment of the obligations is settled in the "strategic plan to provide rights and life quality improvement for persons with disabilities for 2012-2018 in the RK"[29]. It is worth mentioning that 1,1 trillion tenge (5 milliard dollars) are annually allocated to raise the effectiveness of social assistance to the handicapped[30].

[24] See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.IN?locations=KZ&view=chart (31.05.2016).
[25] See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS?locations=KZ&view=chart (31.05.2016).
[26] See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?end=2014&locations=KZ&start=1991&view=chart (31.05.2016).
[27] See the official site of the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development at: https://www.mzsr.gov.
[28] See ibid.
[29] A decree of the government of RK of March 26, 2014 № 254 "On the approval of the second phase (2014-2015) of the strategic plan to provide rights and life quality improvement for persons with disabilities for 2012-2018 in the RK (with amendments of 05.02.2015)." Accessed on 12.05.2016. http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31533640;"Second stage (2014-2015); The strategic plan to provide rights and life quality improvement for persons with disabilities for 2012-2018 in the RK (with amendments of 05.02.2015 (ratified by the decree of the government of March 26, 2014 № 254)." Accessed on 12.05.2016 http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=31533640#pos=6;-287.
[30] See the official site of the Ministry of Healthcare and Socia Development at: https://www.mzsr.gov.

7.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

The study of the curve of the EdFI denotes that the curve decreased in 2013/2014 compared to the previous year (see Figure 1, Table 1). Moreover, the indicators of the EdFI registered in 2013/2014 were low than the one registered in 1995 and respectively the value was recorded with 0,455 points in 1995, whereas it had 0,448 points in 2014 (see Figure 1, Table 1).

During the observed period the reforms of the educational system continued and expenditure on education was comparatively increased, but the issues for educational quality assurance and enhancement have still remained unsolved. In this respect, the development and implementation of state programs targeting the development of education, expansion of its international scope, policy to promote educational integration play a vital role. The procedures set out for their regulation are endorsed in the State Program of Education Development in Kazakhstan for 2011-2020[31].

In 2013 there were 8,764 pre-school institutions, namely 3,340 kindergartens and 5,424 mini-centers where 673,700 children were involved[32]. 24% increase[33] in the number of private preschool education institutions was reported in all regions of the country. The highest rates of pre-school education were registered in the regions of Pavlodar (100%), Kostanayi (99,5%), Karaganda (98,3%), Easern Kazakhstan (97,4%) and Wesern Kazakhstan (95,7%)[34].

The number of secondary schools in an emergency state was reduced, and the issues associated with inclusive education, learning in three languages, free food and health protection and transportation were resolved.

[31] See State Program Of Education Development in the Republic Of Kazakhstan For 2011–2020 (the decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated December 7, 2010 № 1118)." Accessed on 12.05.2016. http://edu.gov.kz/ru/gosudarstvennaya-programma-razvitiya-obrazovaniya; " on the strategic plan for development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011 – 2015, implementation of the State Programme for the Development of Education in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2011 - 2020 years (1st phase) (decree of the government of the RK on Feb 11, 2011 № 130)." Accessed on 12.05.2016 http://edu.gov.kz/ru/gosudarstvennaya-programma-razvitiya-obrazovaniya.

[32] See the information about the implementation of the State Program Of Education Development in the Republic Of Kazakhstan For 2011-2013. Accessed on 12.05.2016 http://edu.gov.kz/sites/default/files/otchet.pdf.

[33] See ibid.

[34] See ibid.

The structural reforms undertaken within this period continued in vocational and higher education institutions by supporting their technical, innovative and research aimed directions as well as the development of human resource[35].

7.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

The study of the curve of the HFI in 1995-2014 shows that it significantly increased compared to the previous years (see Figure 1, Table 1). Meanwhile, the indicators of the HFI in 2013/2014 were the highest within the observed period (see Figure 1, Table 1). The growth of the HFI was conditioned by the improvement of Life expectancy rate and by the increase of Health expenditure. The study shows that in particular the incease of the Life expectancy rate took place in 2013/2014. Hence, its rate was recorded with the value of 64,9 years within 1995-2012 then the indicator went up to 70,5 years in 2013 and respectively to 71,6 years in 2014[36].

During this period the reforms of healthcare system in Kazakhstan were supported by the World Bank, the World Health Organization and the European Union combined with continuous actions aiming to improve the equal distribution of health services as well as the management and development of institutional capacities *(World Bank 2013)*. They have contributed to the rise of social responsibility and unity, accessibility of healthcare, rise of its quality and continuity, assurance of "pro-human" health care system and protection of equal all-nation right to necessary medical and healthcare services. To ensure sufficient management of the healthcare system in Kazakhstan, the preconditions were created for the involvement of concerned parties in the planning, implementation and evaluation processes of healthcare policy *(World Bank 2013; World Health Organization 2013)*. They were aimed at ensuring a healthy and safe environment for a human's life, protecting public health and reducing the risky factors impacting negatively on health, reducing the rate of mortality and premature

[35] See ibid.

[36] See the official site of the WB at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (31.05.2016).

mortality as well as improving the quality of life and prolonging life expectancy rate *(World Bank 2013; World Health Organization 2014)*.

To ensure the progress in the healthcare system in Kazakhstan, the solution of the following key issues were of great significance: 1) effective management and equitable use of resources, 2) provision of safe and high quality medical care, 3) compensation of provided medicare and services by their real cost, 4) medicine and equipment capacity, 5) modernization of laboratory and technical facilities, 6) equal distribution of financial resources allocated to the healthcare system, 7) the transparency of state healthcare targeted programs *(World Bank 2013; World Health Organization 2016)*.

7.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

FIgure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Kazakhstan in the time span between 1995-2014 *



* Source: calculations by the researcher.

It can be seen from Figure 3 that the IDL curve improved compared to the year of 1995. The IDL was recorded with 0,276 points in 1995, meanwhile it was valued with 0,441 points in 2013/2014 within the mentioned period. Moreover, the indicator registered in 2008 with 0,461 points still remained the highest for the period observed (see Figure 3, Table 1).

The improvement of PFI, SFI and HFI indicators stipulated the growth of the IDL in 2013, whereas the drop of EFI and EdFI had a negative impact on it.

The continuous progress of the PFI and HFI as well as the improvement of the EdFI indicator contributed to the stability of the IDL in 2014. On the contrary, low EFI and SFI indicators negatively influenced the IDL.

In overall, when analyzing the curve of the IDL, we may conclude that mainly EFI, and particularly EdFI and SFI had a negative impact on the processes of democratic transformations. In general, a slow progress of the IDL was recorded within the observed period and the level of trust of CSOs in the political regime still of a challenging nature.

7.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

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By means of regression analysis, variables included in the model, which had a significant influence on the IDL of Kazakhstan were revealed.

The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDLi* and the variables of PFI as well as SFI. On the contrary, there has been no significant correlation between the IDLi and the EFI, EdFI and HFI included in the model.

According to the results of the regression analysis there has been a significant correlation between the IDLi and the variables of Political Stability/Absence of Violence as well as the variable of Social Unrest.

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

$$Y' = 0{,}002x_1 + 0{,}286 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}222),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Political Stability/Absence of Violence) and x_1 is the Political Stability/Absence of Violence.

$$Y' = -0{,}059x_2 + 0{,}516 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}262),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Social Unrest and Political Pressure), and x_2 is Social Unrest and Political Pressure.

In Social Factors Index a significant relation was observed between IDLi and Unemployment as well as Gini index.

$$Y' = -0{,}016x_3 + 0{,}523 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}706),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from Unemployment), and x_3 is the Unemployment.

$$Y' = -1{,}527x_4 + 0{,}865 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}430),$$

where Y' is the IDLi ((IDL was cleaned from the variable of Gini index), and x_4 is Gini index.

Overall, unemployment and Gini index of the SFI significantly affect the IDL of the republic of Kazakhstan. The decrease of unemployment by 1% and Gini index by 0,1 unit will bring to the growth of IDLi by 0,016 and 0,15 units respectively. Unemployment has a high coefficient of determination and explains 70,6% of variation of dependent variables. In fact, Political Stability/Absence of Violence and Social Unrest have a significant impact on the level of democracy in the Republic of Kazakhstan. It implies that the positive change of Political Stability/Absence of Violence with 1 unit will result in the growth of the IDLi with 0,002 units. The growth of the variables of Social Unrest and Political Pressure[37] with 1 unit will bring to the decrease of the IDLi with 0,059 units. The negative correlation of the mentioned variables is explained by the fact, that despite political prevention and the fact that civil disobedience is accompanied by political pressure and movements of human rights protection as well as by violence

[37] The variable of "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" is measured by the scaling range of 0-5, where 0 is the highest number of unrest and pressure, including revolutions and coups and 5 is the total absence of such events.

expressed towards civil activists and journalists, they in fact promote reforms in different spheres of public life by positively affecting democratization processes.

By summing up the results of the regression analysis, it may be assumed that the growth of democracy level may be ensured by improving the aforementioned factors. The lack of civiliarchic legitimacy and restrictions imposed on activies of the civil society still are the issues which are difficult to solve in regards with democratic transformations of the political system of the country.

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Abbreviations

APK	Assembly of People of Kazakhstan
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EFI	Economic Factors Index
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
KIBHR	Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFI	Political Factors Index
RK	Republic of Kazakhstan
RK	Republic of Kazakhstan
SFI	Social Factors Index
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 8.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF KYRGYZSTAN

ASTGHIK NADIRYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Kyrgyzstan in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Kyrgyzstan in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,407	0,324	0,503	0,558	0,196	0,390
1996	0,404	0,385	0,502	0,495	0,205	0,398
1997	0,393	0,386	0,500	0,495	0,191	0,392
1998	0,378	0,519	0,509	0,496	0,231	0,426
1999	0,388	0,338	0,510	0,444	0,252	0,380
2000	0,352	0,329	0,542	0,423	0,213	0,359
2001	0,345	0,361	0,555	0,449	0,224	0,370
2002	0,322	0,394	0,551	0,486	0,242	0,374
2003	0,314	0,436	0,579	0,488	0,244	0,386
2004	0,336	0,507	0,577	0,497	0,249	0,414
2005	0,242	0,453	0,584	0,518	0,257	0,365
2006	0,258	0,584	0,609	0,561	0,298	0,418
2007	0,220	0,622	0,657	0,618	0,312	0,425
2008	0,258	0,627	0,697	0,583	0,286	0,440
2009	0,243	0,600	0,730	0,600	0,346	0,439
2010	0,265	0,623	0,746	0,574	0,345	0,452
2011	0,305	0,622	0,799	0,637	0,328	0,479
2012	0,310	0,616	0,881	0,673	0,385	0,499
2013	0,315	0,766	0,877	0,636	0,375	0,534
2014	0,381	0,681	0,867	0,636	0,370	0,538

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

8.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The PFI curve of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) had a negative trend over 1995-2009 and the lowest indicator was registered in 2007. Nonetheless, the PFI curve had a positive trend during 2010-2014.

With adoption of the new Constitution, the Kyrgyz Republic undertook reforms leading to a parliamentary political system in 2010. However, the President is vested with powers and for his dismissal from office must be taken the majority of the total number of the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh (JK) at the initiative of not less than two thirds of the total number of deputies. Hence, it is not an easy task (*Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, Article 67, paragraph 4*). For that reason, Kyrgystan was considered presidential country due to F. Keefer's methodology *(Keefer 2012, 3-4*) which was applied to estimate the variable of ''Political System''.

The first Constitution of independent Kyrgystan was adopted in 1993 initiated by the first President Askar Akayev. The first political parties and movements also appeared during his ruling. On February 5, 1995 the first elections of bicameral Jogorku Kenesh parliament took place particularly on the basis of majoritarian representation. It consisted of a lower chamber with 35 mandates in the Legislative Assembly and an upper chamber with 70 mandates in the Assembly of People's Representatives. On Februry 7, 1996 the referendum was conducted to make amendments of the Constitution and, as a result, presidential powers were more strengthened. Another referendum of amendments was conducted on October 17, 1998. As a result, the election procedure of deputies as well as ratio of their seats in the parliament were changed. Thereafter, Assembly of People's Representatives were to have 45 deputies elected on the basis of majoritarian system and Legislative Assembly were to consist of 60 deputies with 15 of them to be elected on the basis of proporational system (see Figure 2). The immunity of deputies was also abolished.

On February 20, 2000 elections were held in single-mandate districts and by party's lists. Thus, parliamentary elections were held completely in proportional electoral system (see Figure 2). Nine political parties and two electoral blocs

participated in 2010 parliamentary elections. The second round of elections was held on March 12, 2010. As a result, mandates were won by communists, "Union" of Democratic Forces, Democratic Party for the Women, Afghanistan War Veterans' Party, socialist "Ata-Meken (Fatherland)" Party and "Moya Strana" (My Country) party.

In comply with Constitutional amendments adopted in 2003, unicameral parliament was to be formed in 2005. 90 new JK members were intended to be elected by party's lists. In accodance with those changes elected political parties could form government *(JK of the Kyrgyz Republic 2016).* In 2005 after the announcement of results of unicameral parliamentary elections, a coup d'état was triggered by election fraud, violence used against a number of candidates, arrests and prevention cases for participating in elections, as well as growing public discontent with A. Akayev, a winner of three consecutive presidential elections. As a result of the coup, Akayev was forced to flee the country after presiding for 15 years. As a result of the "Tulip Revolution", Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former Prime Minister and a leader of People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), became a President in 2005. Thereafter, he initiated new constitutional amendments two years later in October. As a result, Parliament would henceforth be composed of 90 members elected by proportional electoral system *(JK of the Kyrgyz Republic 2016)* (see Figure 2). Followed by the constitutional amendments, extraordinary parliamentary elections were held on December 16, 2007. Twelve political parties participated in them. Prior to the official announcement of the elections K. Bakiyev announced about the establishment of "Ak Zhol" (Bright Path) party, which won 71 out of the 90 seats causing dissatisfaction and discontent among opposition forces. Those events led to the April Revolution in 2010, during which 86 people died as a result of clashes with police forces, K. Bakiyev left Kyrgyzstan and a provisional government was formed headed by Roza Otunbayeva.

The development of new Constitution was initiated by this newly-formed provisional government which mainly comprised the oppostition forces once participated in the "Tulip Revolution" but couldn't come to power. It was submitted for referendum on June 27, 2010 and it polled 90,55% of the vote *(OSCE/ODIHR 2010).*

In comply with KR Constitution the highest body of executive power in the Kyrgyz Republic shall be exercised by the Government. The Government shall consist of the Prime Minister, vice Prime Ministers, ministers and chairpersons of state committees (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 83*). The faction which has more than one half of deputies' mandates, or a coalition of factions with its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new convocation shall nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister. In case based on the results of the elections neither party shall get more than one half of deputies' mandates, then the President shall propose to one of factions to create parliamentary majority within 15 working days and nominate the candidate for the office of the Prime Minister. The President within 3 days period shall issue a decree on the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government. In the event that the President fails to issue the decree on appointment of the Prime Minister and members of the Government within the above time period, they shall be deemed appointed *(KR Constitution of 2010, Article 84)*. The Government shall be responsible and accountable to the Jogorku Kenesh within the limits stipulated in the present Constitution (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 85, paragraph 1*). The Jogorku Kenesh may consider the issue of no confidence in the Government. Following the expression of no confidence in the Government, the President shall be entitled to take a decision on the dismissal of the Government. In the event that within three months the Jogorku Kenesh repeatedly adopts the decision expressing no confidence in the Government, the President shall dismiss the Government *(KR Constitution of 2010, Article 87, paragraph 3-7).*

The third Section of the new Constitution is completely devoted to the President and his powers. In comply with Article 60, The President shall be the head of State and the symbol of the unity of the people and state power. The President shall be elected by the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic for a term of 6 years. Moreover, one and the same person may not be elected President twice. A citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, no younger than 35 years of age and not older than 70 years of age, who has a command of the state language and who has been resident in the republic for no less than 15 years in total may be elected President

(*KR Constitution of 2010, Section III, Articles 61,62*). There shall be no limit on the number of candidates for the office of the President. A person who has collected not less than 30,000 voters' signatures may be registered as a presidential candidate. The President shall call the elections (as well as early elections) to the Jogorku Kenesh in cases provided for in the present Constitution, shall call elections to local keneshes (parliaments), in accordance with procedure and in cases provided in the law shall dismiss local keneshes. The President shall sign and promulgate laws; shall return laws with his objections to the Jogorku Kenesh; shall have the right to convene an extraordinary sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh and define the issues for consideration thereof. The President shall exercise his/her powers by way of issuing decrees and orders which shall be mandatory for implementation on the entire territory of the Kyrgyz Republic *(KR Constitution of 2010, Articles 64, 65*). The President may be dismissed from office only on the basis of a charge brought by the Jogorku Kenesh in respect of him for having committed a crime, confirmed by the conclusion of the Office of the Prosecutor General and in the event that the President is unable to carry out his/her duties as a result of illness. The decision of the Jogorku Kenesh to bring a charge against the President for his dismissal from office must be taken by the majority of the total number of the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh and shall be supported by a conclusion of a special commission formed by the Jogorku Kenesh. The decision of the Jogorku Kenesh on the impeachment of the President shall be taken by the majority of not less than two thirds of votes of the total number of the deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh not later than within three months. In the event that the Jogorku Kenesh fails to make a decision within this period, the charge shall be deemed rejected. In case of early termination of powers by the President on the grounds envisaged in the present Constitution, his/her powers shall be exercised by the Toraga (Speaker) of the Jogorku Kenesh. In case of inability of the Toraga to exercise the powers of the President, then such powers shall be exercised by the Prime Minister. Early presidential elections are conducted within three months period since the termination of powers of the President. Officials exercising the powers of the President shall not have the right to call early elections of the

Jogorku Kenesh or dismiss the Government (*KR Constitution of 2010, Articles 66-68).*

In comply with Article 83 of the KR Constitution, executive power in the Kyrgyz Republic shall be exercised by the Government headed by the Prime Minister. The faction which has more than one half of deputies' mandates, or a coalition of factions with its participation within 15 days since the date of the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh of new convocation shall nominate a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister. The candidate for the office of the Prime Minister shall submit to the Jogorku Kenesh the program, structure and composition of the Government (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 84).* The President within 3 days period shall issue a decree on the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government. In the event that the President fails to issue the decree on appointment of the Prime Minister and members of the Government within the above time period, they shall be deemed appointed (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 84, paragraph 5).* In the event of failure to approve the program, define the structure and composition of the Government in accordance with the procedures envisaged in the present Constitution, the President shall call for early elections to the Jogorku Kenesh (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 84, paragraph 6).* In the event that a coalition of factions loses the status of the parliamentary majority, the elected and appointed Government shall be changed. In this case, the Jogorku Kenesh shall form the Government Jogorku Kenesh in accordance with procedures and within the time periods envisaged in the present article (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 84, paragraph 7).*

It shoud be noted that The Government shall be responsible and accountable to the Jogorku Kenesh within the limits stipulated in the present Constitution. Nevertheless, in the event of the issue of no confidence in the Government adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh, the President shall be entitled to disagree with the decision of the Jogorku Kenesh. In the event that within three months the Jogorku Kenesh repeatedly adopts the decision expressing no confidence in the Government, the President shall dismiss the Government *(KR Constitution of 2010, Article 85).*

Table 2

Votes of the KR presidential candidates, expressed in percentage[1]

Candidates	KR presidential elections					
	1991	1995	2000	2005	2009	2011
	I round	I round	I round	I round	I round	I round
Askar Akayev	**95,4**	**72,4**	**74,45**	-	-	-
Absamat Masaliyev (CPK)	-	24,7	-	-	-	-
Medetkan Sherimkulov (independent)	-	1,7	-	-	-	-
Omurbek Tekebayev (Ata-Meken- Fatherland)	-	-	13,85	-	-	-
Almazbek Atambayev (SDPK)	-	-	6,00	-	8,39	**62,52**
TURSUNBAY BAKIR UULU (Erkin Kyrgyzstan (Free Kyrgyzstan))	-	-	0,97	3,93	-	-
Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Ak Zhol)	-	-	-	**88,71**	**76,43**	-
Tenir Sariyev	-	-	-	-	6,43	-
Akbarali Aytikeyev (RUIE)	-	-	-	3,62	-	0,11
Adakhan Madumarov (Erkin Kyrgyzstan)	-	-	-	-	-	14,78
Kamchibek Tashiyev (Ata-Zhurt)	-	-	-	-	-	14,32
Other candidates		0,1	4,06	2,8	4,14	7,55
Against all candidates	4,6	1,1	0,67	0,90	4,61	0,72

[1] The source of the data is Nohlen, Dieter, Grotz, Florian, and Hartmann, Christof. (eds). 2001. Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: Volume 1: Middle East as well as the OSCE final report on KR elections at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan (20.05.2016).

The presidential elections of Kyrgyz Republic were held in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2009 and 2011 (see Table 2). During the first decade of country's independence they were held quite peacefully. Although a number of shortcomings in the areas of voters' lists, transparency for voting and candidates' nominations were reported by international observers missions, in particular by OSCE observers, Kyrgyzstan was considered an "island of democracy in Central Asia." 95,4% of the vote brought to power the first non-partizan President Askar Akaev in the first presidential election of independent Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan seemed to undergo a very easy transition stage, but the next two presidential elections showed that the political system was becoming more authoritarian with more expanded presidential powers.

After the "Tulip Revolution" which was one of the color revolutions in post-Soviet countries a former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev won the elections on July 10, 2005. However, during Bakiyev's ruling socio-economic conditions weren't improved, level of corruption was still high, north-south tension was growing up in the country, as well as people accused Bakiyev of distributing government positions and mines to his family members. Social discontent intesified in the country after his re-election in 2009 and after bloody protests in the capital, Bakiyev left the country for Kazakhstan, then Belarus and from exile in Belarus he resigned from the post in April, 2010. Nonetheless, Bakiyev later announced that he didn't recognize his resignation and he was still the legitimate President of Kyrgyzstan.

The Jogorku Kenesh - the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic - is the highest representative body exercising legislative power as defined by the Constitution. The Jogorku Kenesh consists of 120 deputies elected for a five year term on the basis of proportional representation *(KR Constitution of 2010, Article 70)*.

As a result of elections a political party may not be granted more than 65 deputy mandates in the Parliament to provide multi-party system (*KR Constitution of 2010, Article 70, paragraph 2)*.

Table 3

Ratio of the seats received by the political parties in the Jogorku Kenesh of the KR[2]

Political Parties, blocs and participants	Jogorku Kenesh elections											
	1995		2000		2005*		2007		2010		2015	
	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P
SDPK	14	-	-	D**	-	-	-	11	-	26	-	38
Asaba	4	-	-	D**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UPK	4	-	-	D**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ata Meken	3	-	1	1	-		-	-	-	18	-	11
Erkin Kyrgyzstan	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CPK	3	-	1	5	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-
RPPK	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
APK	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ALPK	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DMK	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DWPK	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UDF**	-	-	8	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moya Strana	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PPAWV	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ata-Zhurt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	28***
Ar-Namys	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-	-
Respublika	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	***
Ak Zhol	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	-	-	-	-
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
Onuguu-Progress	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
Bir Bol	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Non-partizan	67	-	73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	*105*	*0*	*90*	*15*	-	-	*0*	*90*	*0*	*120*	*0*	*120*

* The 2005 parliamentary elections on February 27 and March 13 were recognized neither by OSCE observers nor by the people, who demanded the second voting in some polling stations, as a result of which, the "Tulip Revolution" led to change of power in the country. The source is the OSCE/ODIHR missions final report at: //www.osce.org/ru/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan/14835?download=true (01.07.2016).

**D– participated in the elections by the bloc. Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan and "Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan" and Asaba united in the "Union of Democratic Forces" bloc during the 2000 parliamentary elections.

*** Ata-Zhurt and Respublica parties came together in the 2015 parliamentary elections.

[2] Source of the data is Nohlen, Dieter, Grotz, Florian, and Hartmann, Christof. (eds). 2001. Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: Volume 1: Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Oxford University Press, OSCE final report on KR elections http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyzstan (20.05.2016).

The Jogorku Kenesh shall assemble for its first session not later than 15 days after the results of elections are defined. The oldest member of the Jogorku Kenesh shall open the first sitting of the Jogorku Kenesh. The powers of the previous Jogorku Kenesh shall cease from the day of the first sitting of the newly convened Jogorku Kenesh. The Jogorku Kenesh shall adopt the law on appointing a referendum, call for presidential elections, introduce changes to the present Constitution, adopt laws, solve the issues of alteration of the state borders of the Kyrgyz Republic, ratify and denunciate international treaties pursuant the procedures envisaged by law, approve the republican budget and the report on its execution, decide on matters of administrative and territorial structure of the Kyrgyz Republic as well as issue amnesty acts. JK shall approve the program of the activity of the Government, define the structure and composition of the Government except for the members heading state agencies in charge of issues of defense and national security and make decision on expressing no confidence/confidence in the Government. JK shall elect and dismiss the Ombudsman *(KR Constitution 2010, Chapter 4).*

In comply with the new Constitution the right of legislative initiative shall lie with 10,000 voters (popular initiative), deputy of the Jogorku Kenesh and the Government. The laws are passed by the Jogorku Kenesh in three readings. Constitutional laws and laws altering state borders shall be adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh after not less than in three readings by not less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh. A law adopted by the Jogorku Kenesh shall be sent within 14 days to the President for signature.

The President shall appoint with the consent of the Jogorku Kenesh the Prosecutor General.

In fact, after the revolution in 2010 the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic breathed new life into the political life that had deviated from its democratic path. The new constitution was welcomed by the international community, although critics claimed, that process of controlling the referendum under such political and ethnic tensions conditions was not easy. Moreover, some of its provisions hadn't been well developed yet. However, significant changes from presidential to parliamentary political system were undertaken in the KR in

accordance with new Constitution. The first parliamentary elections, defined by the new Constitution, were held on October 10, 2010. Twenty-nine parties participated in the elections, and only five could overcome the minimum 5% electoral threshold and take relatively equal seats (see Table 3).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation



Table 4

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation in Jogorku Kenesh

Electoral representation	1995	2000	2005	2007	2010	2015
Majoritarian	105	90	0	0	0	0
Proportional	0	15	90	90	120	120
Total	**105**	**105**	**90**	**90**	**120**	**120**

Human rights and freedoms. There are similar problems in Kyrgyzstan as in other countries of Central Asia in this regard. The high level of corruption, religious restrictions, interpretation of laws in favour of the ruling government and pressure against opposition are major problems in Kyrgyzstan. The 2010 revolution was a positive step towards the elimination of authoritarian governance, but problems anyway persistenly exist. The fact that national minorities are not represented in government bodies and their languages don't have a state status is one of the key issues (*Freedom House 1998*).

Human rights defense institution was strongly suppressed in Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 Human Rights Committee of Kyrgyzstan, which protected freedom of the press, underlined government pressure on judicial system and hence was subject to acts of violence. So, in July, police closed the agencies of Human Rights Committee of Kyrgyzstan and tried to arrest the director Ramazan Dirildayev, who had to leave the country (*Freedom House 1999*). In general, Human rights defense institution had repeatedly been exerted to pressure, particularly at the elections period. This is evidenced by reports submitted by international human rights organizations and press releases.

After 2010 mass media in Kyrgyzstan were quite liberalized compared to Bakiyev's administration years. Bishkek based news services are free and freely speak about election and political issues as well as issues of national security. Furthermore, the websites of Central Election Commission and state institutions are being modernized. But before that, according to annual Freedom House reports, press was disproportionately distributed and was biased, as it provided only the information confirmed by the authorities. Moreover, there were no media released in other language, particularly in Uzbek-language for ethnic groups living in the country.

The Internet is also available for a greater number of citizens. Social networks have become widespread and are not controlled by authorities. Many parliament and government representatives have their own social pages and communicate with citizens. Nevertheless, besides all these, after the 2010 events radio and TV stations in the south of the country that used to be in Uzbek language started broadcasting in Kyrgyz language, which is a problem in terms of the interests of minorities. It should be noted that ethnic minorities are not properly presented in

the legislative and executive authorities as well as in judicial bodies, especially those in the south region of the country. After the revolution, the number of Uzbeks in police forces increased by 2 % of the total number in the southern regions of Osh and Jalal-Abad. But taking into account that Uzbeks comprise 40% of the population of Kyrgyzstan, this number is quite small *(Marat 2011).*

In general, the 2010 revolution and ethnic clashes gave rise to strong criticism voiced by international organizations. Despite the fact that public order changes had a positive effect on the country, human rights issues have been still of much concern. Thus, persecution and arbitrary arrests of Uzbeks had been continuously reported in "Human Rights Watch" (HRW) 2012 report. After the events in Osh about 5000 criminal cases were filed with the majority of victims being Uzbek. These cases haven't been investigated yet. Many Uzbeks were found guilty and sent to prison and some of them were tortured as a result of irregular judicial processes *(Amnesty International 2010)*. Over the period, Azimzhan Askarov human rights defender was arrested after he was involved in investigating violence cases exerted against the detainees. He was accused of killing a policeman and wounding some other officers during Bazar-Kurgan mass disturbances in June in 2010. Askarov was sentenced to life imprisonment by out of order trial. In December 2011, the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan upheld that decision and prosecutor's bodies refused to review the case on the proposal of HRW mission. Since then, many international organizations have repeatedly appealed with a demand to release A. Askarov and to investigate the case of his being exerted to violence, but the issue has not been resolved so far (*OMCT 2016; OSCE 2016).*

Hasan Mirzakarimov's arrest was similar in its nature, as he was found guilty on charges of murder and participation in mass disturbances on June 12, 2012 and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Osh Regional Court. Mirzakarimov's lawyers stated that he had psychological and mental problems, and claimed that the police had obtained his confession through torture *(OMCT 2016; OSCE 2016*). Besides that, Alim Amanova, Jalal-Abad regional ombudsman, visited places of detention and informed HRW on the fact that 37 out of 42 detainees she met claimed to have been beaten *(Human Rights Watch 2012).*

The provisions of the KR Constitution, especially those used against opposition forces, were quite arbitrary in 1993 in terms of political rights. Such

were cases of candidates' registration complications on the eve of presidential and parliamentary elections related to complications of language, citizens' signatures and registration of criminal cases. According to Article 43 of the Constitution 1993, the President shall have a command of the state language and have been resident in the republic for no less than 15 years in total. Thus, Central Election Commission (CEC) prior to the presidential elections on October 29, 2000 created a Linguistic Commission to check Kyrgyz language proficiency level of a candidate, by hence referring to the Constitution and Article 61 of Electoral Code. This was negatively estimated by OSCE and was qualified as violations of Article 5 of OSCE Copenhagen Document and Article 25 about political and civil rights of International Convention on Human Rights ratified by the country (*Кынев 2005).* Another violation was referred to the dissmissal of some candidates from presidential race due to a fact that a person who has collected less than 50,000 voters' signatures may not be registered as a presidential candidate in accordance with Article 55 of the Constitution (*Кынев 2005).*

Kyrgyzstan has recently made progress in the field of human rights and freedoms, political and civil rights. Thus, for example, the death penalty was abolished in Kyrgyzstan in 2007. The change of constitution and political regime also had a positive influence in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, corruption and political disturbances are of much concern and anti-corruption and civil bodies created by post-revolutionary government fight against the latter. HRW singles out the issues of LGBT rights mentioning public pressure and police violence exerted against them *(Human Rights Watch 2014a, 2014b)*[3].

Ongoing ethnic tensions, intransperancy and unfairness in litigation processes, police arbitrariness, domestic violence and pressure against Uzbeks in the South cause concern for international organizations. Moreover, poor state of prisons, the lack of judicial impartiality, the violation of the principle of religious freedom, shortage of independent mass media, the lack of favorable conditions for peoples with disabilities, trafficking, child labor and others are issues to be tackled by those competetent organizations *(US State Department 2013).*

[3] See the official site of Human Rights Watch at: www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/kyrgyzstan (18.06.2015).

***Civil disobedience*.** Kyrgyzstan is quite active in terms of civil disobedience. Even though the state adopted the path of democratic reforms after the independence, it became a strong authoritarian state governed by a President in the late 90's. This is evidenced by various reports and monitoring missions conducted by international institutions and organizations such as Freedom House, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Thus, after independence, Kyrgyzstan was divided into South and North zones each influenced by clans and therefore, the country appreared in politically intricate and economically dwindling situation, which resulted in stirring waves of civil disobedience.

in April 1998 Kyrgyzstan was facing economic crisis with external debt of about $ 1 billion. In the same year there was a big scandal aroused for selling the country's gold mines by government officials to foreign companies. To avoid the scandal, Jumangulov a Prime Minister resigned *(Freedom House 1998).* According to Freedom House report, the status of the country was changed from ''partly free'' to ''not free'' due to a high level of corruption and enforced athoritarian system.

Social unrest was mostly activated in the mid-90s, when 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections were conducted with numerous frauds and were strongly criticized by OSCE observation missions (*Freedom House 1998, 2000; OSCE 1995*). As a result, demonstrations headed by representatives of opposition parties and parliamentarians against the current government took place. In April, 1999 Felix Kulov a Bishkek mayor and Akayev's strong critic was arrested on accusations of crime against the state and conspirancy *(Freedom House 1998)*.

Many opposition parties were banned from participating in 2000 parliamentary elections by various artificial technical reasons (*Freedom House 1999)*. First, in April 1999 Parliament adopted a law in comply with which a political party should be registered a year prior to the scheduled elections. However, the elections were to be held in February 2000. This was severely

* Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was chosen for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

criticized by the Helsinki Commission. In the letter addressed to the Government the Committee expresseed its deep concern about the fact that the principles of free and fair elections were violated and freedom of press and speech were greatly suppressed. Although it was once considered the most liberal country in Central Asia *(OSCE 2000)*. The elections were eventually held, and F.Kulov ufficiently amassing high per cent of votes was defeated in the secound round and was again arrested (*Freedom House 2001).*

A. Akayev ran for the upcoming presidential elections in the same year. As it was defined by Constitution of 1993, one and the same person might not be elected President three times. Nevertheless, Constitutional Court ruled that Akayev might be re-elected as his first term had begun before the adoption of the Constitution. In fact, elections were criticized by OSCE as a result of inaccuracies in the voters' lists, bribery, ballot stuffing and biased media releases *(OSCE 2000).*

It should also be noted that F. Kulov could not participate in the elections due to the failure of Kyrgyz language proficiency test, which was a tool and a mean to avoid unfavourable and undesirable candidates.

Protesters, walking out against unfair elections as well as opposition members were either arrested or beaten by the police *(Freedom House 2001).*

Police opened fire on protesters demanding Akayev's resignation in 2002 which was unprecedented in the history of Kyrgystan *(Freedom House 2003).* Those opposition protests created difficult economic situation and caused Alimbek Beknazarov's arrest. Thousands of people came out to protest on March 17 and 18 in the southern Aksi region a few days later after the trial. The police opened fire on demonstrators by killing 6 and injuring more than 10 civilians. Even though the government accused human rights activists of instigating clashes, it eventually released Beknazarov to avoid further unpleasant problems (*Freedom House 2002, 2008).*

Those events had a serious blow on Akayev's legitimacy and more aggravated anti-government sentiments. Nonetheless, Akayev initiated a referendum on constitutional changes to take place on February 2, 2003. In comply with those changes parliament would become unicameral, the President and his family would be granted life-long immunity and Akayev would be the President until December 2005. According to the final results of the referendum, 76% of the population

voted in favor of the amendments, although elections were marred by disturbances and violations. Besides, OSCE was not able to send observation mission since the referendum had been announced only three weeks prior to the date of its conducting *(Freedom House 2004).*

Changes to the Electoral Code were made in 2004, according to which candidates with criminal records would not participate in elections *(Freedom House 2005)*. Those amendments were made in 2005 prior to parliamentary and presidential elections to be held in February and October correspondingly, to ban the particiaption of some opposition members in the elections as almost all competitive opposition representatives were once arrested (*Freedom House 2005*). Those parliamentary elections were relatively more highly assessed by OSCE than the previous ones, but the results were not accepted both by the opposition and the population. All this led to the "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan, which was one of those color revolutions in post-Soviet countries.

A big wave of protests occurred following the parliamentary elections in February 2005, connected with the decision to invalidate candidacies of a number of independent candidates and opposition leaders. in March after the second round of elections the situation was further exacerbated, by spreading from the south to Bishkek. Protesters attacked a number of state institutions, released F. Kulov who joined K. Bakiyev. President A. Akayev was forced to leave the country and signed his resignation in Moscow in April (*BBC 2015; Economist 2005*).

As it has already been mentioned, after the revolution of March 25, Akayev was dismissed from office. K. Bakiyev succeeded him and came to power, but the situation wasn't improved anyway. First, the leaders of the revolution had already been divided, which led to new discontent. Second, the division took place in the region as well, by separating the north and south (*International Crisis Group 2006)*. In turn, the President-elect began enhancing his institutions, by restricting the right of freedom of assembly with reference to the law on compulsory registration of demonstrations. Despite all this, the Freedom House considered the revolution in 2005 as a step towards liberalization, by changing the status from "not free" to "partly free" (*Freedom House 2006*). Bakiyev dissolved the parliament and new elections were scheduled for December 2007. Prior to that, constitutional amendments were adopted in October according to which there would be 90

instead of then 75 deputy mandates for candidates elected by party's lists in the parliament. Ak Zhol party founded by Bakiyev won the elections in December and hence suggested a candidate for a Prime Minister *(Freedom House 2008*). All this proved Bakiyev's intention to build the presidential state. Mines and resources of the country were persistently sold to people with close ties to authorities, and corruption kept its high level. There was no improvement in the situation of the population of Kyrgyzstan during Bakiyev's administration. On the contrary, it led to more concentrated powers; government passed new laws that restricted rights of freedom of religion, press and assembly (*Freedom House 2010*). Thus, it triggered the most bloody events in the history of Kyrgyzstan.

On April 7, 2010 mass demonstrations began in Bishkek and in other regions. They were caused by aforementioned problems, which had been yearly exacerbating after the "Tulip Revolution" in 2005. Furthermore, in 2010 the government announced twofold increase in the prices of electricity and heating, and fivefold increase of hot water price, which stirred mass protests in February-March in various parts of the country (*RIA Novosti 2010a*). The opposition planned to hold meetings in different regions and cities, but the government responded with their arrests. In response to arrest of Bolot Sherniyazov vice President of Ata-Meken opposition party, protesters stormed governement building in the center of Talas. Furthermore, the police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. As a result of the clashes between riot police and anti-government demonstrators, two civilians were injured (*Fergana News 2010)*. Almazbek Atambayev, a former Prime Minister and leader of SDPK as well as other opposition leaders were arrested (*RIA Novosti 2010b*).

On April 7 mass demonstrations began in the capital. Thousands of protesters clashed with riot police. The latter resorted to special measures, but failed to disperse the demonstration. During the protest, about 100 civilians were injured, and some were killed (*RIA Novosti 2010c*). Demonstrations were spreading into regions where protesters were seizing administratve centers (*RIA Novosti 2010d*). Protesters invaded, plundered and ravaged the buildings of the Parliament, Prosecutor General's Office, the Government, as well as Bakiyev's houses *(RIA Novosti 2010e, 2010f)*. In the evening it was known that the government had resigned and a new provisional government was formed headed by Roza

Otunbayeva. According to the investigation of Independent Public Commission 84 people died and 1,651 were injured as a result of April 6-8 events (*CentreAsia 2010)*.

Disturbances began in Osh on June 11 and escalated into mass clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks residing in the south of the country (*Radio Liberty 2010)*. As a result of those clases, 2000 civilians died, 400,000 were displaced, whereas 100,000 migrated to Uzbekistan and 1,500 buildings and constructions were ruined[4].

In years to follow the Kyrgyzstan continued to hold protests conditioned by social, political, economic, cultural and various issues. According to official data, there were totally 4075 protests in Kyrgyzstan, which was averaged to 3 protests a day within the period of 2011-2013 and from January to February in 2014 *(Politicheskoe Obozrenie 2014).* Thus, there were more protests throughout the country in 2011 than in revolutionary 2010. Last year their number was totalled to 1193 with 680 rallies, 428 pickets, 18 marches and 16 demonstrations. There were also 51 cases of road closure in that year (including 10 in the capital). 626 protests were aimed at political issues, while 562 were aimed at socio-economic issues. It is noteworthy that most of the protests (582) were held in Bishkek. 537 rallies, 706 pickets, 4 marches and 2 demonstrations totalled to 1,286 protests were registered in the next 2012. They were mostly conducted in the capital as in the previous year and were also accompanied by road closure and even land confiscation cases. It should be noted that not only the number of protests grew up but also the number of participants reaching up to 73,000 people which was twice more than in the previous year. After the change of power criminal cases for violations at the rallies were filed in Kyrgyzstan for the first time in 2012. Last year seven people were arrested where three were deputies and one was a former prosecutor. Administrative penalties were aslo applied.

In 2013 Ministry of Internal Affairs of the KR reported only 849 protests and 452 of them were conducted in Bishkek. During that year, the protests were attended by 37,000 in Bishkek, 15,500 in Osh and 16,000 in Jalal-Abad, whch was totalled to about 119,000 people. Mass demonstrations were held in Issyk Kul region in connection with the sale of Kumtor gold mine, which accumulated more

[4] See the official site of Amnesty International at: www.amnestyusa.org/research/science-for-human-rights/kyrgyzstan (15.05.2016).

than 16,000 participants. This year about 46,000 were put to work for the discipline of police officers, and the Kazakh Interior Ministry team only four times smaller. Protests had both political and socio-economic reasons in 2013 and 2014. There were also demonstrations against high-profile court cases, such as the case of the deputies who were arrested last year, as well as criminal cases related to events in Osh. The number of those under trial had reached to 236.

36 rallies and 25 pickets within the period of January 1 to February 28, 2014. Talas region, which had been the quietest regions of the country for years, was shaken with disturbances that started on April 3 and were connected with Bakay-Atinyan gold mine region. In relation to In Issyk Kul region it was still a tough issue to deal with due to unresolved problem of Kumtor gold mine (*Politicheskoe Obozrenie 2014).*

Thus, Kyrgyzstan is viewed as an active and turbulent country in terms of civil disobedience. It is evidenced by two revolutions as well as the unprecedented number of demonstrations over the recent years. It is noteworthy that although 2010 was considered one of the bloodiest years in the history of independent Kyrgyzstan, international organizations positively assessed the changes happened in that year. This is evidenced by the increase of PFI of the IDL due to adoption of the new policy, the new Constitution, as well as activation of civil society. All this contributed to the rise of the IDL. According to Freedom House, Kyrgyzstan has become "partly free" country since 2010[5].

In conclusion, it should be noted that PFI indicator registered in 1995 with the value of 0,407 units was the highest one over the period. This means that the positive trend observed since 2010 has not yet overcome the threshold of indicators registered in the 90s (see Table 1). The PFI sharp fluctuations denote that the political life of Kyrgyzstan was unstable and hence it adversely affected on the IDL.

[5] See the official site of Freedom House at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/kyrgyzstan (15.05.2016).

8.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

Kyrgyzstan is a poor country and its economy is mainly sustained by financial remittances of citizens who are employed either abroad or in agricultural areas and industry of useful minerals. Cotton is the most exported agricultural product, whereas gold, uranium, mercury and natural gas are also in the list of goods for export *(CIA.gov 2016)*. High level of corruption impedes the regulations of country's economic life and creates certain difficulties for foreign investments and already existing inner resources to be distributed at best.

After the collapse of the USSR, the economy of Kygyzstan faced serious challenges. First, the market economy model should be adopted by the country. Second, in 1993 Kyrgyzstan became the first Central Asian state to introduce its own currency, the som, which resulted in inflation *(Баум 2007, 110-112)*. Hyperinflation was eventually overcome in the second half of the 90s and the country adopted a market economy. Agricultural transformations and loss of former export markets were another problem Kyrgyzstan was faced with and hence it was the reason that it started exporting not a finished product, but raw materials. GDP of the state increased sharply in 1994 and started to decline in 1997 *(Баум 2007, 111-112)*. Over the next years and up to 2006 GDP was registered with fluctuations, but since 2006 it has denoted a stable growth (*Kyrgyzstan in figures 2006-2010, 2014, 2015).* At present, GNI of the state is $ 1250 per capita and thus it is classified as lower-middle-income country [6].

Gold mines of the state play a major role in economic life, especially Kumtor, which has a significant impact on GDP. Thus, a significant economic growth in 2011 was followed by a decline caused by reduction of workplaces in Kumtor gold mines. In the first half of 2012 real GDP was contracted by 5,6 % due to a 60% reduction in Kumtor gold production[7].

[6] Classifications of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (15.05.2016).

[7] See the official site of the WB at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kyrgyzrepublic/overview (15.05.2016).

After the 2010 coup, new government set main directions aimed at fighting against corruption to increase efficiency and transparency of existing infrastructure[8].

The EFI was registered with many fluctuations but the dynamics of the growth is positive (see Figure 1, Table 1). A sharp increase of EFI was registered in 2013 and it was the highest 0,766 indicator registered over the period observed. However, a sharp decline of EFI was observed in 2014 conditioned by the serious reduction of foreign direct investments from 10,37% to 2,8% of GDP[9].

8.3 Social Factors Index

The curve of SFI denotes that despite some declines it grew within the period mentioned. The highest indicator was recorded in 2012, but over the next years it was declining due to reduction of Real wage.

Instability of social and political life of the country is mainly conditioned by ineffeciency of social policy and as a result, the population protests and tries to make reforms this way.

Poverty is one of the main social issues of Kyrgyzstan. According to data of National Statistical Committee of the KR 1,801,000,000 people with 68,2% of them residents of rural communites live in poverty. 71,000 people live in extreme poverty and 60% of them are rural residents. It is noteworthy that indicators of poverty in southern regions such as Jalal-Abad, Osh and Talas two times exceeded those in other regions. Poverty rate was reduced by 8% compared to previous years and reached to 30,6% in 2014 *(National Statistical Committee of the KR 2014)*. Poverty hits pensioners foremost. 92% of them live in poverty and the average pension is about 87 USD dollars. According to statistics, pensions increase by only 10% every year. This is due to the fact that a pensioner's ratio falls to 1,3 of a tax-payer. The International Labour Organization proposed to increase that ratio from one to three in order to raise pensions in the state and as a result, pensions will rise twice in 2017 *(Petrov 2013)*.

[8] See ibid.

[9] See the official site of the WB at:
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&country=&series=FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG&period= (15.05.2016).

After the revolution the newly elected parliament and the government set out to solve social problems. Thus, in September 2013 Kazakhstan adopted National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2013-2017. It was particularly noted in the strategy that despite assistance of international organizations and donors, steps taken to improve the previouos social situation failed due to corruption, ineffective public administration and criminalization of state structures[10]. Corruption was also qualified as a threat to national security[11]. However, it should be stated that the government succeeded in fighting against corruption to some extent. This is evidenced by Transparency International reports on Corruption Perceptions Index and according to them, Kyrgyzstan was ranked from 164th to 154th in 2012, 150th in 2013 and 136th in 2014 correspondingly[12].

The Strategy also plans to increase pensions in line with international standards[13]. Besides, according to Article 9 of the Constitution, Kazakhstan shall develop social programs to ensure a decent standard of living, shall support vulnerable groups and develop social services system, define state pensions, welfares and other social security guarantees[14]. The Strategy reaffirms the commitment to these principles.

8.4 Educational Factors Index

Educational system of the KR comprised of pre-school, school, higher and post-graduate education[15]. Pres-school education is compulsory in comply with the

[10] National Sustainable Development Strategy of the KR for the period of 2013-2017 (edited in decree of President of 27 September 2013 № 194) www.cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/61542 (25.06.2016).
[11] See ibid. Paragraph 2, 5.
[12] See the official site of Transparency International at: www.transparency.org/research/cpi/ (25.06.2016).
[13] National Sustainable Development Strategy of the KR for the period of 2013-2017, paragraph 4, 3 // www.cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/61542.
[14] Constitution of the KR. (entered into force by the law of 27 June 2010)// www.gov.kg/?page_id=263&lang=ru (25.06.2016).
[15] See the official site of the Ministry of Education and Science of the KR www.edu.gov.kg/ru/about/sistema-obrazovaniya/ (25.06.2016).

"Law on Education"[16] and "Law on Pre-school Education"[17]. School education consists of 3 stages; primary education that lasts four years (grades 1 to 4), basic secondary education that lasts four years (grades 5 to 9) and which is compulsory and complete general education that requires two additional years of study (grades 10 and 11). After the completion of basic secondary education, a schoolchild may get a primary or basic vocational education and be considered able for working.

Since 1991, the number of higher education institutions has been increased from 12 to 50, hence the number of students has been quatrupled[18].

In 2012 Kazakhstan adopted the two-level model of higher education, which opts students to obtain bachelor's, master's or professional degrees. Postgraduate education includes postgraduate (aspirantura) and doctorantura programmes. In 2013 PhD degree program was also introduced in higher education system of the KR[19].

In 2006 Kyrgyzstan joined the Global Partnership for Education and to implement its education programmes it was granted 8,99 million US dollars for 2007-2010, 5,9 million dollars for 2011-2012 and 12,7 million US dollars for 2014-2017 respectively within the scope of the organization. Moreover, the state had jointly carried out other educational programs, such as providing textbooks for children with special needs as well as teachers trainings programmes for 100 schools. Besides, about 100,000 children were included in a one-year preparatory school program and schools were equipped with necessary manuals[20] and etc. Education Development Strategy of the KR for 2012-2020 was adopted by the state as it had succeeded in fulfilling all programmes within the scope of Global Partnership for Education[21]. It is designed to improve the quality of Education of

[16] "The Law of the KR on Education" of 30 April, //http://edc.kg/media/uploads/files/npa/59_zakon_kr_ob_obrazovanii.pdf (25.06.2016).

[17] "The Law of the KR on Primary Education", of 29 June 2009// http://edc.kg/media/uploads/files/npa/3_zakon-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki-o-doshkolnom-obrazovanii.pdf (25.06.2016).

[18] See the official site of the Ministry of Education and Science at: www.edu.gov.kg/ru/about/sistema-obrazovaniya/ (25.06.2016).

[19] See ibid.

[20] See the official site of "Global Partnership for Education" www.globalpartnership.org/country/kyrgyz-republic (25.06.2016).

[21] "Education Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2012-2020." Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic // www.globalpartnership.org/fr/download/file/fid/44406 (25.06.2016).

the KR by 2020. This document as well as UNICEF study have singled out a number of important issues that urgently require solutions for education quality improvement. Uneven distribution of educational institutions, low professional qualifications of staff, old methods of teaching, lack of materials, textbooks and premises, poor equipment and insufficient conditions are the main problems in the area[22] (*UNICEF 2011)*.

32% of the population is currently young people in Kyrgyzstan. According to data of international organizations, more than 35% of the youth study, whereas 50% of them work. Unemployed and those you don't study are in social risks group[23]. That is the reason that Kyrgyzstan is currently conducting an active policy to make education reforms.

The EdFI curve had a positive trend over the period of 1995-2014. However, it was full of fluctuations and they were mainly caused by reductions of expenditure on education. It's worth mentioning that government expenditure on education reached the level it once had in the 1990s. Furthermore, if expenditure on health exceeded the expenditure on education before 2011, then the situation has changed in favour of education since 2011.

8.5 Health Factors Index

Kyrgyzstan is reported the first in the region to allocate most expenditure on public healthcare[24]. It has been growing with some fluctuations since 1995 and comprised 6,5% of GDP[25].

Since 2014 The Public Health Programme from 2014-2017 has been implemented with Soros Foundation, which is aimed at making health services

[22] See ibid.

[23] National Sustainable Development Strategy of the KR for the period of 2013-2017 (edited in decree of President of 27 September 2013 № 194)// www.cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/61542 (25.06.2015).

[24] See the official site of World Health Organization at: http://data.euro.who.int/hfadb/ (20.05.2016).

[25] See ibid.

more accessible for the most vulnerable groups of the population[26]. It should be noted that more resources are allocated to healthcare in Kyrgyzstan than in other neighboring countries. However, the number of hospitals with 100,000 cots took Kyrgyzstan to the lowest position in the region. It should be observed that in 2013 there were 141 hospitals in Kyrgyzstan compared to 461,665 and 920 hospitals in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan respectiviely[27]. Moreover, healthcare institutions were unevenly distributed. Thus, there are 110 healthcare institutions and only 97 are located in Bishkek[28].

Disproportionate development, lack of medical facilities, low qualification and low salaries for medical staff are the main issues of healthcare sector in Kyrgyzstan *(Mir24 2011a).* Hence, children are the most vulnerable group which is subject to death caused by flu and their number is quite high (*Mir24 2010*). Tuberculosis and hepatitis C are widespread and there is only one specialized, not fully operating institution for children that fights against cancer in Kyrgyzstan *(Mir24 2014*). Tumors are hard to be treated and cured because cancer patients turn to Cancer Treatment Center on the last stages of the disease *(Vecherniy Bishkek 2013).*

In 2011 healthcare problems forced the Kyrgyzs parliament to take an appropriate decision which is as follows; after graduation to send students studying in educational medical institutions on tuition free basis to work mandatory in villages for equal healthcare development in all regions of Kyrgyzstan, otherwise the student will have to return the entire tuition paid by the state *(Mir24 2011b).*

The HFI curve had a positive development over the mentioned period and 0,196 points registered in 1995 reached up to 0,370 points in 2014. The lowest indicator was registered in 1997 and the highest one in 2012 stipulated by the expenditure on health sector.

[26] See the official site of "Soros-Kyrgyzstan" at: http://soros.kg/programmes/obshhestvennoe-zdravoohranenie (20.05.2016).

[27] The source of the data is the official site of World Health Organization at // http://data.euro.who.int/hfadb/ (20.05.2016).

[28] The source of the data is Kyrgyzstan Business Directory // www.spr.kg (20.05.2016).

8.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

The Index of Democracy Level of Kyrgyzstan in the time span between 1995-2014[*]



After the declaration of independence in 1991 Kyrgyzstan initiated the process of democratic reforms, and it became an "oasis of democracy in Central Asia." Despite this, the authoritarian regime was again enforced in Kyrgyzstan in the late 90s which was typical of many post-Soviet states. The country was faced with serious socio-political problems, which entailed the breakup of two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan.

The lowest IDL indicator with 0,359 points was recorded in 2000. The deepest decline was observed in 2005, conditioned by the revoultion, social issues as well as by transformations from an authoritarian regime to another. Nonetheless, it should be noted the trend of the IDL was positive in total, and its indicators had been improving for years with the highest indicator of 0,538 points recorded in 2014. The smooth growth has started since 2010. It has been stipulated by the

[*] Source: calculations by the researcher.

establishment of new political powers, introduction of new mechanizms fighting against corruption, stabilization of political as well as social and economic situation. Even though the revolution of 2010 was bloody and aggravated ethnical conflicts, it had a significant impact on the abolishment of authoritarian regime and re-adoption of democratization. It was vividly evidenced by the adoption of new Constitution as a result of the referendum held in 2010, highly estimated by interational organizations as an effective mean to establlish parliamentary political system in the country.

8.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Astghik Nadiryan

Within the framework of the research the regression analysis illustrates the variables of Political, Economic, and Health Factors Indices included in the model, which had a significant influence on the IDL of Kyrgyzstan.

The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDL_i* and PFI variables of Political Stability/Absence of Violence and Social Unrest and Political Pressure.

$$Y' = -0{,}003x_1 + 0{,}487 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}183),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Political Stability/Absence of Conflict, x_1 is Political Stability/Absence of Conflict

$$Y' = -0{,}024x_2 + 0{,}476 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}171),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Social Unrest and Political Pressure, x_2 is Social Unrest and Political Pressure.

The following correlation has been established between the IDLi and FDI of SFI.

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

$$Y' = 0{,}007x_3 + 0{,}394 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}155),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from FDI), x_3 is FDI.

The following equation has been done for EdFI:

$$Y' = 0{,}035x_4 + 0{,}244 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}644),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Government expenditure on education) and x_4 is the variable of Government expenditure on education (of GDP%):

The following equation has been done for HFI.

$$Y' = 0{,}027x_5 - 1{,}45 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}339),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL is cleaned from the variable of Life expectancy) and x_5 is variable of Life expectancy.

So, PFI variables of Political Stability/Absence of Violence and Social Unrest and Political Pressure have a significant influence on the IDL of Kyrgyzstan. The correlation between IDLi and variable of Political Stability/Absence of Violence is negative which is estimated by the destabilization inside the country and drastic changes of regime inconsistent with the Constitutional Rule. The negative correlation is also explained by the fact, that major important reforms took place as a result of those aforementioned revolutions in Kyrgyzstan. For example, as a result of "Tulip Revolution" in 2005 A. Akayev, who had been elected as the President for three consecutive times had to resign, semi-parliamentry political system as well as new Constitution were adopted after the 2010 revolution and etc. According to the results of regression analysis one point decrease of variable of Political Stability/Absence of Violence will lead to IDLi increase by 0,003 units respectively. The same method is applied to explain a negative correlation between IDLi and the variable of Social Unrest and Political Pressure (the less incidents of Social Unrest the higher indicators of the variable due to methodology). In this case, the decline of the variable with one unit will result the IDLi increase by 0,024 units.

Indicator of FD also impact on the IDL. Hence, FDI increase with 1% of GDP will lead to the growth of IDLi by 0,007.

1% of GDP change of Government expenditure on education will lead to IDLi change with 0,035 units. This factor has the highest determination coefficient and explains 64% of IDLi variation.

A significant correlation has been established between IDLi and variable of Life expectancy and a positive change of one year will stipulate the IDLi growth by 0,027 units. This health factor has a high determination coefficient and explains 34% of variable variation.

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Abbreviations

ALPK	Agrarian-Labor Party of Kyrgyzstan
APK	Agrarian Party of the Kyrgyz Republic
APKR	Agrarian Party of the Kyrgyz Republic
CPK	Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan
DMK	Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan
DPK	Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
DWPK	Democratic Women's Party of Kyrgyzstan
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Uion
EFI	Economic Factors Index
FK	«Free Kyrgystan» Republic People's Party
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
JK	Jogorku Kenesh
KR	Kyrgyz Republic
KR	Kyrgyz Republic
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
OSCE/ ODIHR	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Office of Democratic Initiatives and Human Rights
PFI	Political Factors Index
PPAWV	Political Party of Afghan War Veterans
RPPK	Republican People's Party of Kyrgyzstan
RUIE	Republic's Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
SDPK	Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan
SFI	Social Factors Index
UDF	Union of Democratic Forces
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

CHAPTER 9.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF UKRAINE

ASHOT ALEKSANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Social, Economic, Educational and Health Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Ukraine in the time span between 1995-2014*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Ukraine in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Years	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,462	0,122	0,529	0,568	0,295	0,374
1996	0,472	0,268	0,549	0,575	0,293	0,419
1997	0,458	0,218	0,558	0,572	0,292	0,401
1998	0,444	0,343	0,544	0,510	0,300	0,420
1999	0,462	0,412	0,531	0,458	0,268	0,435
2000	0,395	0,521	0,533	0,499	0,241	0,437
2001	0,408	0,475	0,551	0,546	0,258	0,439
2002	0,441	0,487	0,566	0,592	0,290	0,466
2003	0,419	0,537	0,584	0,603	0,326	0,477
2004	0,405	0,504	0,607	0,584	0,307	0,461
2005	0,460	0,594	0,655	0,646	0,289	0,518
2006	0,497	0,562	0,698	0,658	0,292	0,531
2007	0,482	0,628	0,760	0,657	0,294	0,549
2008	0,498	0,709	0,845	0,676	0,311	0,589
2009	0,491	0,592	0,735	0,732	0,404	0,561
2010	0,444	0,598	0,779	0,697	0,439	0,547
2011	0,468	0,676	0,825	0,665	0,411	0,576
2012	0,451	0,658	0,867	0,700	0,442	0,576
2013	0,395	0,602	0,894	0,699	0,459	0,543
2014	0,341	0,588	0,799	0,699	0,429	0,503

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

9.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

Social and political processes undergoing in Ukraine in 2013-2015 created a new situation for state and local self-government bodies, political parties, civil society organizations, mass movements and social groups. When observing the curve of the PFI of the IDL of Ukraine it becomes evident that factors, affecting the formation of independent statehood, protection of electoral, ethno-political and human rights in the democratic transformations of the political system continued to have a significant impact. It is apparent from Figure 1 that the curve of the PFI continued to decline with the value of 0,395 in 2013 and 0,341 in 2014. These PFI values, particularly the indicator recorded in 2014, were the lowest within the observed time span of 1995-2014.

The presence of conflict between the Ukrainian government and the opposition, mass civil disobedience, killings of demonstrators and civic activists, the change of power, the annexation of Crimea to Russia, military operations in Donbas and civil war, requirements of federalization of Ukraine, the tragic events taken place in Odessa on May 2, 2014 as well as continuous violence and unrest in different regions of Ukraine had the most negative impact on the PFI of the IDL *(Бедрицкий, Бышок, Кочетков 2014; Ворожейкина 2014, 6-25; Фесенко 2014, 26-35)*.

The implemented reforms and the fulfillment of the commitments undertaken within the framework of the Eastern Partnership and the EU in 2013-2014 led to a rearrangement of the political elite and forces. In February 2014 in the result of the recent change of the government, Ukraine signed the political chapters of the Association Agreement with the EU on March 21. Besides, both parties also signed the remaining economic chapters on 27 June. *(EU-Ukraine DCFTA 2013)*. On September 16, 2014 the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament simultaneously ratified the Association Agreement[1] between Ukraine and the EU, which was later signed by the President. However, the Association Agreement will enter into force once all EU Member States, in addition to Ukraine, have ratified it.

[1] See "Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part." Official Journal of the European Union (29.05.2014). Accessed on January 25, 2016 at: http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf.

The intensification of European integration processes in the post-Soviet territory aggravated not only Russia-Ukrainia relations, but also Russia-EU, Russia-USA and Russia-NATO relations (*Bond 2015, 127-145; Christiansson 2014; Walke 2015, 141-154; Valdai Discussion Club 2014; The EU Newsroom 2015*). As a result, Ukraine's political system was has undergone internal political crisis and is still in the focus of geopolitical conflicts *(Sakwa 2015; Rutland 2015, 130-140; Баев 2014, 73-86; Макаренко 2014, 87-103)*.

Despite the fact that President V. Yanukovych made "unprecedented" concessions under public pressure[2] by signing the agreement for the resolution of the political crisis with the representatives of opposition parties on February 21, 2014, the implementation of the abovementioned agreement was however impossible.

If opposition forces continued to maintain national unity by consistently demanding an immediate resignation of the President and the government, then the ruling political elite unsuccessfully tried to maintain the "status quo." The persistent pressure of opposition forces actually led to an inactivity of the President, government and parliament by deadlocking the ruling political elite. The conflict culminated on February 22 when opposition parties of the Parliament made a decision to legalize the restriction of the President's constitutional powers by self-dismissal or self-resignation[3] *(Борисов 2014, 118-128)*. This fact enabled the parliamentary opposition to form a coalition government and elect a new speaker of the parliament by provisionally vesting him with the powers of the President.

It should be noted that there are still ongoing negotiations about the crisis in Ukraine and diplomatic efforts attest to the geopolitical significance of internal processes *(Бедрицкий, Бышок, Кочетков 2014; BBC 2014).*

[2] It was intended to restore immediately the Constitution of 2004, to form coalition and national unity governement within 10 days, to start and finish Constitutional reforms no later than in September 2014 as well as to hold extraordinary presidential elections no later than in December 2014 (RIA Novosti 2014. "Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine (21.02.2014)." Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://ria.ru/world/20140221/996319889.html).

[3]See "Поіменне голосування про проект Постанови про самоусунення Президента України від виконання конституційних повноважень (№4193) - за основу та в цілому (22.02.2014)." Accessed on 26.05.2016 a: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=386307&n_skl=7.

The current political developments led to the escalation of ethno-political problems, expressed by the criticism and dissent voiced by the Russian population in two eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea, namely Donetsk and Lugansk *(Гольц 2014, 45-56; Макаркин 2014, 36-44; Петров 2014, 57-72)*. If the conflict in the Crimea was resolved by holding a national referendum in March 2014 and by proclaiming independence and annexation to Russia (State Council of the Crimea[4] 2016), then military operations began in April in reference to Donetsk and Lugansk. As a result, these two regions declared their independence by intensifying the present conflict to greater extent. All these actions have entailed a tense political and geopolitical situation, which has been preserved in the region so far. Therefore, the extraordinary presidential elections took place in the politically instable Ukraine on May 25 *(Борисов 2014)*. They were also unprecedented by the participation of 21 candidates for presidency. Moreover, two more candidates withdrew from the list of nominated candidates, while three others were denied the registration by the Ukrainian Central Election Commission. According to the results of the election, P. Poroshenko won in the first round of the elections with 54,7% of the vote and Yu. Tymoshenko received 12,81% of vote (see Table 2).

In reference to the 2012 parliamentary elections, it should be noted that Party of Regions had a leading political position in the decision-making process in Verkhovna Rada after the elections in 2013. The aforementioned party in cooperation with the Ukrainian Communist Party had an essential role in inner political processes. In this respect, Party of Regions succeeded in finding solutions with the parliamentary opposition parties until November 2013 ("All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna ", "Vitali Klitschko UDAR", All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" Freedom).

[4]See the Declaration about "The independence of the autonomous Republic of Crimea and city of Sevastopol" (11.03.2014). Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://crimea.gov.ru/app/2988; Decree N147 of the RF President on "the recognition of the Republic of Crimea" of 17 March 2014. Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38202. "The agreement between the RF and the Republic of Crimea on the annexation of Crimea to the RF and n the formation of new objects within the RF of 18 March 2014 (entered into force on 1 April 2014 года, letter № 4886 of the MoFA of the RF of 02.04.2014". Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201403180024.

Table 2

Votes of the RU presidential candidates, expressed in percentage[5]

Candidates	Presidential elections in Ukraine
	2014
	I round
Petro Poroshenko	54,70
Yuliya Tymoshenko	12,81
Oleh Lyashko	8,32
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	5,48
Serhiy Tihipko	5,23
Mykhaylo Dobkin	3,03
Vadym Rabinovych	2,25
Olha Bohomolets	1,90
Petro Symonenko	1,51
Oleh Tyahnybok	1,16
Dmytro Yarosh	0,70
Other candidates	*1,95*

Nonetheless, the fact that Ukraine did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 deepened the differences between the Parliamentary parties. As it has already been mentioned, civil disobedience and unprecedented pressure triggered by the opposition parties during 2013/2014 entailed the "self-dismissal'' of the incubent President, the resignation of the government and in fact, the dissolution of the Party of Regions. By the initiative of the opposition parties and as a result of an active actions carried out by the parties, the Verkhovna Rada simultaneously exercised the executive and legislative powers by becoming the actual carrier of public power and a legitimate political decision-making institution. On February 22, 2014 the parliament of Ukraine elected a new

[5]The source of the data is the official site of CEC of Ukraine (27.05.2016), http://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_cvk_25052014.pdf (27.05.2016), OSCE election observation final report in Ukraine at: http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/elections/ukraine/120962?download=true (27.05.2016).

Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada[6] by vesting him with the powers of the President[7]. The parliament also elected the Prime Minister on February 27, and formed a provisional government[8]. The newly elected Speaker and Acting President of the country as well as the Prime Minister were representatives of All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna political party. However, its both members left the party due to certain political differences and with its former associates agreed to form a new "People's Front" political party[9].

Prior to the date of extraordianry parliamentary elections, the activities undertaken by both the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine were constantly causing conflicts over the process of legislative initiatives.

After the change of the power in 2014, the extraordinary parliamentary elections took place under a very tense political condition on October 26. Twenty-nine political parties and pre-election blocs participated in the elections and only six succeeded in passing 5% threshold defined by the electoral legislation[10]. According to a proportional representation, the People's Front political party gained the most 22,14% of vote and "Petro Poroshenko Bloc" Party with 21,82% of vote (see Table 3). As for the Ukrainian Communist Party, it amassed only 3,88% of votes, whereas the Party of Regions did not participate at all and the majority of its members took part in the electoral process as members of other parties.

There were 297 legally registered political parties in Ukraine per data provided on October 9, 2015 *(Укрдержреєстр 2015).*

[6] See Постанова Верховної Ради України "Про Голову Верховної Ради України". Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/748-18.

[7] See Постанова Верховної Ради України "Про покладення на Голову Верховної Ради України виконання обов'язків Президента України згідно із статтею 112 Конституції України" (Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2014, № 11, page163). Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/764-18.

[8] See "Проект Постанови про призначення Яценюка А. П. Прем'єр-міністром України", 4302 від 27.02.2014. Accesseed on 26.05.2016 at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=49999.

[9] See the official site of « People's Front » Party in Ukraine at: http://nfront.org.ua/party (26.05.2016).

[10] The source of the data is the official site of the CEC of Ukraine at: "Партії, які за підсумками голосування набрали п'ять та більше відсотків голосів виборців". Accessed on 26.05.2016 at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp510?PT001F01=910.

Table 3

Ratio of the seats received by the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine[11]

Parties, unions, participants	Elections of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	
	2014	
	M	*P*
People's Front Political Party	18	64
Petro Poroshenko Bloc Party	69	63
Samopomich (Self-Reliance) Political Party	1	32
Opposition Bloc	2	27
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko	0	22
Batkivshchyna All-Ukrainian Union Political Party	2	17
Svoboda (Freedom) All-Ukrainian Union Political Party	6	0
Strong Ukraine	1	0
"Zastup"All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union	1	0
Right Sector Political Party	1	0
Volya (Will)	1	0
Self-nominated / Non-party	96	-
Vacancies	2	0
Total	*225*	*225*

[11] The source of the data is the official site of the CEC of Ukraine at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua (26.05.2016), OSCE election observation final report in Ukraine at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine (26.05.2016).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation[12]



Table 4

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation in Verkhovna Rada

Electoral representation	1994	1998	2002	2006	2007	2012	2014
Proportional	0	225	225	450	450	225	225
Majoritarian	450	225	225	0	0	225	225
Total	**450**	**450**	**450**	**450**	**450**	**450**	**450**

Human rights and freedoms. After the proclaimation of the independence, Ukraine joined the main treaties on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. On assuming the obligations made within the scope of international organizations such as UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and the European Union, Ukraine had developed new socio-economic and cultural

[12] The source of the data is the official site of the CEC of Ukraine at: http://www.cvk.gov.ua (28.05.2016), OSCE election observation final report in Ukraine at: http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/elections/ukraine/133436?download=true (28.05.2016).

concepts aimed at ensuring the protection of human rights norms and policies. Ukraine still continues to proceed with the commitments and programs in providing the protection of human rights in social, political, economic and cultural spheres. However, violations of human rights and freedoms were recorded in 2013-2014 caused by mass rallies, expressions of civil disobedience and Euromaidan events. They were stated in the UN monitoring mission reports[13] *(OHCHR 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g, 2014h, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016a, 2016b)*, in the ''White book'' of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on ''violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine[14] and in the reports of the ''Memorial'' Human Rights Center *("Memorial" Human Rights Center 2014a, 2014b)* as well as in the reports of the international NGO's on human rights protection *(Human Rights Watch 2014a, 2014b)*.

According to data accumulated by Freedom House, Ukraine was estimated as "partly free"[15] in the sphere of Political Rights and Civil Liberites. In reference to Press Freedom the country was assessed as ''not free'' in 2013, but a year later the situation was changed to "partly free"[16]. The negative decline of Press Freedom was conditioned by mass threats and expressions of violence done by the police to independent journalists and representatives of mass media who had been covering the Euromaidan event in 2013[17].

The problems related to the protection of human rights and freedoms deteriorated within the period from November 21, 2014 to December 31, 2014 *(Дюков 2015)* and in particular from Feb 22, 2014 up to May 22 *(Дюков 2014)*,

[13] The source of the data is the official site of UNHCR "Documents on Ukraine: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights." Accessed May 19, 2016. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?c=193&su=191.

[14] The source of the data is the official site of the ''White book'' of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on ''violations of human rights and the rule of law in Ukraine." Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://archive.mid.ru//bdomp/ns-dgpch.nsf/03c344d01162d351442579510044415b/38fa8597760acc2144257ccf002beeb8!OpenDocument.

[15] See the official site of the Freedom House at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/ukraine (28.05.2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/ukraine (28.05.2016).

[16]See the official site of the Freedom House at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/ukraine (28.05.2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/ukraine (28.05.2016):

[17] See ibid.

when a new wave of civil movements and armed conflicts had emerged. The civil war in the eastern regions of Ukraine, the war against terror as well as illegally armed groups caused irreparable damage to the protection of human rights. The protests organized by federalization supporters in the south-east and south-west of Ukraine, particularly in Kiev, Kharkov, Lugansk, Slavyansk, Mariopol, Yenakievoy, Kramatorsk caused ethnic and political turmoil. That fact was quite inexplicable under those circumstances. The negligence of all those mentioned above and pressures led to a public mistrust of the government. The main public demand was to make reforms aimed at the expansion of the local self-government authorities and to hold referenda to make amendments in the Constitution.

The geopolitical situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine, trends to wage another civil war as well as the course of future events had gradually been deteriorating the situation in the sphere of the protection of cultural human rights *(Bambals 2015; Martinez, Paletar, Hecking 2015; GHA Report 2015; OSCE 2015).* After the change of power the ethnic tensions has gradually escalated in Ukraine and even after a temporary suspension of hostilities they still impose a threat for the protection of the rights of the Russian population inhabiting in the country. It refers to the issues of decentralization and federalization of Ukraine as well as to the negotiations being conducting about them. Despite the fact that Russia, the US and the EU actively pursue the mission of the mediator, there are still no solutions aimed at restoring civil peace in Ukraine and at eliminating unpredictable consequences.

Civil disobedience**[*]**. The indicators of "social unrest" subindex of the PFI of the IDL sharply decreased compared to the previous year. Moreover, within the mentioned years of 1995-2014 the indicators of "social unrest" subindex were the lowest in 2013/2014 with the lowest value precisely registered in 2013. The unprecedented growth of civil disobedience, political instability, social

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of the Political Factors Index and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

contradictions, tensions, low level of public trust, ethnic and political conflicts and risks triggered the decline of the mentioned indicators.

The fact that Ukraine did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU during the Eastern Partnership 3rd Vilnius summit of November 28-29 deepened the conflict between the ruling elite and the opposition parties. Civil society organizations with European integration orientation were actively involved in the process by demanding the President and the government to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and to resume negotiations towards European integration. The failure of the ruling political elite to comply with those requirements led to mass rallies and demonstrations in Maidan Independence Square organized by supporters of Eurointegration (Майдан Незалежності). Once again "Maidan Nezalezhnost" became the national platform for the formation and implementation of new political agenda in the political life of Ukrainian society. The civil disobedience voiced by the supporters of the European Ukraine was aimed at protecting the sovereignty of Ukraine by demanding to sign the Association Agreement between the two parties, by holding extraordinary elections as well as by demanding the resignation of the President and the government along with the implementation of constitutional amendments.

With the expansion of civil disobedience "EuroMaidan" (Євромайдан) transformed into a unique national institution and a national decision-making procedure, where the representatives of all opposition parties and civil society organizations were included in the coordination council (*Smith, Harari 2014*). All-Ukrainian Union Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and UDAR political parties supported by a number of nationalist organizations (UNA-UPSD[18], "Right Sector"[19], "Trident"[20] "Ukranian Patriots"[21]) had a key role in the political decision-making process of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience was widely expanding in almost all regions of Ukraine due to the tension between the authorities and Euromaidan. It took a little more than three months (since November 21, 2013 to February 27, 2014) and

[18] See the official site of the Ukranian National Assembly-Ukranian People's Self-Defense («UNA-UPSD») http://unso.in.ua/en (29.05.2016).

[19]See the official site of the Right Sector political party at: http://pravyysektor.info (29.05.2016).

[20] See the official site of Ukrainian organization "Trident" named after Stepan Bandera at: http://banderivets.org.ua (29.05.2016).

[21] See the official site of the ''Ukranian Patriots'' at: http://patrioty.org.ua (29.05.2016).

it resulted in Prime Minister's resignation and a "self-dismissal" of the President. The Constitution of 2004 was restored and the process of the formation of the provisional government and state authority bodies was launched. According to official data, the number of dead rose to 106 as of April 14, 2014 while the number of wounded and those who applied to medical aid rose to 1,791[22]. As a result of civil disobedience, the case of "the snipers of Kiev" as well as the circumstances under which 53 people were killed attracted a broad public attention. The cases are still under investigation at present *(Кошкина 2016; 2000.ua 2015)*.

The Crimean referendum and its annexation to Russian, referenda in the eastern regions of Ukraine, political struggle as well as its subsequent events forced the Acting President Turchynov to sign a decree "on urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and the territorial integrity of Ukraine"[23] *(Vesti-ukr.com 2014a, 2014b; Lenta.ru 2014)*.

Nevertheless, despite the current differences, negotiations launched in June 2014 were of great importance for the settlement of civil, ethnic and political conflicts in Ukraine. It was attended by representatives of Ukraine and Russia, and delegations of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk People's republic as well as OSCE representatives that was assuming a role of a mediator in the negotiation process[24]. The negotiation process was hindered by bellicose rhetoric of the new leadership of Ukraine (*BBC 2014*). This was not an appropriate approach, as the peaceful plan of the President of Ukraine on the settlement of the situation in eastern regions of Ukraine had been proposed[25] earlier in June 20,

[22] The source of the data is the official site of the Ministry of Health of the Repoublic of Ukraine at: http://www.moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/pre_20140414_b.html (14.05.2016).

[23] See № 405 Decree of President of Ukraine "On the decision of the National Security and Defense of Ukraine from April 13, 2014 "On urgent measures to overcome the terrorist threat and the territorial integrity of Ukraine". Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/405/2014.

[24] The source of the data is the official site of OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine «Daily and spot reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine»: http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/reports (20.07.2016).

[25] The source of the data is the official site of the President of the Ukraine «Peaceful plan of the President of Ukraine on the settlement of the situation in eastern regions of Ukraine»: http://www.President.gov.ua/en/news/petro-poroshenko-predstaviv-v-donbasi-mirnij-plan-z-vregulyu-33044 (10.06.2016).

2014. Moreover, he proposed to resolve and regulate the current situation by peaceful and civilized methods[26].

However, monitoring and mediator missions helped to overcome the current difficulties and all parties involved in the conflict signed a protocol on ceasefire in the capital of Belarus on September 5[27].

In September 16, 2014 the Verkhovna Rada by the initiative of the President[28] adopted draft law on special order of local governments in some regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions[29]. An explanatory note was added to the draft law in order to overcome a public mistrust within the parties in the Parliament[30]. Similar action caused a new wave of civil disobedience, leading to destabilization of the situation. The memorandum signed on September 19 by outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol played an impotant role in this context[31]. It aimed to sustain peace and implement joint actions to stabilize the situation.

The scale of civil disobedience continued to expand as a result of deputies' and heads' elections in the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk on

[26] The source of the data is the official site of the President of the Ukraine «In Donbas, Petro Poroshenko presented the peaceful plan on the settlement of the situation in the east of Ukraine» (20.06.2014). http://www.President.gov.ua/en/news/petro-poroshenko-predstaviv-v-donbasi-mirnij-plan-z-vregulyu-33044 (10.06.2016).

[27] The source of the data is the official site of OSCE on the ''Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014 at; http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true (10.06.2016).

[28] See Draft Law on special order local governments in some regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52182.

[29] Sh´u "Закон України "Про особливий порядок місцевого самоврядування в окремих районах Донецької та Луганської областей" {Із змінами, внесеними згідно із Законом № 256-VIII від 17.03.2015, ВВР, 2015, № 17, ст.125} (Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2014, № 45, ст.2043)." Дата доступа: 18.04.2016. http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1680-18.

[30] See explanatory note on the draft law on special order local governments in some regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions". Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52182.

[31] The source of the data is the official site of OSCE on ''the memorandum outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014'' at: http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123807?download=true (11.06.2016), http://www.osce.org/home/123806 (11.06.2016).

November 2, 2014. The elections held in eastern Ukraine created a new political situation by requiring changes through compromise.

There are still differences between Ukrainian political elite and parliamentary parties in connection with Donbas peaceful settlement. The tension among the President, government and civil society organizations is often exacerbated under pressure from civil disobedience. Hence, as a result, the hostilities in the eastern regions of Ukraine resumed in January 2015.

"Normandy Four" negotiations resumed on February 12, 2015 in Minsk resulted in signing an agreement on complete ceasefire from February 15 in the eastern Ukraine and in implementation of the Minsk agreements[32]. Taking into consideration the importance of peace settlement process in Lugansk and Donetsk regions, the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France adopted a joint declaration[33].

Regardless of fully accepted obligations, the risks of civil disobedience and ethno-political tensions are still actual. The following key issues such as "too fragile" ceasefire, Minsk agreements, "telephone diplomacy", the creation of security area in Donbas, troops withdrawal and removal of military equipment, exchange of military prisoners, monitoring and mediation missions of OSCE, US, EU and "Normandy four", preparation of constitutional reforms in Ukraine, development of legislation of special status of Donetsk and Lugansk, the status of the Russian language and the implementation of actions in cooperation with the Russian Federation and others are worth to be outlined *(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2014; Бедрицкий, Бышок, Кочетков 2014; Ворожейкина 2014, 6-25; Фесенко 2014, 26-35; Зубаревич 2014, 118-128; Гудков 2014, 129-147; Демакова, Маковецкая, Скрякова 2014, 148-163).*

The recruitment of the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, additional sanctions against Russia imposed by the US and EU, political and economic

[32] See the official site of OSCE on ''Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements'' at: http://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true (12.06.2016).

[33] The source of the data is the official site of the President at: «Declaration in Support of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements Approved in Minsk on February 12, 2015 (12 February 2015) http://www.President.gov.ua/en/news/deklaraciya-prezidenta-rosijskoyi-federaciyi-prezidenta-ukra-34695 (12.06.2016).

isolation process of Russia as well as ongoing tensions in Donbas impact negatively on the inner political differences.

In reference to the indicators of Political Stability and the Rule of Law included in the model, it can be denoted, that they decreased during the mentioned period. Moreover, indicators of Political Stability registered during 2013-2014 were the lowest compared to 1995-2012 period. Besides, the index of Political Stability estimated in 2014 with 6,31 points was the lowest within the observed period of 1995-2014. The indicators of the Rule of Law also declined in 2013/2014 compared to the period of 2002-2012[34].

According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine occupied the 142nd place out of 177 countries in 2013, 144th place out of 175 countries in 2014 and respectively 130th place out of 168 countries in 2015[35].

According to the data of Global Gender Gap Report *(Global Gender Gap Report 2013, 2014, 2015)* Ukraine took 64th position out of 136 countries, 64th out of 142 and 67th out of 145 in the consecutive years of 2013, 2014 and 2015. The lowest data among the aforementioned ones was recorded in the subindex of Political Ability in 2013-2015. Hence, Ukraine took accordingly 119th place in 2013, 105th place in 2014 and 107th place in 2015. The indicator of the Political Ability of Global Gender Gap Index improved in 2014-2015. After the parliamentary elections on December 1, 2015, ratio of women deputies of Verkhovna Rada constituted to 12,1% of the total members [36].

To sum up, the curve of the PFI of the IDL declined in 2013-2014 compared to the period of 1995-2012. Hence, the PFI was estmated with 0,395 points in 2013, in 2014 it went down to 0,341 points, which was the lowest indicators of the PFI within the period observed.

[34] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx# reports (25.01.2016).

[35] See the official site of Transparency International at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (25.01.2016), http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 (25.01.2016).

[36] The source of the data is the official site of «Women in national parliaments» at: http://www.ipu. org/wmn-e/classif.htm (25.01.2016).

9.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

The EFI continue to have a major impact on the IDL of Ukraine. The events taken place in Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk and ongoing conflicts pose insurmountable difficulties for the Ukrainian economy. More than 5% of GDP of Ukraine is allocated to spend in the sphere of national security and defense because of political conflicts and inner political tensions. The Ukraine being unable to use the economic potential of Donetsk and Lugansk had its economy cut by 20%. *(Segodnya.ua. 2015)*.

At the beginning of 2013 the World Economic Forum initiated the development and implementation of economic programs in Ukraine given the unprecedented economic crisis *(World Economic Forum 2014).* The elimination of political differences and ineffective public administration procedures are of the key issues set by the forum.

Despite the fact that Ukraine did not join the Customs Union, it signed and ratified CIS Free trade zone treaty in 2011-2012[37] *(ConsultantPlus 2011)*. It actively propelled the EU and Ukranian relations to a new high level.

The question whether Russian and the European model of economic integration were equally beneficial for Ukraine and the question of its choice was of key importance. That was best evidenced by signing of a memorandum[38] on cooperation between Ukraine and the Customs Union on May 31, 2013 which caused political differences in the Ukranian Parliament. Those events were followed by the decision of Ukrainian government to approve the draft Association Agreement with the EU on September 18, 2013 *(Euronews 2013)*.

Russia announced reduction of the gas price for Ukraine and allocation of financial support equivalent to $ 15 billion in December 2013 to avoid the loss of the Ukrainian economic market. Despite the fact that Russia factually provided financial support by buying $ 3 billion Eurabonds issued by Ukraine (*BBC 2015*),

[37] The source of the data is the official site of the executive committee of CIS on «Free trade zone» http://www.cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/printPreview/text?id=3183 (18.04.2016).

[38]Source: Web-Portal of Ukranian Government: "About deepening of cooperation between Ukraine and European Economic Commision." «Меморандум об углублении взаимодействия между Украиной и Евразийской экономической комиссией»: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en (18.04.2016):

the activation of the political opposition and civil disobedience resulted in the change of government several months later.

If the economic relations and cooperation with the RF were quite essential to provide stability for the economic system of Ukraine[39]in 2013, then the vector of economic development of Ukraine shifted towards the EU and Western European countries after the change of the power in February 2014 *(Martinez, Paletar, Hecking 2015; Gusev, Westphal 2015; Okhrimenko, Okhrimenko 2015)*. This was particularly evident after the fact, when P.Poroshenko President-elect signed only the economic chapter of the Association Agreement with the EU[40] after June 27, 2014. This entailed a creation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area[41] (DCFTA) as a new strategy of Ukraine's economic integration. In addition, the implementation of DCFTA priorities were undertaken in parallel with the escalation of the economic conflict with Russia and the severance of economic relations and cooperation dated back to times of the USSR. It should be noted that most of the financial and economic system shocks were conditioned by the fact that the state budget was approved by Yanukovych[42] in 2014. The new political elite, the government and the President faced great inner and foreign difficulties in various stages of the implementation of economic policy *(GAIN Report 2015; IMF 2014; Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 2015)*.

The main factors hindering the stabilization and the growth of the Ukrainian economy in 2013-2015 were numerous. The slowdown of the real economy growth, the decline in the purchasing power parity (PPP), the rising of the external debt, a sharp reduction of foreign exchange reserves, an increasing demand for external funding, the absence of diversification of energy suppliers and

[39] See "Закон України Про Державний бюджет України на 2013 рік {із змінами} (Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 2013, № 5-6, ст.60)." Accessed on 18.04.2016 http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5515-17.

[40] Ukraine and the EU agreed to postpone the implementation of the Association Agreement in regard of DCFTA till December 31, 2015.

[41] The source of the data is the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine «EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area»: http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/european-integration/ua-eu-association (18.04.2016).

[42]See "Закон України Про Державний бюджет України на 2014 рік {із змінами}(Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2014, № 9, ст.93)." Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/719-18.

the high cost of Russian gas, the decline in foreign investments as well as a decrease in export and import volume can be pointed out as such *(Григорьев, Голяшев, Буряк 2014; Григорьев, Голяшев, Буряк 2015).*

Joint work aimed to enhance mutual energy security was confirmed in line with the Declaration of the EaP made in 2013. The EU's continuing support for the modernization of the Ukrainian gas transportation system was highlighted in this regard[43].

The curve of the EFI was registered with a decline. Hence, its value was 0,602 in 2013, whereas 0,588 points were recorded in 2014. An unprecedented reduction of foreign direct investments as well as a high level of budget deficit caused the decline of the curve of the EFI in 2013-2014. The indicators of the gross national income and of the Index of Economic Freedom were also reduced compared to the previous year of 2013. A high level of inflation with the value of 12,2% was added to those factors[44].

9.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

The curve of the SFI of the IDL increased in 2013 and value was recorded with 0,894 points, which was the lowest indicator within the mentioned period, whereas it declined even more to 0,799 points in 2014. The decline of the SFI was caused by humanitarian crisis, migration processes alongside with military conflict in southeastern regions of Ukraine *(Adamczyk 2014; WHO Regional Office for Europe 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; GHA Report 2015).*

During this period, the SFI was affected by the value of the Human Development Index, according to which Ukraine took the 83th place out of 187 countries with estimated value of 0,734 points in 2013 and it was respectfully ranked the 81st place out of 188 countries with 0,747 points in 2014. The Human

[43] The source of the data is the official site of the Ministry of foreign Affairs of Ukraine «Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013,
Eastern Partnership: the way ahead http://mfa.am/u_files/file/Declaration_29112013.pdf

[44] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (10.04.2016).

Development Index increased from 0,668 to 0,747 points within the time span of 2000-2014 *(UNDP HDR 2014, 2015)*.

The overall level of unemployment was reduced to 7,2% in 2013 compared to the years of 2009-2012 which had positively affected the SFI. The overall level of unemployment was risen by 0,5%, but generally remained low compared to 2009-2011.

9.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

The curve of the EdFI of the IDL was stable and was recorded with positive trends. This was mainly stipulated with the implementation of international and European obligations in the field of education.

A number of structural and functional reforms were made to improve the efficiency of the Ukrainian education system. They were fixed by changes in the laws[45] on "About Education", "About Higher Education", "About Vocational and Technical Education", "About general secondary education", "About Preschool Education", "About out-of-school education". All the abovementioned facilitated the processes aimed at effectively regulating the development and implementation of educational policies in preschool education, general secondary education, non-formal education, technical and vocational education, higher education, postgraduate education, doctoral and self-education levels.

[45] See Закон України "Про освіту" (Відомості Верховної Ради УРСР (ВВР), 1991, № 34, ст. 451) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1060-12; Закон України "Про вищу освіту" (Відомості Верховної Ради (ВВР), 2014, № 37-38, ст.2004) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1556-18/page; Закон України "Про професійно-технічну освіту" (Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1998, № 32, ст. 215) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/103/98-%D0%B2% D1% 80; Закон України "Про загальну середню освіту" (Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1999, № 28, ст.230) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016at: http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/ 651-14; Закон України "Про дошкільну освіту (Відомості Верховної Ради України" (ВВР), 2001, № 49, ст.259) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon4.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/2628-14; Закон України "Про позашкільну освіту" (Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 2000, № 46, ст.393) {Із змінами}. Accessed on 18.04.2016 at: http://zakon3.rada.gov. ua/laws/show/1841-14.

According to the estimation of "Global Competitiveness in Higher Education and Training" subindex of the World Economic Forum, Ukraine took the 43 th place among 148 countries in 2013-2014, 40th place among 144 countries in 2014-2015 and 34th place among 140 countries in 2015-2016 *(The World Economic Forum 2013, 2014, 2015).* According to the estimation of "Health and Basic Education" subindex, Ukraine occupied the 62nd place among 148 countries in 2013-2014, 43rd place among 144 countries in 2014-2015, 45th place among 140 countries in 2015-2016 *(The World Economic Forum 2013, 2014, 2015)*. In accordance with the ranking of the EdFI, Ukraine took the 84th place in 2013/2014, 76th place in 2014/2015 and 79th place in 2015/2016 (*The World Economic Forum 2013, 2014, 2015)*.

The indicators of Human Capital Index of "Education" subindex registered the trends of the educational reforms as well as development of knowledge-based economy. According to this, Ukraine was ranked 45th place out of 122 countries. Positive changes of the EdFI registered in 2015 were of high importance in the data of Human Capital Index, according to which Ukraine took the 31th place out of 124 countries.

Reforms[46] of a higher educational system implemented within the scope of the Bologna process continued to be carried out in the country during 2013-2014. They were directed to the internationalization and integration of Ukrainian universities into the European higher education area, improvement of the current state of the educational system and process of defining future strategic priorities for 2013-2014 *(The European Higher Education Area 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013)*.

During the observed period, Ukraine was a country with high level of human development due to Human Development Index (HDI) education component.

[46] See the official site of the European Higher Education Area at: http://www.ehea.info/article-details.aspx?ArticleId=86 (13.06.2016), http://www.ehea.info/country-details.aspx?countryId=48 (13.06.2016).

9.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

The curve of the HFI of the IDL increased with value of 0,459 points registered in 2013 and on the contrary decreased with 0,429 points in 2014. The indicator recorded in 2013 was the lowest one within the mentioned period of 1995-2014.

The radical changes happened in Ukraine, namely ethno-political conflict, war, humanitarian crisis, migration, severance of economic ties and a state of a blockade had a negative impact on the assessment of population health indicators in 2013-2014. Socio-economic and political developments shifted the attention and formed an improper attitude towards healthcare problems that were directly and indirectly related with the genesis of noncommunicable diseases. New challenges significantly damaged the socio-economic status of the population, who were in fact deprived of a constitutionally guaranteed right of access to medical and first aid services for all citizens.

Insufficient state budget funding, healthcare services being inaccessible and unaffordable for the population, the absence of mandatory medical insurance system, unequal distribution of hospitals as well as modern medical technologies are serious impediments for the Ukrainian healthcare system.

The implementation of the events aimed at the prevention, early detection and treatment of widely spread non-infectious diseases are crucial for Ukraine in the future relations with the World Health Organization (WHO). According to WHO data, mortality rate of non-infectious diseases among the population is about 86% in Ukraine. Therefore, it had continued to widely promote the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases in 2013-2016. For this purpose the implementation of the "European Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases 2012–2016" and "Health 2020" a new concept of European health policy were undertaken[47] *(WHO Regional Office for Europe 2012a, 2012b)*.

[47] See the official site of the World Health Organiation Regional Office for Europe at: http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-policy/health-2020-the-european-policy-for-health-and-well-being/about-health-2020 (12.06.2016).

The major factors of the healthcare policy of Ukraine are: improvement of basic health indicators and life quality in general, increase of a healthy life expectancy and decrease of mortality rates, disease-related complications and diseases that contributed to disability together with the establishment of epidemiological system. The development and implementation of strategic plans and management of risk factors in the healthcare system are of great importance for the country in question. An effective healthcare policy will help to prevent the development of diseases. In this regard, it is important to implement the work funded by WHO and the government of Ukraine not only in Kiev but in six more regions, such as Dnepropetrovsk, Poltava, Vinnitsa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankovsk and Kharkov.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the draft on the "concept of the new healthcare system" developed by the Ministry of Health[48]. The concept aimed to improve the regulatory system, to solve the main structural-functional issues of healthcare system, to raise the indicator of average life expectancy at birth, to fight effectively to reduce indicators of mortality and disability as well as to eliminate main causes of a disease emergence and its further spreading[49]. Healthcare system reforms, carried out by the Kiev city state administration played an important role in the improvement and optimization of the level healthcare in the city[50].

The national strategy of the healthcare system reform developed by the Ministry of Health of Ukraine positively influenced on improvement of the performance of the HFI of the IDL in 2014. *(Стратегічна дорадча група 2014a, 2014b)*.

[48] The source of the data is the official site of the Ministry of Health in Ukraine. The draft on "concept of the new health care system approved by the Cabinet of Ministries in Ukraine. Accessed on 23.04.2016 http://www.moz.gov.ua/docfiles/Pro_20140527_0_dod.pdf.

[49]The source of the data is the official site of the Ministry of Health in Ukraine.Пояснювальна записка до проекту розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України "Про схвалення Концепції нової системи охорони здоров'я". Accessed on 23.04.2016. http://www.moz.gov.ua/ua/portal/Pro_20140527_0.html.

[50] See the official site of the Kiev city state administration at: http://health.kievcity.gov.ua/content/statystyka.html (23.04.2016)

9.6 Development Trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Ukraine in the time span between 1995-2014*



Figure 3 shows Indices of Democracy Level of Ukraine within 1995-2014 and according to them, the IDL went on decreasing in 2013-2014. In the observed period, The IDL had a higher indicator of 0,543 in 2013 than the registered indicator of 0,503 points in 2014.

When analyzing Figure 1 and 3 it becomes clear that a decline of the IDL in 2013 was mainly caused by a slight decrease of PFI and EFI as well as EdFI. The decrease of the IDL registered in 2014 was mainly conditioned by the reduced indicators of the PFI, EFI, SFI and HFI. EdFI, which is another factor of the IDL, had a steady growth trend in 2013-2014, but due to unprecedented political and economic tensions it was of minor significance. It is also noticeable that the SFI of the IDL was recorded with much higher indicator in 2013, though it also failed to resolve the current socio-economic difficulties.

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

A comparative analysis of the factors of the IDL shows that deepening of the European integration process, constitutional reforms, presidential, parliamentary and local self-government elections played a limited role in the re-establishment of political stability in 2013-2014. Unceasing diplomatic negotiations and mediation missions conducted for the peaceful settlement of armed conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine have been under way so far. Moreover, unresolved territorial, administrative, cultural and ethno-linguistic differences, intensified after the independence of Ukraine, have persistently had a negative impact on the IDL.

The development and implementation of civiliarchic procedures in the spheres of public life will be of high significance in providing stability and growth of the IDL of Ukraine during the coming years. All those mentioned above will allow to resolve ethnic and political tensions as well as inner conflicts by restoring Ukraine's regional and international reputation.

9.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Ashot Aleksanyan

Within the framework of the research, the regression analysis will illustrate those variables of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors Indices included in the model, which have the most significant influence on the IDL of Ukraine.

The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDLi* and the variable of the Rule of Law.

$$Y' = 0{,}010x_1 + 0{,}280 \text{ (Adj. } R^2=0{,}496),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the Rule of Law) and x_1 is the Rule of Law.

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

The significant correlation has been established between the IDLi and Foreign direct investments (FDI) of the EFI included in the model.

$$Y' = 0{,}017x_2 + 0{,}444 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}332),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the FDI), and x_2 is tFDI (% of GDP).

In Social Factors Index a significant relation was observed between IDLi and Unemployment.

$$Y' = -0{,}018x_3 + 0{,}630 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}157),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from Unemployment), and x_3 is Unemployment.

As a result of regression analysis of Educational Factors Index, a significant correlation was established between IDLi and the variables of HDI Education Index as well as Government expenditure on education.

$$Y' = 1{,}541x_4 - 0{,}673 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}878),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the variable of HDI Education Index) and x_4 is the HDI Education Index:

$$Y' = 0{,}047x_5 + 0{,}238 \text{ (Adj. } R^2 = 0{,}471),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the variable of government spending on education) and x_5 is Government expenditure on education (% of GDP).

To sum up, from the Political Factors included in the model, especially the variable of the Rule of Law has significantly influenced on democracy of Ukraine, and positive change with 1unit will ensure 0,010 unit growth of IDL. The mentioned variable explains 49,6% of the variation of dependent variable.

Foreign direct investments of the EFI also make an influence of the democracy. The growth of FDI by 1% of GDP will provide the growth of the IDLi by 0,017 units by explaining 33,2% of the variation of dependent variable.

In reference with SFI, Unemployment has an impact of the level of democracy and a one unit decrease will result in the IDLi increase with 0,018 units.

As for the EdFI, the growth of HDI Education Index by 0,1 unit, and change of Government expenditure on education by 1% of GDP will assist to the increase

of IDLi by 0,15 and 0,047 units accordingly. In particular, Human Development Index Education Index explains 87,8% of the variation of democracy.

By summarizing aforesaid, regression analysis shows that the Rule of Law, FDI, Unemployment, HDI Education Index, Government expenditure on education along with other factors mostly influence on IDL. HDI Education Index and, somehow, the variable of the Rule of Law have high coefficient of determination from the mentioned factors. They show that the procedures of the rule of law and the key priorities of the state policy for promoting education are of great significance to facilitate civiliarchic reforms in the Ukrainian public sector.

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Abbreviations

CEC	Central Election Commission
CoE	Council of Europe
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EFI	Economic Factors Index
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investments
GDP	Gross domestic product
GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GNI	Gross national income

HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Level
MM	Mass media
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PFI	Political Factors Index
RF	Russian Federation
RU	Republic of Ukraine
UDAR	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform
UN	United Nations
UNA-UPSD	Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian People's Self-Defense
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER 10.
THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) OF MOLDOVA

VAHAN HUNANYAN

Figure 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Health and Educational Factors affecting the Index of Democracy Level of Armenia in the time span between 1995-2014[*]



[*] Source: calculations by the researcher.
The indices of the IDL factors are comparable with each other by the trends only.

Table 1

Indices of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of Moldova in the time span between 1995 and 2014*

Year	PFI	EFI	SFI	EdFI	HFI	IDL
1995	0,461	0,119	0,508	0,796	0,395	0,406
1996	0,554	0,218	0,516	0,802	0,458	0,479
1997	0,559	0,319	0,519	0,642	0,412	0,485
1998	0,575	0,417	0,532	0,641	0,317	0,508
1999	0,542	0,250	0,484	0,479	0,221	0,418
2000	0,517	0,383	0,504	0,475	0,268	0,449
2001	0,490	0,434	0,523	0,504	0,293	0,459
2002	0,446	0,523	0,542	0,544	0,370	0,479
2003	0,472	0,535	0,560	0,540	0,371	0,494
2004	0,471	0,494	0,584	0,623	0,389	0,497
2005	0,468	0,610	0,601	0,654	0,430	0,536
2006	0,481	0,602	0,640	0,679	0,518	0,555
2007	0,495	0,728	0,696	0,728	0,542	0,608
2008	0,470	0,698	0,785	0,726	0,584	0,604
2009	0,405	0,445	0,814	0,803	0,660	0,530
2010	0,542	0,506	0,786	0,778	0,655	0,597
2011	0,566	0,612	0,813	0,745	0,592	0,627
2012	0,568	0,631	0,854	0,731	0,677	0,645
2013	0,563	0,659	0,872	0,705	0,590	0,640
2014	0,557	0,613	0,879	0,679	0,614	0,626

* Source: calculations by the researcher.
The EFI, SFI, HFI, EdFI and the indices of certain years estimated in accordance with IDL may have a slight difference in comparison to the indices of the corresponding years estimated in the previous publications in the result of updated data, the insertion of new data and the change of minimum and maximum indices.

10.1 Political Factors Index (PFI)

The period of relative stability, gained as a result of 2012 presidential elections won by the candidate Nicolae Timofti was largely preserved in Moldova in 2013 and 2014. However, the polarization of the society on the country's geopolitical orientation aggravated during the observed period. The PFI undertook a certain decline in 2013-2014 caused by the growth of Civil disobedience and the deterioration of Press Freedom (see Figure 1, Table 1). In 2013-2014 Moldova successfully completed the negotiations by signing the Association Agreement as well as obtaining visa-free regime with the EU and all these achievements have been registered as an essential success of the country's foreign policy. Meanwhile, phenomena such as corruption of the judicial system, the gradually increasing influence of various wealthy businessmen in the country's political life haven't been eliminated so far despite the reforms launched in the country *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 2)*. In addition, Moldova was again faced with the problem of the efficiency of the governing system, since there were serious tensions in the ruling coalition in the first half of 2013.

According to the scandalous story revealed in January 2013, an illegal hunting was held in the national park near the border with Romania in December 2012 attended by high-ranking officials of Moldovan judicial sector, including the Prosecutor General and a number of businessmen. One participant was accidentally killed during that event. Prime Minister Vlad Filat strongly criticized Prosecutor General Valeri Zubko for his participation in the hunting who was also accused of an attempt to cover up the incident. As a result, V. Zubko resigned from the post. Pro-European coalition government known as the Alliance for European Integration comprising the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and the Liberal Party (LP) and the Democratic Party (DP) collapsed due to further tensed events. The LP appointee Prosecutor General's resignation from the office was viewed as a hostile act by the Liberal Party and consequently, the LP accused the Prime Minister from the LDP of the corruption. The Liberal and Democratic Parties initiated the vote of no-confidence in the government, which was succeeded thanks to the support of

the opposition Communist Party, and Moldova's Constitutional Court barred V. Filat from seeking the position of the Prime Minister again *(Tanas 2013)*. After long negotiations and maneuvers, Iurie Leanca, who was the member of a former Prime Minister's party and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration formed the new government in May 31 (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity 2013), which continued the policy of European integration under the conditions of the rising internal and external resistance. Iurie Leanca's government managed to pre-sign the Association Agreement with the EU in the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership at the end of 2013 and eventually the aforementioned agreement was signed in June 2014.

The parliamentary elections were held on November 30 2014, where parties of European and Eurasian orientation enjoyed almost equal support in the competition among the population of the country. The main competition was between the supporters of the Customs Union integration represented by Socialist and Communist parties of Moldova and the supporters of the ruling European Integration coalition including the Liberal Democratic, Liberal and Democratic Parties. Regardless of the fact, that those pro-European forces received overall majority. Surprisingly, the biggest winner of the election was the Socialist party which participated in the elections for the first time. The position of the Communist Party of Moldova, which for a long time played an essential role in the political life of the country, was greatly undermined and it respectively received two times fewer seats compared to the previous parliamentary elections.

In accordance with the assessment by OSCE /ODIHR observers elections had provided wide choice of political alternative and in general, were well organized. The voters were given the opportunity to "elect their preferred candidates and even the geopolitical aspirations pursued in their campaign." Nonetheless, there were some issues related to media's biasness, technical difficulties in the electronic registration system and the last minute prohibition of a political party's participation *(OSCE/ODIHR 2014)*. The reference has been made in connection with pro-Russian "Patria" (Homeland) party, when the Central Election Commission accused it of the usage of foreign funds to finance its campaign which is prohibited by the laws of the Republic of Moldova *(Ursu and Coalson 2014)*.

However, the exclusion of the party from the electoral process a few days prior the election was perceived as a political decision and the representatives of the EU and Western countries as well as Russia expressed their concerns in this regard *(Całus 2014)*.

Table 2

Ratio of the seats received by the political parties in the parliament of the Republic of Moldova (Parliamentary elections in 2014)[1]

Parties, unions, participants	2014
	Proportional representation
Liberal Party	13
Democratic Party of Moldova	19
Liberal -Democratic Party of Moldova	23
Communist Party of Moldova	21
Socialist Party of Moldova	25
Total	***101***

It should also be noted that although the government had initiated an amendment to the Electoral Code in 2013 with the intention to replace the existing proportional electoral system with a mixed parallel electoral system, the decision was cancelled. The only significant change compared to the previous year was the raising of the threshold for parliamentary elections from 4% to 6% for parties, from 6% to 9% for electoral blocs of two parties, from 9% to 12% for coalitions of three or more parties *(ADEPT 2016)*.

[1] Source: ADEPT (Association for Participatory Democracy). 2014. "Results of the November 30, 2014 Parliamentary Elections." http://www.e-democracy.md/en/elections/parliamentary/2014/results/ (28.03.2016).

Figure 2

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation[2]



Table 3

Ratio of seats by the proportional and majoritarian representation in the parliament of Moldova

Electoral representation	1994	1998	2001	2005	2009	2009	2010	2014
Majoritarian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Proportional	104	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
Total	**104**	**101**	**101**	**101**	**101**	**101**	**101**	**101**

Human rights and freedoms. Since 2010 Moldova has been rated as "partly free" by the Freedom House receiving 3 points for both political rights and civil

[2] The source of the data is ADEPT (Association for Participatory Democracy). 2016. "Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Moldova." http://www.e-democracy.md/en/elections/parliamentary/ (12.03.2016).

liberties[3].

In 2014 the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in June and its conditional entry into force in September of the same year allowed Moldova with the EU support to ensure the development of democracy and the protection of human rights and liberties. But in order to succeed in the mentioned spheres Moldova has to overcome considerable challenges. In comparison with the years when the Communist Party was ruling the country, the freedom of the press and expression has made a significant progress in Moldova. Meanwhile, it should be noted that there was some stagnation in this field and even regression was registered in 2014 which was reflected in the 2 point decline of the index of Press Freedom in Moldova measured by Freedom House[4]. Although freedom of attaining information from the media as well as its diversity is ensured in the country, the issue still remains controversial particularly in reference to media ownership and transparency of their funding sources. In this regard, observers point out that the sector is largely under the control of several business and political groups' interests. There are also some doubts about the independence of Audiovisual Coordination Council that regulates this sector. And despite the government's promises, the draft law ensuring transparency in the sector and disclosing the identity of mass media ownership was not adopted by the Parliament *(European Commission and High Representative 2015).*

Due to particular international assistance the number of NGOs in Moldova has been increased within the last decade reaching to 9135 in 2014. In fact, only a small portion of them is active and is mostly concentrated in the capital. The Strategy for Developing the Civil Society for 2012-2015 was also adopted in Moldova for the purpose of creating a favorable environment for the development of an active civil society that will be able to contribute to the country's democratic progress[5]. Despite the urge to raise local funds for NGOs,

[3] See the official site of the Freedom House at: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (05.03.2016).

[4] See the official site of the Freedom House at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (05.03.2016).

[5] Strategy for Developing the Civil Society for 2012-2015 and the Action Plan for Implementing the Strategy in Moldova. http://www.fhi360.md/docs/MD_Strategy_2012-2015_unofficial_translation_ENG.pdf (05.02.2016).

more than 80% of the funding comes from the outside. A bill according to which taxpayers can direct 2% of their income tax for their preferred NGO was proposed in order to provide local funding for NGOs. Non-governmental organizations are particularly active in the fight against corruption and play a significant role in the drafting and further supervision of the legislation of this field *(Freedom House 2015a, 445)*. The National Participation Council that allows the NGOs to take part in the government meetings was created to make the civil society's voice heard. Although according to the surveys the level of confidence in NGOs is not high and measures only 25% (this result is comparable to level of confidence of some public institutions), the negative attitude towards them is milder and measures 41% compared, for example, with 74% expressed towards political parties *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 23-24).*

The corruption-related issues and the independence of the judiciary system remain problematic in Moldova. The reforms of this sector have been prioritized by the government and hence the Justice Sector Reform Strategy for 2011-2016[6] was correspondingly adopted. The EU strongly supported the efforts to implement the judicial reform and the sum of 60 million euros provided by the EU as a direct financial support is bigger than money provided tothe Balkan candidate countries (*Gamurari and Ghinea 2014)*. One of the measures applicable in the sector within the scope of the reforms is the termination of judges' immunity under the suspicion of their involvement in corruption-related cases as well as the introduction of new tests to be taken by professional judges. As a result, 140 judges out of 420 left their position in 2009. The judge was convicted of corruption in April 2014, which was an unprecedented fact *(Secrieru and Sobják 2014)*. Before 2013 the salaries of judges were the lowest in Moldova amongst the member states of the Council of Europe. The 100% raise of the salary in 2013 was one of the most important steps aimed at resolving the issue. Moreover, the salary was increased for more than 100% in 2014. A 10% raise is also expected in 2015-2016 (each year) *(Legal Resources Centre from Moldova 2014)*.

[6] Justice Sector Reform Strategy for 2011-2016 http://www.justice.gov.md/public/files/file/reforma_ sectorul_justitiei/srsj_pa_srsj/SRSJru.pdf (03.04.2016).

According to a study conducted by the International Commission of Jurists and the Soros fund, the reform process initiated in the sector by the government has been the most ambitious in the decades however the implementation of laws and initiatives remains major challenge (*International Commission of Jurists 2013)*. The division of important positions in the justice sector between the ruling political parties hinders the efforts to reform the sector, and as stated earlier in 2013, the scandal connected with the Prosecutor General the Liberal Party appointee led to a crisis in the government.

The prosecution service of Moldova vested with wide powers hasn't undergone any fundamental reforms since the independence and there is an ongoing struggle between various political forces to gain control over it. Although the concept of reforming the judicial system was adopted by the Parliament, the legislative changes for its implementation were not discussed by the Parliament as of 2014 *(Legal Resources Centre from Moldova 2014)*.

The reform of the Ombudsman Institute aimed to bring it in line with the Paris Principles is progressing slowly. A new law on the Ombudsman[7] was adopted by the Parliament in April 2014. However, a new ombudsman failed to be elected because of the lack of consensus *(European Commission 2015)*.

***Civil disobedience**[*]*. In the years 2013-2014 incidents of civil disobedience were mainly connected with the foreign political orientation of the country and were mostly caused by competition of pro-Russian and pro-European forces. It should be noted that the freedom of assembly in Moldova is regulated by the law[8] adopted in 2008, which is quite progressive in its nature.

[7] "Law on the People Advocate (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Moldova" of 3 April 2014// http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2015)018-e (10.04.2016).

[*] Civil disobedience is a part of the "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" variable of PFI and is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was chosen for their assessment, where 0 is the value for the highest number of unrest and pressure, including coup d'état and revolution and 5 is the total absence of those in question.

[8] "Law on assembly Nr. 26." from 22.02.2008 // http://lex.justice.md/ru/327693/ (10.04.2016).

Taking advantage of the differences in the ruling coalition, the Communist Party which was in office during 2001-2009, was striving to regain power. The former President and the leader of the Communist Party Vladimir Voronin announced the start of the Velvet Revolution in July 2013. The aims were the following: Iurie Leanca's resignation by the autumn and the holding of new parliamentary elections, after which the Communists hoped to return to power *(Lenta.ru. 2013).* The biggest action taken by the Communist party toward achieving abovementioned goals was the organization of the demonstration comprising 15,000 people in the second half of November in Chisinau, but the opposition resorted to no further serious actions. Moreover, the demonstration was also held under the calls to join the Customs Union. Two weeks prior to this event, the government in its turn organized a rally of 50,000 people to support of the country's European orientation *(Nielsen 2013)*.

On of the important events in the life of country in 2014 was referendum held in Gagauzia autonomous region of Moldova, where 98,4 % of voters supported closer integration with the Customs Union and 97,2% voted against deeper European integration. 98,9% voted in favour of the declaration of independence of Gagauzia, if Moldova lost its independence and sovereignty (taking into account the possible unification with Romania). The Moldovan authorities had initially declared the referendum illegal and even a criminal case was opened against the organizers of referendum (*RFE / RL's Moldovan Service 2014*).

Small-scale protests of various types were held by the representatives of both Eurasian and European orientation on a continuous basis during 2014 *(RFE/RL's Moldovan Service 2014b)*. In this regards, the demonstrations in October were more or less a prominent event, as the opposition members temporarily blocked the entrance of the Constitutional Court, when the latter was in the process of making a decision on the constitutionality of the Association Agreement with the EU *(Freedom House 2015b)*.

Demonstrations were anticipated after the parliamentary elections in 2014 as the pro-Russian "Patria" party was barred from participating a few days prior to the elections, alsoonly five polling stations were opened in the Russian Federation despite the fact that many thousands of Moldovan voters live there. Yet the post-election process was quite peaceful. The Security Service of Moldova arrested a

group of people, who by policemen claimings had a plan to instigate violence after the elections and had weapons and a certain amount of money in their possession (*Ursu and Robert 2014*). The appeal made by opposition parties to declare the election results invalid was rejected by the Constitutional Court and the results were respectively confirmed *(Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova 2014).*

In regards to other variables included in the PFI, it should be noted that during the observed years of 1995-2014 the highest result of the index of political stability with 46,45 points was registered in 2013, but it declined with more than 4 points the next year. In reference to the index of the Rule of Law, it increased by about 4 points in 2014 compared to 2013[9]. The index of the Global Gender Gap of Moldova was reported with a rapid improvement in 2014 by being placed from 52nd to 25th position. The country has achieved a great result especially in the subindex of women's economic participation and opportunity by taking the 11th place in 2014. Moldova was ranked relatively low in the subindex of political participation, which is typical of the most post-Soviet countries[10]. To provide gender equality, Moldova adopted a law "On ensuring equal opportunities for men and women" in 2006 aimed at "ensuring the exercise by women and men of their equal rights in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other spheres of life guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova"[11]. Another step to achieve equality between men and women in the country was adoption by the government the National Programme on Ensuring Gender Equality during 2010-2015[12]. Corruption Perceptions Index of Moldova declined 0,1 points in 2013 compared to the previous year, yet it remained unchanged in 2014. As a result, the

[9] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx# reports (20.03.2016).
[10] See the official site of the WEF GGI at: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/ economies/#economy=MDA (20.03.2016).
[11] "Law N5 of 09.02.2006 on ensuring equal opportunities for men and women" // http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=328234&lang=2 (20.03.2016).
[12] "Decision No. 933 of 31.12.2009 regarding the approval of the National Programme on Ensuring Gender Equality during 2010-2015
// http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=333441&lang=2 (20.03.2016).

country was ranked as number 103 out of 175 countries[13]. It should be pointed out that, when new Pro-European coalition came to power in 2009, in Corruption Perceptions Index Moldova ranked as 89th out of 180 countries[14]. According to many observers, corruption has been one of the main national concerns and to succeed on the European integration path, the country has to overcome it. The Moldovan parliament approved the National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2011-2015 to solve the matter[15]. Two main institutions have been involved in the fight against corruption: the National Anti-Corruption Center (NAC), whose prototype was created by the former President V.Voronin, and the National Integrity Commission (NIC), a new institutional body that was established as part of the visa liberalization conditions with the EU in order to deal with the politician's and officials' conflicts of interests and to verify the declarations of income. However, the effectiveness of these anti-corruption bodies suffers because of the ambiguity of the legislative framework regulating the sector, insufficient funding and toolkits. In addition, critics state that the majority of corruption cases target the low and mid-level officials *(Gamurari and Ghinea, 2014)*. The main anti-corruption body - the National Anti-Corruption Center, regardless of the EU calls, is still accountable to the government, but not to the parliament, which is incompatible with international anti-corruption standards *(European Commission 2015)*. The largest incident of corruption in recent years took place in November 2014, when $ 1 billion dollars, equivalent to 12% of Moldova's GDP, went "missing" from three major banks in Moldova *(Kottasova 2015)*. The Prime Minister during 2009-2013 years Vlad Filat was charged with connection to the affair and was arrested after his immunity was revoked by the Parliament. This story with the "lost" money posed a serious blow to the international image of Moldova as well as it gave rise to fervent anti-government demonstrations (*RFE/RL's Moldovan Service 2015*). Thus, the data of the analysis show (see Figure 1, Table 1) that the PFI was slowly declining in 2013-2014. In fact, the registered stability and the PFI growth after

[13] See the official site of Transparency International at: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results ; http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results (05.02.2016).
[14] See the official site of the Transparency International Anti-Cooruption Centre at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009 (05.02.2016).
[15] "Decision Nr. 154 of the Parliament of Republic of Moldova for approval the 2011-2015 National Anti-Corruption Strategy of 21.07.2011 // http://lex.justice.md/ru/340429/ (05.02.2016).

overcoming the crisis of 2009 and pro-European forces coming to power, ended. This was primarily due to the polarization of the society over the issue of European versus Eurasian orientation, and the inability of the government to overcome differences within coalition and implement effective reforms, especially in the justice and anti-corruption spheres. The decline of the PFI in 2013-2014 was mainly conditioned by the growth of civil disobedience, stagnation or regression in the processes aimed at enhancing fight against anit- and strengthening Press Freedom.

10.2 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

Moldova's economy has grown significantly in recent years. Thus, the value of GNI per capita increased more than two times in 2014 compared to 2007[16]. At the same time, it should be noted that economic growth is quite unstable with sharp ups and downs. For instance, in 2012 0,7% decline caused by the decrease of exports to the EU and 22,3% decline in agriculture due to bad weather conditions was followed with the 9,4% growth of GDP in 2013GDP growth of 9, underpinned by a record-breaking harvest. Again, in 2014 a slow agricultural growth had its impact on the growth of GDP, which was more modest - 4,6%. In addition, difficult economic conditions of Moldova's trade partners and restrictions imposed by Russia also made a bad impact *(World Bank Group 2015)*.

Overall, the Moldovan economy is highly impacted by international economic developments, unstable political system and climate change, since agriculture plays a crucial role.

Thanks to efficient fiscal policy of the government of Moldova in recent years the budget deficit has been significantly reduced. 5,9% of budget deficit registered in 2009 was decreased to 1,8% in 2013-2014 *(World Bank Group 2015)*.

[16] See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD (05.02.2016).

4.6% inflation was registered in 2013 and 5,1% respectively in 2014, which is a significant improvement in comparison with 7,5% registered in 2010-2011 and in particular with more than 12% growth of inflation on average in 2003-2008[17].

The government of Moldova is seeking to replace the economic growth model developed since independence based on the consumption through remittances from labour migrants to a model based on foreign and domestic investment, as well as export-oriented industries *(National Bank of Moldova 2015)*. Although 0.8% growth was registered in 2014 in terms of foreign direct investment, the level of the investment was significantly lowered after the global economic crisis and their previous volumes have not been recovered yet (in 2014 FDI comprised 4,4% of GDP in contrary to 12,2% of GDP registered in 2007[18]).

The decline in trade continued for 2013 and 2014. The bans imposed by Russia against Moldovan wines and fruit in 2013 were the main reasons because Russian market was responsible for 43% of Moldovan agricultural exports *(Puiu 2014)*.

Moldova has high expectations in regards to Association Agreement (AA) including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. The AA was signed in June 2014 and provisionally entered into force in September of the same year. It has been expected that agreement will increase trade with the EU, create more competitive business environment and bring foreign investments.

Since 2008 the EU has been providing Moldova with the so-called "Autonomous trade preferences" which allows most of the goods with the exception of certain category of agricultural products produced in Moldova to be exported to the EU on duty-free basis. Given the restrictions established by Russia, the EU has enabled duty free import of Moldovan fruit into the single market with quotas and annulled the quotas on imports of Moldovan wine. As a result, exports to the EU grew by 20% in 2014, while imports from the EU rose by 3% only, which enabled Moldova to reduce to an extent the negative foreign trade balance with the EU *(European Commission 2015)*. It is noteworthy to mention that the EU has significantly increased financial support for the country especially after

[17] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG (05.02.2016).

[18]See the official site of the World Bank at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS (05.02.2016).

pro-European government came to power in 2009. Through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 482 million euros were allocated for Moldova from 2007 to 2013 and it is the largest support per capita among the Eastern Partnership countries. In addition, the EU played a key role in providing grants and loans for Moldova equivalent to 1,9 billion euros during the donors' conference in 2010 *(Kostanyan 2016)*.

The Index of Economic Freedom of Moldova was registered with a positive growth of 1,8 points in 2013, but in 2014 the growth slowed down to 0,2 points. The country has been rated as mostly unfree. Moldova received high scores in fiscal and trade freedom areas, whereas low scores were obtained for freedom from corruption and labour freedom areas[19]. It can be assumed from Figure 1 and Table 1 that in EFI's second largest value since 1995 was recorded in 2013. Nonetheless, a substantial regress was registered the next year mainly due to inflation, reduction of domestic credits and trade volumes. But, it can be argued, that the EFI overcame difficult period which appeared as a result of the global economic crisis.

10.3 Social Factors Index (SFI)

Moldova, described by many observers as the poorest country in Europe, made distinctive progress in terms of overcoming poverty challenges in the last decade and accordingly, 30,2% of people living below the poverty line registered in 2006 decreased to 12,7% in 2013. Thus, Moldova has exceeded its commitment to have a maximum of 20% of poverty addressed by the Millennium Development Goals. This was successfully stipulated by the economic growth, migrants' remittances and targeted social assistance provided by the government (*UNDP in Moldova 2016*). In this regard, the problem is the fact that 84% of the poor population lives in rural areas *(UNDP in Moldova 2014)*.

An extensive system of social protection operates in Moldova and the costs intended to improve this sphere are quite large and a significant growth was

[19] See the official site of Heritage Foundation at: http://www.heritage.org/index/country/moldova (09.02.2016).

registered in the last decade from 9% of GDP in 2003 to 13% of GDP in 2013 *(World Bank Group 2015)*.

The unemployment rate has been continuously decreasing in the country since 2011 and reached to 3,4% in 2014, which has been the lowest figure registered since 1995. It should be noted that a considerable number of the working age population has been employed abroad, thus this fact resulted to a considerable reduction of the number of unemployed in the country. According to the International Labour Organisation, 25% of the Moldovan working age population will work abroad for some period of their lives. Labour migrants' remittances amounting to 24% of GDP in 2014 *(ILO in Moldova 2016)* are of essential importance to improve the social situation in Moldova. Russia is the main destination for Moldovan labour migrants- more than 68% of their total number went there in 2014 *(Lupusor et al., 2015, 22)*.

The real wage increased in 2013, but a slight decline was recorded the next year [20]. In years 2013-2014 the situation in Moldova has also improved in terms of social equality with the reduction of Gini index[21].

Analysis of the data (see Figure 1, Table 1) denotes that the SFI have experienced some increase both in 2013 and in 2014 and therefore, it had a positive influence on the IDL respectivelyduring the observed period.

10.4 Educational Factors Index (EdFI)

Studying Moldova's educational sphere, it can be stated that the total net enrollment in educational institutions is quite high. The enrollment rate expressed in the percentage amounted to 80,6% in preschool, 87,9% in elementary, 77,2% in secondary and 41,3%, in higher education institutions according to data accumulated for the year of 2013[22]. The fall of the enrollment rate in secondary

[20] See the official site of National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova at: http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ru&idc=263&id=2193 (12.03.2016).
[21] See the official site of National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova at: http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ru&idc=263&id=2193 (12.03.2016).
[22] See the official site of UNESCO Institute of Statistics at: http://data.uis.unesco.org/# (12.03.2016).

and higher education institutions in comparison with the preschool and elementary education levels can be accounted for the fact that many leave the country to study in EU countries, especially Romania, the country that has ethnic similarity with Moldova *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 22)*.

For years, Government expenditure on education has been quite high, but a certain decline had been reported during the last two or three years. In particular, equivalent of 9,5% of GDP was allocated for education sector in 2009, then it was reduced to 7,5% in 2014, which is still a significant result and one of the highest in Europe[23]. According to the Global Competitiveness Report, the quality of the Moldovan educational system is quite low, ranking as 103rd out of 144 countries *(World Economic Forum 2014)*. The Education Code of the Republic of Moldova aimed at solving problems of the education sector was adopted after long discussions in 2014[24]. Within the context of the Bologna process and European integration framework, its main goal is set to modernize the education system, to promote lifelong learning, to connect the educational system with the labor market, to create an effective system of education quality evaluation and etc.,. The funds assigned for research and development in recent years amounted to only 0.4% of GDP, thus, the sector was registered with low results *(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, 22)*.

The brain drain is one of the major challenges for the country in questions. Siginificant portion of qualified specialists leave for Russia or the EU countries as average salaries are much higher there. In the "Country's capacity to attract talent" index measured by the World Economic Forum Moldova was assessed with 1,88 points out of 7,21 *(Lupusor et al. 2015, 31)*.

The value of HDI (Human Development Index) Education Index (HDI.ed) registered decline of 0,003 points in 2012 compared to the previous year and it has remained unchanged since[25].

[23]See the official site of UNESCO Institute of Statistics at: http://data.uis.unesco.org/# (12.03.2016).
[24] Education Code of the Republic of Moldova No. 152 dated July 17, 2014 http://lex.justice.md/ru/355156/ (23.01.2016).
[25] See the official site of the United Nations Development Programm, Human Development Reports at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/education-index (23.01.2016).

By studying Figure 1 and Table 1 it becomes clear that EdFI has been continuously decreasing since 2009. This has been mainly caused by the reduction of the sums allocated for the educational sector.

10.5 Health Factors Index (HFI)

The amount equivalent to a 10.1% of GDP was assigned by the government to health sector in 2013 which was 1,8% less compared to the previous year. In 2014 Health expenditures have been slightly increased amounting to 10,3%[26] of GDP. The portion of public spending on health in total health expenditure amounted to 51,4%, while the "out of pocket" spending from population amounted to 38,4%[27].

Life expectancy has been annually growing in Moldova with the 71,5 years in 2014[28]. There is a considerable difference between the genders in terms of life expectancy indicator: 67,4 years for men and 75,7 years for women[29].

According to the World Bank an introduction of mandatory health insurance is the greatest achievement of the health system in Moldova which entailed the result that about 85% of the population has been insured. Although the mortality rate among young age groups has been decreased, an increase in cases of adult male mortality has been recently registered. Moreover, alcohol and smoking, unhealthy diet and obesity are serious issues of public health *(World Bank Group 2015)*. The government approved the National Public Health Strategy[30] at the end of 2013, which aimed at finding solutions to the current problems in the health sector.

[26] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (23.01.2016).
[27] See the official site of the World Bank, World Development Indicators: Health systems http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.15# (23.01.2016).
[28] See the official site of the World Bank at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (23.01.2016).
[29] See the official site of the World Bank ,Women in development // http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.5 (23.01.2016).
[30] "Decree Nr. 1032 on the approval of the National Public Health Strategy for 2014-2020 dated on 20.12.2013; http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=350833&lang=2 (23.01.2016).

It can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 that the HFI had a deep regress in 2013, but a certain growth was registered in 2014, which was significantly low in comparison with the indicator in 2012. This was conditioned by inconsistency and fluctuations of the sums allocated to health sector.

10.6 Development trends of the Index of Democracy Level

Figure 3

Index of Democracy Level of Moldova in the time span between 1995-2014*



Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of IDL of Moldova within 1995-2014. The diagram shows that the IDL of Moldova has been increasing since 2010, registering the highest value in 2012, however it went into a decline in 2013 and 2014.

From analyisis of Table 1, it it becomes clear that the small decline of the IDL in 2013was conditioned by the political, educational and health factors, whereas economic and social factors had a positive effect on it. Although in 2014 health factors' dynamic of growth was positive and social factors also registered modest

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

progress, it was not enough to balance the downturn of the political, educational and particularly economic factors and hence, the IDL continued to decline.

Of course, the fall of political factors has not been significantand there is no need to talk about a serious setback in this area. But the growing polarization of society on the issue of geopolitical choice as well as incapacity of coalition governments to implement irreversible reforms in a number of key areas or a delay of these reforms pose a serious challenge for the democratization of Moldova. This study shows that economic factors hence IDL as well, are greatly dependent on external impulses. This can be proved by the fact, that in 2013 the great progress was registered due to the unprecedented growth in agriculture stipulated by the favorable weather conditions alongside with the advantages provided by the EU. However, a decline in the agricultural growth, trade restrictions imposed by Russia and a crisis in the Ukraine led to a significant decline of economic factors, thereby causing the fall of the IDL. Educational factors have been declining after 2009 due to the continuous reduction of the sums allocated to this sector.

10.7 Regression analysis of the Index of Democracy Level

Arusyak Aleksanyan, Vahan Hunanyan

Within the framework of the research the regression analysis illustrates the variables of Political, Economic, and Health Factors Indices, which has a significant influence on the IDL of Moldova. The regression results show that there has been a significant correlation between the IDL_i* and variable of the Corruption Perceptions Index:

$$Y' = 0{,}120x_1 + 0{,}200 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}400),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the Corruption Perceptions Index), and x_1 is the Corruption Perceptions Index.

* IDLi is the Index of Democracy Level cleaned from the corresponding variable during every paired regression analysis.

From economic factors, significant correlation has been established between the IDL_i and GNI per capita and Domestic credit:

$$Y' = 0{,}077x_2 + 0{,}454 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}688),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of the GNI per capita), and x_2 is the GNI per capita (1000$).

$$Y' = 0{,}009x_3 + 0{,}238 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}718),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Domestic credit), and x_3 is Domestic credit (% of GDP).

In Social Factors Index a significant relation was observed between IDL_i and Unemployment and Gini index:

$$Y' = -0{,}033x_4 + 0{,}737 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}422),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Unemployment), and x_4 is Unemployment:

$$Y' = -1{,}836x_5 + 1{,}253 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}826),$$

where Y' is the IDLi (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Gini index), and x_5 is GINI index.

As a result of regression analysis of Health Factors the following equations were obtained for Health Factors:

$$Y' = 0{,}041x_6 - 2{,}264 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}719),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Life expectancy), and x_6 is Life expectancy.

$$Y' = 0{,}026x_7 + 0{,}263 \text{ (Adj. } R2=0{,}399),$$

where Y' is the IDL_i (IDL was cleaned from the variable of Health Expenditure), and x_7 is the Health Expenditure (% of GDP).

So, the Corruption Perception Index from the political factors has the most influence on the IDL of Moldova, where one unit positive change will bring to by 0,12 unit change of IDL_i.

From Economic factors GNI and Domestic credit (coefficient of determination reaches to 72%) influence the democracy. The growth of GNI per capita by 1000 USD, and the growth of Domestic credit by 1% of GDP will contribute to the growth of IDL_i by 0,077 and 0,009 units accordingly.

From social factors the Gini index is the most influential, decrease of which by 0,1 unit will bring to the growth of IDL_i by 0,184 units. Gini index has a high coefficient of determination and explains 83% of variation of dependent variables.

From Health Factors, a positive change of the Life expectancy by one year and the growth of Health Expenditure by 1% of GDP will assist to the growth of IDL_i by 0,041 and 0,026 units accordingly.

Regression analysis shows that IDL is mostly influenced by Corruption Perceptions Index, GNI per capita, Domestic credit, Gini index, Unemployment, Life expectancy and Health Expenditure. GNI per capita, Domestic credit, Life expectancy and Gini index have higher coefficient of determination from the factors mentioned above. Consequently, in order to foster the democratic development in Moldova it is required to make efforts aimed at economic development of the country and simultaneously to implement a social policy that will generate a relatively equal distribution of income and the reduction of social polarization as well as undertake such measures in the health sector that will lead to the increase in Life expectancy.

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Abbreviations

EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EFI	Economic Factors Index
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign direct investments
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
HFI	Health Factors Index
IDL	Index of Democracy Lelev
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OSCE/ODIHR	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
PFI	Political Factors Index
SFI	Social Factors Index
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 11.
CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL (IDL) (ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN, RUSSIA, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA)

ARUSYAK ALEKSANYAN

11.1 Comparative Analysis of the IDL

Figure 1

Index of Democracy Level (2014)*



* Source: calculations by the researcher.

According to data obtained for 2014 through the cross-country analysis (see Figure 1, Table 1) all the studied states have maintained their partially free democratic status[1]. Moldova has the highest indicator of the IDL (52,9), followed by Georgia (48,9). Armenia has gained 43,2 points and thus has improved its position in comparison with 2013 and has supassed Ukraine (42,6). The IDL of Belarus and Kazakhstan has also gone up compared with the previous year, which allowed Kazakhstan to gain superior position over Russia. Azerbaijan's index (36,8) remains the lowest and approaches the classification of "non-democratic political system".

Table 1

Comparison of the Index of Democracy Level (2012-2014)*

Countries	2014	Changed compared to 2013	2013	Changed compared to 2012	2012
Moldova	52,9	-0,5	53,4	-0,2	53,6
Georgia	48,9	0,8	48,1	-1,7	49,8
Armenia	43,2	0,7	42,5	-0,6	43,1
Ukraine	42,6	-3	45,6	-2,4	48,0
Belarus	41,9	0,6	41,3	2,5	38,8
Kyrgyzstan	41,0	-	-	-	-
Kazakhstan	40,8	1,1	39,7	0,9	38,8
Russia	39,4	-1,4	40,8	0,2	40,6
Azerbaijan**	36,8	0,1	36,7	-0,4	37,1

Among the studied countries Ukraine has the most severe fall of the IDL compared to the previous year (-3). The decline was caused by a syncronized plunge of all subindices (PFI, EFI, SFI, EdFI, HFI), among which PFI and EFI changes of were the most drastic. Ukraine's IDL for 2012-2014 deteriorated with about 5,4 points decrease. As it has been mentioned above, not only Ukraine but Russia also had a positional change, since its IDL decreased by 1,4 points (see Table 1). The decline was mostly caused by political and to some extent by social factors indices. Indicators of "Conflict Presence", "Political Stability", "Civil Liberties" and some other variables were particularly worsened (see Table 2).

[1] Cross-country index is measured from 0 to 100, according to which states are classified in the following way: 0 – 32 is non-democratic, 33 – 66 is partially democratic, 67 - 100 is democratic.

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

** Azerbaijan's IDL for 2012 and 2013 is adjusted.

Table 2

Values of the main variables of the IDL
(Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Moldova 2014)[2]

Main variables of the Index of Democracy Level	Armenia	Georgia	Azerbaijan	Russia	Belarus	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Ukraine	Moldova
1. Political Stability (0-100)	37,86	35,92	29,13	18,45	51,94	47,57	19,9	6,31	42,23
2. Rule of Law (0-100)	43,75	64,42	30,77	26,44	22,6	34,13	15,87	23,08	46,63
3. Press Freedom (100-0)	61	48	87	83	93	85	67	58	55
4. Political Rights and Civil Liberties (7-1)	4,5	3	6	6	6,5	5,5	5	3	3
5. Corruption Perceptions Index (0-100)	37	52	29	27	31	29	27	26	35
6. Gender Equality (0-1)	0,6622	0,6855	0,6753	0,6927	0,73	0,721	0,6974	0,7056	0,7405
7.Political System (0,1,2)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
8.Majority in the Parliament (0,1,2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
9.Social Unrest and Political Pressure (0-5)	3,5	2,5	1,5	1,8	1,3	2,7	2	0,3	3,6
10.Religion (0,1)	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
11.Conflict Presence (0,1,2)	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	1
12.GNI per capita, $ (PPP)	8450	9080	16920	22160	17610	21710	3220	8560	5500
13.External trade rate (% of GDP)	75	103	70	53	115	65	125	102	120
14.Index of Economic Freedom (0-100)	67,1	73	61	52,1	49,8	63,3	61,3	46,9	57,5
15.Domestic credit (% of GDP)	51,3	48,5	33,8	52,4	42,8	36,6	15,9	109,9	38,9
16.FDI (% of GDP)	3,5	10,0	5,9	1,2	2,4	3,5	2,8	0,6	4,4
17.Inflation (%)	3,0	3,1	1,4	7,8	18,1	6,7	7,5	12,2	5,1
18.Budget proficit/deficit (% of GDP)	-1,8	-3,2	-0,5	-0,5	1,0	-1,2	-0,5	-4,6	-1,8
19.Real wage, $ (PPP)	663	693[a]	723	1047[a]	999	830	478	654	513
20.Unemployment (%)	17,1	13,4	5,2	5,1	5,9	4,1	8,1	7,7	3,4
21. Gini index (0-1)[a]	0,315	0,400	0,337	0,416	0,260	0,264	0,274	0,246	0,285
22.HDI Education index (0-1)	0,701	0,77	0,7	0,78	0,82	0,762	0,656	0,796	0,653
23.Government expenditure on education (% GDP)	2,4	2,0[a]	2,5[a]	4,2[a]	5,0	2,9	6,8[a]	6,7[a]	7,5
24.Life expectancy at birth	74,7	74,7	70,8	70,4	73,0	71,6	70,4	71,2	71,5
25.Health expenditure (% of GDP)	4,48	7,42	6,04	7,07	5,69	4,36	6,48	7,10	10,32

[2] Sources for calculations: *1, 2* - www.govindicators.org, *3, 4* -http://www.freedomhouse.org, *5* - http://www.transparency.org, *6* - http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-gap, 7*, 8, 9, 10, 11* – calculated by the researcher, *12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25*- http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, *14*-http://www.heritage.org/index/, *16* - http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-budget, *19* - http://w3.unece.org/, *22* - http://hdr.undp.org, a –other sources have been used in case of absence of some data for 2014 in the mentioned sources (08.05.16).

In contrast to it, the IDL of Kazakhstan and Belarus had gradually been improving each year since 2012. Belarus' progress, which constituted 3,1 points during the time span from 2012 to 2014 is really significant (see Table 1).

The analysis of subindices of democracy level (see Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and its variables (see Table 2) gives us an opportunity to reveal the factors which has caused democratic processes in the states within the mentioned period of time.

11.2 Political Factors Index (PFI)

Figure 2

Political Factors Index (2014)*



In accordance with data of political factors index of the IDL among the observed states Moldova has maintained its leading role with 55,7 points, and Azerbaijan has remained the last one with its 24,1 points. Armenia (41), compared to the previous year, improved its PFI indicator by 2 points, thus exceeded Ukraine. Kazakhstan has also improved its positions (32,7) by recording increase of PFI by 2,3 points and leaving Russia (28,6) and Belarus (32) behind (see Figure 2). And i *(Aleksanyan 2015, 212)* Belarus has had a 0,7 point progress and Russia's PFI declined by around 3,9 points compared to 2013.

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

Observing seperate variables of the Political Factors Index (see Table 2), it should be mentioned that according to Freedom House report (2015 report includes the events of 2014) the best Political Rights and Civil Liberties indicators were registered in Moldova (3), Georgia (3) and Ukraine (3), and hence countries are classified as "partly free" approaching to the category of "free"[3]. Armenia is also among the "partly free" states having recorded 5 and 4 points in the categories of Political Rights and Civil Liberties correspondingly. However, Armenia is behind the Central Asian and European countries in the sphere of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Meanwhile, examination of EAEU member states experts evaluations show that besides Armenia and Kyrgyz Republic (5), the rest of states (Russia (6), Kazakhstan (5,5) and Belarus (6,5)) are also among "not-free" countries *(Freedom House 2015, 10-11, 21-26)*.

As for Azerbaijan (6), it was also marked as "not-free". Moreover, the unified index of freedom haad a negative trend. This means that freedom restricting phenomena occured in the country, but they were not enough to change the level of the mentioned index. The negative trend was caused by increased pressure on dissent, including arrests of human rights defenders and journalists. In 2014 the number of political prisoners was increased in Azerbaijan. High ranked officials struggled against them in order to neutralize the threat of revolution. And even though repressions and limitations were increasing year by year, Azerbaijan managed to avoid the critisism of democratic world due to its energy sources and cooperation in security issues (*Freedom House 2015, 5, 7, 11*).

According to the data of 2014 index of Political Stability/Absence of violence publicized by the World Bank, Belarus (51,94) was the most politically stable, and Ukraine (6,31) was the most unstable among the studied states. Moreover, that index was reduced by more than 15 points compared to the previous year, and during 2012-2014 it was reduced by 35,4 points due to the events taken place in Maydan and further processes. According to 2013 data, Armenia, which was the most stable state among the studied states, declined by 11,9 points[4]. As for the Rule

[3] Indices of Political Rights and Civil Liberties measured by Freedom House are estimated by 1 to 7 point scale where the states gained 1 to 2,5 points are free, 3 to 5 points are partially free and 5,5 to 7 points are not free.

[4] See World Bank official website
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (12.05.2016).

of Law and Freedom of press[5], the most problematic situation was in Kyrgyz Republic which recorded the lowest result for the first variable and in Belarus which recorded the lowest result for the second one. The best result was recorded in Georgia (see Table 2).

In conformation with the Corruption Perceptions Index of the Transparency International[6] Georgia (52) continues successive implementation of anti-corruption policy[7], meanwhile among the EAEU states Armenia (37) has the highest points. In this regard, the most problematic situation was still preserved in Ukraine (26) among the observed states.

The highest level of Social Unrest[8] was registered in Ukraine (0,3). It began at the end of 2013 and culminated in 2014. The same year was the calmest for Moldova (3,5) and Armenia (3,6) in this regard (see Table 2). In reference to the variable of the Political system of PFI, according to 2014 data only political systems of Georgia and Moldova among the countries under this study are described as those with curtailed presidential powers and expanded parliamentary powers. It should be mentioned that, in Armenia a new model of Constitution was adopted by referendum conducted on December 6, 2015 due to which Armenia's political system should be transformed from semi-presidential to parliamentary. In conformity with adopted amendments the powers of President shall be drastically curtailed in favour of expansion of National Assembly and Prime Minister privileges *(Constitution of the RA ' with 2015 amendments)*. However, the whole package of amendments will come into force after the 2018presidential elections. In this regard, Kyrgyz Republic is somehow distinguished among the observed countries. In 2010 a new Constitution was adopted by referndum according to which the

[5] Index of Press Freedom measured by Freedom House is estimated by the ranking scale from 100 to 1 where the states gained 0 to 30 are free, 31 to 60 are partially free, and 61 to 100 are not free.

[6] Corruption Perceptions Index is measured by Transparency International. The index has the 0-100 ranking scale where 0 point implies the highest level of corruption and effectively 100 points indicates the lowest level of it.

[7] In 2010 in accordance with «Global Corruption Barometer» Georgia was ranked as world's leading with relative decrease temps in the level of corruption.

[8] The variable of "Social Unrest and Political Pressure" is measured by a number of demonstrations, strikes, social unrests, particularly pressures applied against them during a specified span of time. Taking into account the absence of such statistics, relying on the analyses, reports and informative studies carried out by newspapers and research centres, the scaling range of 0-5 was settled for their assessment.

powers of the President were limited and powers of the Parliament and Prime Minister were expanded *(Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic 2010)*. However, in conformity with the standards adopted for the model, Kyrgyzstan's political model was observed as presidential *(Keefer 2012, 3-4)*.

According to the research conducted within the frames of variable of "Majority in the parliament", the best indicators were registered only in Moldova, Ukraine and Kyrgyz Republic in 2014, hence the distribution of seats between authorities and opposition in their parlaments was relatively equal. In the rest of countries, the political party of the head of executive power enjoys an absolute majority in the Parliament, or an absolute majority of deputies who, irrespective of their party affiliation, are followers of pro-President policy.

It is also significant, that all of the observed states, except Belarus and Kazakhastan, have zones of conflict.

11.3 Economic Factors Index (EFI)

Table 3

Economic Factors Index (2014)*



According to data of Economic Factors Index of the IDL, Georgia holds a leading position (45,3), and the result recorded in Ukraine (39,4) yields to the rest of the states (see Figure 3).

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

Georgia's economy after 3,7% reduction in 2009 has been recovered with 5,6% average annual growth during the post-crisis period.

Georgia's economy was quickly recovered after economic crisis in 2009 by growing of 5,6% average per anum. Over the last five years Foreign direct investments has also been quite high (annual average was 17%). The new tax code adopted in 2005 cut taxes and tax rates, expanded the tax base and simplified administration, which significantly influenced on reduction of corruption and promotion of business. Overall, economic and structural reforms carried out in Georgia put the country on a new path of development. As a result, Georgia has significantly improved its position in various international rankings. In 2014 Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the EU (including the agreement to establish Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area)[9]. The latter will enable Georgia to gradually access the EU market without taxes *(EDRC 2015, 6-8).*

According to EFI Georgia is followed by Azerbaijan. And though Azerbaijan's GDP per capita ($17520 adjusted for purchasing power parity items) is almost twice bigger than that of Georgia ($9162) it, however, is ahead due to rates recorded in the spheres of Trade, Foreign Direct Investments and Domestic Credits[10]. Moreover, the highest Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) [11] is recorded in Georgia. In general, it should be mentioned that IEF is an important index for measuring democracy and Georgia and Armenia are distinguished among the observed states. So, Georgia (73) occupies the 11the position, and Armenia (67,1) holds the 23rd position, while Russia (52,1), Belarus (49,8) and Ukraine (46,9) among European 43 states *(Miller, Kim 2015, 72)*.

Among the studied states Russia has the highest GDP per capita ($22989 adjusted for purchasing power parity items), however, the 2014 developments were especially unfavorable for Russian economy. Tensions between Russia and

[9] "The EU's Association Agreements with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine", European Commission MEMO, Brussels, 23 June 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-430_en.htm (10.05.2016).

[10] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (14.05.2016).

[11] The Index of Economic Freedom is measured by The Heritage Foundation. In the model the value of 100 points (max) is estimated as the highest indicator, where 0-49,9 stand for "economically oppressed" countries,50- 59,9 stand for "generally not-free", 60-69,9 "merely free", 70- 79,9 points are for "generally free", and 80-100 points stand for "free". The calculation of the IDL for 2014 was based on the IEF data for 2015 as it comprehends indicators from July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014.

Ukraine and its consequences, the fall of oil prices, capital outflow and devaluation of Russian ruble led to considerable difficulties. At the end of 2014 there were signs of economic crisis in Russia and economic growth rates were noticeably reduced and 2015 was concluded by an economic decline. This fact had some influence on Armenia and other CIS countries *(EDRC 2015, 4)*.

As it has already been mentioned Ukraine has the lowest indicator of EFI. Political events of the last years had their significant influence on economic crisis in Ukraine. However, Ukrainian economy is one of the weakest one in the world and its problems aren't new. Ineffecient management, high level of corruption, shadow economy are great obstacles that has hindered country's development. According to numerous researches nearly all organizations in Ukraine are complaining about high taxes and corruption *(Miller, Kim 2015, 39)*. In accordance with Corruption Perceptions Index it holds the 142nd position among 174 states[12]. At the same time because of attempts to avoid high taxes there has been developed shadow economy, which is according to International Monetary Fund researches is the highest in the world and composes approximately 50% of GDP *(The Economist 2014)*. Speaking about economic decline in 2015 in Ukraine ex Prime Minister A. Yatsenyuk mentioned its major causes. According to him Ukraine was deprived of 20% of its economy after losing Lugansk, Donetsk and Crimea (65 out of 90 Ukrainian mines are located in these areas). Economist Anders Oslund has calculated that the loss of Crimea has resulted in reduction of GDP by 4%, whereas war in Donbass – by 7%. Besides, outflow of investments has caused another 3% reduction of GDP *(Segodnya.ua 2015)*.

[12] See Transparency International official website http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results (14.05.2016).

11.4 Social Factors Index (SFI)

Table 4

Social Factors Index (2014)*



Kazakhstan had the highest indicator of Social Factors Index (58,4) of the IDL in 2014, and Belarus slightly yielded to it (58,3), meanwhile, the lowest results were recorded in Armenia (51,9) and Georgia (50,4).

Both Kazakhstan and Belarus due to effective state policy could overcome particularly social problems that had emerged in the newly independent states. For example, if in 1999 in Belarus and in 2001 in Kazakhastan the poverty level of population was 46,7%, then in 2014 that indicator in Kazakhstan was reduced by about 2,8%, and in Belarus by 4,8%[13]. Observing the indices and dynamics of Unemployment and GINI index in Kazakhastan and Belarus, we can see success of state policy in these spheres as well (see Table 2). However, the correlation coefficient of SFI and EFI of Belarus are higher ($R_{SFI/EFI}$ = 0,9), than the same index of Kazakhstan ($R_{SFI/EFI}$ = 0,6), which allows us to state their close connection as well as introduction of economic development results into the social sphere.

Unlike this states Armenia could not overcome the poverty issue, which reached its culmination in 90s, when more than a half of population was poor. In

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

[13] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC (18.05.2016).

the recent years it was gradually reduced but it still remains one of the highest among the CIS states. In Armenia 30% of population is poor, and 2,3% is extremely poor[14]. Poverty and extreme poverty remain especially high in regions.

Georgia, which had recorded the lowest indicator of the SFI and at the same time having lower global poverty level, couldn't overcome income polarization of society at the beginning of 90s. Among the studied states Georgia and Russia have the highest Gini index. Talking about social problems, it should be mentioned that Georgia, like Armenia, has serious problems linked to unemployment and migration.

11.5 Educational Factors Index (EFI)

Figure 5

Educational Factors Index (2014)*



In 2014 the best EdFI indicators were recorded in Ukraine (62,8), and Armenia (39,7) that held the last place (see Figure 5). The calculation of EdFI is based also on Human Development Index (HDI). According to it Ukraine holds the

[14] Ibid.

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

30th position, and Armenia is on the 63rd place out of 187 states. Among the studied states Belarus holds the leading 21st position. In 2014 mean years of schooling were 11,3 years and expected years of schooling were 15,1 years, wheeas in Armenia it was 10,9 and 12,3 years respectively[15]. Moreover, in Ukraine mean years of schooling were increased by 4,2 years, and expected years of schooling increased by 3,1 years between 1980 and 2014 *(UNDP 2015a, 2-3)*. As for Armenia, its corresponding indicators were increased by 1,7 and 1,6 years in this regard *(UNDP 2015b, 2-3)*.

It should also be noted that the best indicators for gross enrollment in higher education were registered in Belarus (88,9%) and Ukraine (82,3%), and the lowest level of enrollment was in Azerbaijan (23,2%). In Armenia this indicator was equal to 46,6%[16].

Comparative analysis of public spending on education shows that the highest were in Moldova (7,5% of GDP) among the studied countries. In this regard it should be mentioned that Moldovan public spending on education were high for many years though in the pre-crisis year 2009 this indicator was gradually reduced from 9,5 % of GDP to 7,5 % in 2014. But still this result is one of the highest in Europe[17]. The decline of Moldova's EdFI in 2014 and positional change in favor of Ukraine were also conditioned by reduction of these spending compared to the previous year *(Aleksanyan 2015, 216)*.

In Armenia public spending on education was reduced too. Its dynamics shows that in 2013 and 2014 it was gradually reduced by about 1% reaching 2,4 % of GDP in 2014[18]. The latter also caused the decline of EdFI in Armenia by 2,9 points compared to the previous year and caused change of position in favor to Georgia and Azerbaijan *(Aleksanyan 2015, 216)*.

[15] Human Development Index Education Index (HDI-education) is assessed by the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). It is based on two indicators: 1. expected years of schooling (number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child's life, 2.mean years of schooling (average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level).

[16] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR (22.05.2016).

[17] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS (22.05.2016).

[18] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS (19.04.2016).

11.6 Health Factors Index (HFI)

Figure 6

Health Factors Index (2014წ.)*



Moldova has the highest indicator of Health Factors Index (57,9),whereas Kazakhstan has the lowest one (38,2) (see Figure 6).

The greatest achievement of Moldova's health system is the introduction of compulsory health insurance in 2004 due to which over 85% of population is insured now. Despite this, according to World Bank experts, a state like Moldova with such high national incomes and high health expenditure (GDP) has to have more efficient healthcare system *(World Bank 2015, 4)*.

Among the nine mentioned countries Moldova's public spending on education, as well as health expenditure of GDP is the highest reaching to 10,3 of GDP (private and public spending) compared to Kazakhstan's 4,4% of GDP, which is the lowest indicator in this series[19]. Life expectacy indicator in these states is nearly the same. In Moldova it is 71,5 years, increased by 4,8 years during 1995-2014, and in Kazakhstan it is 71,6 years increasing by 6,7 years during the reported period[20]. However, indicator of life expectancy in Kazakhstan is lower compared to

* Source: calculations by the researcher.

[19] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (23.05.2016).

[20] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (23.05.2016).

states with incomes alike *(World Bank Group 2016a, 6).* It should be mentioned that in Kazakhstan the GDP per capita ($24227, adjusted for purchasing power parity items) is the second highest indicator following Russia among the nine states observed, and it's almost five times higher than GDP in Moldova ($4982)[21].

As for Armenia, an essential problem for this sector is the comparatively low level of public spending. In 2014 state health budget was increased by 12% and reached 1,71% of GDP, which is one of the lowest in Europe and Central Asia *(World Bank Group 2016b, 8-9).* And it is noticeable that indicator of life expectacy in Armenia (74,7 years) is the lighest among the studied states. During 1995-2014 it grew by 5,9 years[22].

Conclusions

As a result of the comparative analysis of Political, Economic, Social, Educational and Health Factors of the Index of Democracy Level of nine states observed within the framework of the research we came to the following conclusions:

- Moldova has the highest, and Azerbaijan has the lowest Index of Democracy among the studied countries. If democracy level of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine that had chosen the vector of European integration was higher than those of EAEU member states, than in 2014 Ukraine registered drastic fall thus yielding its position to Armenia.
- Armenia has registered the highest IDL (43,2), followed by Belarus (41,9), Kyrgyz Republic (41) and Kazakhstan (40,8), and Russia registered the lowest level of IDL (39,4) among the EAEU member states.
- In reference to the South Caucasus countries, according to the IDL the countries were distributed as follows: Georgia (48,9), Armenia (43,2), Azerbaijan (36,8).

[21] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD (23.05.2016).
[22] See World Bank official website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN (23.05.2016).

- Comparative analysis of the PFI shows, that:
  - ✓ Elements typical to parliamentary republic prevail in Moldova and Georgia which are distinguished by high indicators of IDL. In this regard, Armenia will join them after the 2018 Presidential elections when the Constitutional amendments will come into force fully.
  - ✓ The distribution of seats between authority and the opposition in parliaments of Ukraine, Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova are almost equal as opposed to other countries. The political party of the head of the executive power or forces assisting him/her made absolute majority of deputies in the rest six countries.
  - ✓ According to the 2014 data, Ukraine was the most politically unstable, corrupted and conflicting. The highest level of social unrest and political pressures were also registered in Ukraine.
  - ✓ Belarus was the most politically stable, but at the same time it has registered the lowest rates of political rights and civil liberties and freedom of press.
- If the interval of the recorded indicators of the PFI of studied states is sufficiently long (st. deviation = 10,6, average = 36,8), then it is vice versa in EFI (St. deviation = 1,8, mean = 42,9) and in EFI (St. deviation = 2,9, mean = 55,3). In fact, the observed nine post-soviet states have completely different levels of development from the viewpoint of political reforms and progress, while they are relatively on the same level from the point of view of economic progress and social situation
- Georgia registered the best EFI and the worst SFI indicators. This means, that in recent years economic, as well as political reforms had a positive impact on country's economic progress but at the same time there is low level of economic progress investment in the social sphere. Ukraine took the last place in regards to EFI which was greatly influenced by the ongoing political processes in the country.
- It is noteworthy to mention a comparative analysis of the Index of Economic Freedom from the variables included in the Index of Democracy Level, according to which Armenia and Georgia recorded high indicators, the average of which was closer to EU indicator (70) and

was higher than global (60,4) European regional (67) averages, whereas the average indicator of EAEU member states Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic was equal to 57 (see Table 1). This means that economy of Armenia and Georgia are liberalized in this regard and are closer to the EU economic system.

To conclude, it's noteworthy to state that despite the different levels of political and socio-economic development and progress in the studied states, all of them have a lot to do towards democratic reforms. The results of IDL of Armenia and states with European integration vector are higher than in EAEU member states and Azerbaijan. The difference between the indicators of Armenia and the rest of the EAEU member states is more significant especially in political sphere. In this regard, Armenia after joining the EAEU integration processes must take steps towards maintaining its comparatively hight rates and leading position in this sphere.

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Abbreviations

EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EdFI	Educational Factors Index
EDRC	Economic Development and Research Centre
EFI	Economic Factors Index
HDI	Human Development Index
HFI	Health Factors Index

IDL	Index of Democracy Level
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom
PFI	Political Factors Index
SFI	Social Factors Index
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INDEX OF DEMOCRACY LEVEL IN THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

(ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN, RUSSIA, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA)

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